nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2022‒07‒25
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. The effects of induced emotions on environmental preferences and behavior: an experimental study By Lisette Ibanez; Sébastien Roussel
  2. Perceived Temperature, Trust and Civil Unrest in Africa By Gabriel Aboyadana; Marco Alfano
  3. Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters? By Hamet Sarr; Mohamed Ali Bchir; François Cochard; Anne Rozan

  1. By: Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Sébastien Roussel (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement)
    Abstract: Communication policies employed by policymakers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often appeal to the emotions to persuade people to adopt virtuous behavior. The aim of this paper is to study the impact of induced emotions on pro-environmental behavior (PEB). We design a three-stage laboratory experiment. In the first stage, we determine the level of the subjects' environmental awareness. In the second stage, subjects read scripts that place them in realistic hypothetical scenarios designed to induce specific emotions. We implement a 2 x 2 in-between design by varying both the valence and social dimension of the four emotional states induced: happiness, sadness, pride and shame. In the third stage, subjects play a modified dictator game in which the recipient is an environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO). We show that the emotional states of subjects can influence PEB. In particular, negative emotions significantly reduce the average individual amount of donations made to ENGOs. We also find that the precise impact of the emotional states is more complex and appears to be dependent on individuals' characteristics and awareness for environmental issues. For instance, in positive emotional states, men donate significantly less than women. In addition, a high level of environmental awareness increases donations in subjects experiencing shame and decreases their likelihood to donate when feeling pride. Also, we observe behavioral consistency for negative emotions and rather compensatory behavior for positive emotions.
    Keywords: Emotions,Happiness,Prosocial Behavior,Dictator game,Educational attainment,Decision making,Experimental economics,advertising
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03352952&r=
  2. By: Gabriel Aboyadana (Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde and School of Education, University of Glasgow); Marco Alfano (Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde and Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, University College London)
    Abstract: This paper documents a significant effect of short-term temperature fluctuations on attitudes towards institutions and on civil unrest in Africa. Combining attitudinal survey and climate data, we calculate temperature as perceived by respondents via an algorithm that combines different meteorological variables. The results show that daily temperature anomalies at the location of interview increase self-reported mistrust in government and intentions to vote for opposition parties. Effects are particularly strong in poor countries where temperature anomalies also increase self-reported intentions to protest. Accordingly, we find that temperature anomalies also increase incidences of protests and riots. Evidence suggests that effects are not driven by changes in agricultural incomes.
    Keywords: Climate, Trust, Conflict
    JEL: D74 Q54 N57
    Date: 2021–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:344&r=
  3. By: Hamet Sarr (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - ENGEES - École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Mohamed Ali Bchir (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - ENGEES - École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); François Cochard (CRESAT - Centre de recherches sur les économies, les sociétés, les arts et les techniques - CRESAT - UR3436 - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar); Anne Rozan (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - ENGEES - École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: We study the "average Pigouvian tax" (APT), an ambient-based policy instrument that requires polluters to cooperate to achieve the social optimum. In this paper, we are interested in the group size variation and its effect of the APT efficiency. Indeed, in the field, the implementation of the instrument will face group sizes that can vary from a few to a large number of farmers. We find that increasing the size of the group reduces cooperation among subjects, thereby reducing the efficiency of the instrument. We also show that when the sucker's cost is lowered, the instrument can converge towards the social optimum.
    Keywords: sucker’s payoff,Size effect,Cooperation,Ambient-based taxes,Nonpoint source pollution
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03662042&r=

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