nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2019‒10‒07
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State By Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Tyran
  2. On Green Growth with Sustainable Capital By Parantap Basu; Tooraj Jamasb
  3. Monopsony in Spatial Equilibrium By Matthew E. Kahn; Joseph Tracy

  1. By: Kenju Kamei (Durham University Business School); Louis Putterman (Brown University); Jean-Robert Tyran (University of Vienna)
    Abstract: TWe develop an endogenous growth model to address a long standing question whether sustainable green growth is feasible by re-allocating resource use between green (natural) and man-made (carbon intensive) capital. In our model, Önal output is produced with two reproducible inputs, green and man-made capital. The growth of the man-made capital causes depreciation of green capital via carbon emissions which the private sector does not internalize. A benevolent government uses carbon taxes to encourage Örms to substitute carbon intensive man-made capital with green capital that the production technology allows. Doing so, the damage to natural capital by emissions can be reversed through a lower, but socially optimal long run growth. This trade-o§ between environmental policy and long-run growth can be overcome by a combination of an investment in pollution abatement and higher total factor productivity.
    Keywords: civic engagement; public goods provision; punishment; experiment; cooperation
    JEL: C92 D02 D72 H41
    Date: 2019–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dur:durham:2019_05&r=all
  2. By: Parantap Basu (Durham University Business School); Tooraj Jamasb (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: We develop an endogenous growth model to address a long standing question whether sustainable green growth is feasible by re-allocating resource use between green (natural) and man-made (carbon intensive) capital. In our model, Önal output is produced with two reproducible inputs, green and man-made capital. The growth of the man-made capital causes depreciation of green capital via carbon emissions which the private sector does not internalize. A benevolent government uses carbon taxes to encourage Örms to substitute carbon intensive man-made capital with green capital that the production technology allows. Doing so, the damage to natural capital by emissions can be reversed through a lower, but socially optimal long run growth. This trade-o§ between environmental policy and long-run growth can be overcome by a combination of an investment in pollution abatement and higher total factor productivity
    Keywords: Green growth, sustainability, carbon tax, clean growth, resource substitution
    JEL: E1 O3 O4 Q2
    Date: 2019–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dur:durham:2019_06&r=all
  3. By: Matthew E. Kahn; Joseph Tracy
    Abstract: An emerging labor economics literature studies the consequences of firms exercising market power in local labor markets. These monopsony models have implications for trends in earnings inequality. The extent of this market power is likely to vary across local labor markets. In choosing what market to live and work in, workers tradeoff wages, rents and local amenities. Building on the Rosen/Roback spatial equilibrium model, we investigate how the existence of local monopsony power affects the cross-sectional spatial distribution of wages and rents across cities. We find an employment-weighted elasticity of land prices to concentration of –0.034—similar to Rinz (2018) reported elasticity of compensation to concentration. This finding has implications for who bears the economic incidence of labor market power. We present two extensions of the model focusing on the role of migration costs and worker skill heterogeneity.
    JEL: J3 R23
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26295&r=all

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