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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2019‒09‒09
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Ambec, Stefan (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitol (INRA) and University of Gothenburg); Coria, Jessica (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a pollution standard when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown and emissions are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting, the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in the second period. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since the low-cost firms might strategically hide their cost by abating no more than required by the standard. We provide conditions for the separating equilibrium to hold when firms act strategically. We illustrate our theoretical results with the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that are taxed experience more frequent standard updates. |
| Keywords: | pollution; externalities; asymmetric information; environmental regulation; tax; standards; multiple policies; ratchet effect; nitrogen oxides |
| JEL: | D04 D21 H23 L51 Q48 Q58 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0774&r=all |
| By: | Axenbeck, Janna |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of environmental innovations on firm profitability with respect to differences between small and medium-sized (SME) and large (LE) enterprises. Using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 2015, results show that, in general, SME benefit more from environmental innovations than LE. This effect is particularly strong for resource efficiency-improving innovations induced by regulation. These environmental innovations are significantly related to an increase in profits of SME, whilst related to a decrease in profits of LE. A robustness check with data from the MIP 2009, however, does not confirm this result as the effect for LE is insignificant and differences between the two groups cannot be found in this survey wave. A reason why negative effects for LE are observed in the MIP 2015 - but not in the MIP 2009 - might be that most LE had already exploited the potentials of environmental innovations when they were surveyed in the MIP 2015. This is supported by evidence suggesting that size-related differences in the MIP 2015 are driven by a negative relationship between LE's profits and environmental innovations related to externalities that were reduced by innovations in periods before. |
| Keywords: | Firm Behavior,Firm Size,Porter hypothesis,Environmental Technology Adaption,Technological Innovation,Environmental Regulation |
| JEL: | D22 L25 Q52 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19033&r=all |
| By: | Yamamura, Eiji (Seinan Gakuin University); Powdthavee, Nattavudh (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | What determines human beings' decisions to donate money to a charity? Using a nationally representative survey of the Japanese population, we demonstrate that having been taught by a female teacher in their first year of school makes individuals more likely to donate to charities following natural disasters. The findings are robust in controlling for lessons on prosocial behaviors, such as group learning. We tested our results separately for men and women, as well as on prosocial attitude outcomes. Overall, our results suggest potential prosocial implications may arise from teacher-student gender matching. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving, gender, prosocial, Japan, natural disaster, donation |
| JEL: | D64 I20 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12528&r=all |
| By: | Carlos A. Chávez (Universidad de Talca and Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR)); James J. Murphy (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); John K. Stranlund (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| Abstract: | This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with participants in the territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) management scheme that regulates access to nearshore fisheries along the coast of Chile. In the experiments, TURF members not only decided on harvest but also invested in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Treatments varied whether the monitoring investment was an individual decision or determined by a group vote. Per-unit sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority, and we varied the sanction level. Our results suggest that co-enforcement, in which monitoring for poaching is provided by resource users and sanctions are levied by the government, can reduce poaching levels. Monitoring investments were not high enough to lift the expected marginal penalty for poaching above the marginal gain from poaching when the sanction for poaching was low, but expected marginal penalties were higher than the marginal gain from poaching when the sanction was high. Despite this, poaching levels were not sensitive to changes in monitoring levels and sanctions. While co-enforcement did not eliminate poaching, it did eliminate the gains from poaching in all but one treatment. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, Common pool resources; enforcement; field experiments; poaching; territorial use rights fisheries; social dilemma; fisheries management; development economics; co-enforcement |
| JEL: | C72 C90 C93 D70 H41 K42 Q22 Q28 Q56 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-18&r=all |