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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2021‒06‒21
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Aronsson, Thomas (Dept of Economics, Umeå School of Business, Umeå University, Sweden); Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Wendner, Ronald (Dept of Economics, University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes optimal taxation of charitable giving to a public good in a Mirrleesian framework with social comparisons. Leisure separability together with zero transaction costs of giving imply that charitable giving should be subsidized to such an extent that governmental contributions are completely crowded out, regardless of whether the government acknowledges warm glows of giving. Stronger concerns for relative charitable giving and larger transaction costs support lower marginal subsidies, whereas relative consumption concerns work in the other direction. A dual screening approach, where charitable giving constitutes an indicator of wealth, is also presents. Numerical simulations supplement the theoretical results. |
| Keywords: | Conspicuous consumption; conspicuous charitable giving; optimal taxation; public good provision; warm glow; multiple screening |
| JEL: | D03 D62 H21 H23 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0807&r= |
| By: | Christoph Boehringer (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Thomas Rutherford (University of Wisconsin); Jan Schneider (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the economic impacts of CO2 emissions pricing for Germany in the context of the Paris Agreement where we highlight the role of international market responses for the incidence across heterogeneous households. We consider three settings for international spillover eects: (i) a small-open-economy framework where international commodity prices remain constant, (ii) a multi-region-trade framework with endogenous terms of trade where only Germany undertakes emission pricing, and (iii) a multi-region-trade framework where all other regions also price CO2 emissions. In all three settings Germany complies to a given domestic CO2 emissions reduction target through economy-wide uniform CO2 emissions pricing. CO2 revenues are recycled lump-sum to households on an equal-per-household basis. We nd that the small-openeconomy setting in the case of Germany not only overstates overall economic adjustment costs to CO2 emissions pricing, but also understates the degree of progressiveness of CO2 revenue recycling. The reason is that in the multi-region-trade frameworks Germany is able to pass through part of its economic adjustment costs to trading partners via higher export prices. As a consequence, the CO2 prices required to achieve the domestic emissions reduction target are higher, yielding more CO2 revenues that are recycled to households. |
| Keywords: | computable general equilibrium; incidence; environmental taxes |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:435&r= |
| By: | Gunnar S. Eskeland (Norwegian School of Economics); Shiyu Yan (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | In addition to a longstanding CO2 component in fuel taxes, Norway has used two main policy instruments to decarbonise its car fleet. A CO2-differentiated registration tax gives strong and continuous incentives to buy cars with lower registered CO2 intensity (or higher fuel efficiency). Moreover, generous tax incentives, including registration tax and VAT exemptions, are applied to zero-emission cars, and have given Norway the highest electric vehicle sales in the world. This paper analyses effects of the two instruments (the vehicle registration tax and tax exemption) using an excellent and detailed data set. |
| Keywords: | co-benefits, Cost-benefit analysis, Distributional effects, environmental externality, Greenhouse gas emission reduction, low-emission vehicles, policy instruments, vehicule registration tax |
| JEL: | L62 Q54 Q41 H23 Q51 |
| Date: | 2021–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaaa:178-en&r= |