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on Resource Economics |
Issue of 2019‒06‒17
three papers chosen by |
By: | Reynaert, Mathias |
Abstract: | Emission standards are a major policy tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation. The welfare effects from this type of regulation depend on how firms choose to abate emissions, i.e., by sales-mixing (changing prices), by downsizing (releasing smaller cars), by technology adoption or by gaming emission tests. Using panel data covering 1998-2011, I find that the introduction of a EU-wide emission standard coincides with a 14% drop in emission ratings. I find that this drop is fully explained by technology adoption and gaming and not by sales mixing or downsizing. I estimate a structural model to find that the regulation missed its emission target and was not welfare improving. Abatement with sales mixing would have reduced emissions, but at high costs. The political environment in the EU shaped the design and weak enforcement of the regulation and explains the choices for abatement by technology adoption and gaming. |
Keywords: | automobiles; Carbon Emissions; compliance; Environmental Regulation; fuel economy |
JEL: | L5 Q5 |
Date: | 2019–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13756&r=all |
By: | Broberg, Thomas (CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics); Melkamu Daniel , Aemiro (CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics); Persson, Lars (CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics) |
Abstract: | In this paper we investigate if a pro-environmental framing influences households' stated willingness to accept restrictions on their electricity use. We use a split-sample choice experiment (CE) and ask respondents to choose between their current electricity contract and hypothetical contracts featuring various load controls and a monetary compensation. Our results indicate that the pro-environmental framing have little impact on the respondents' choices. We observe a significant framing effect on choices and marginal willingness-to-accept (MWTA) for only a few contract attributes. The results further suggest that there is no significant framing effect among households that engage in different pro-environmental activities. |
Keywords: | Choice experiment; Demand response; Electricity contract; Load management; Pro-environmental framing; Willingness to accept |
JEL: | C25 D83 Q51 Q54 |
Date: | 2019–06–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slucer:2019_008&r=all |
By: | David Newbery (University of Cambridge); Giorgio Castagneto Gissey (UCL); Bowei Guo (University of Cambridge); Paul E Dodds (UCL) |
Keywords: | Interconnectors, market coupling, hedging, private and social cost |
JEL: | C54 D40 D44 F14 H23 L94 Q48 |
Date: | 2019–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1913&r=all |