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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2022‒03‒28
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Aditya Goenka (University of Birmingham [Birmingham]); Lin Liu (University of Liverpool); Manh-Hung Nguyen (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Preliminary evidence indicates that pollution increases the severity and likelihood of COVID-19 infections similar to many other infectious diseases. This paper models the inter-action of pollution and disease preventive actions, either pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical interventions, on transmission of infectious diseases in a neoclassical growth framework. There are two externalities – households do not take into account how their actions affect disease transmission, and productive activity results in pollution which increases the likelihood of in-fections. The disease dynamics are modeled to be of SIS type. We study the difference in health and economic outcomes between the decentralized economy, where households do not internalize externalities, and socially optimal outcomes, and characterize the taxes and subsi-dies that decentralize the latter. Thus, we examine the question whether there are sufficient incentives to reduce pollution, at both private and public levels, once its effects on disease transmission is considered. In competitive outcomes, pollution increases with increased pro-ductivity. The socially efficient outcome has higher pollution than a competitive outcome, despite increase in abatement, as the effect of higher productivity and larger labor supply dom-inates. The results question the hopes of a Green Recovery. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic Pigovian taxes,Green Recovery,Infectious disease,Pollution: environmental policy,Covid-19 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03549316&r= |
| By: | Gilles Grandjean (CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marco Mantovani (University of Milan, Department of Economics, University of Milan Bicocca) |
| Abstract: | In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two main explanations are consistent with this pattern: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper analyzes experimentally these explanations, by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both the preference and the strategic ability dimensions. Our results highlight the role of strategic ability in sustaining contributions, and suggest that the interaction between the two dimensions also matters: we find that groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and also have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Voluntary contribution,public goods,conditional cooperation,free riding,strategic sophistication |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03547809&r= |