nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2019‒02‒18
five papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Regional Climate Policy under Deep Uncertainty By William Brock; Anastasios Xepapadeas
  3. Market size asymmetry and industrial policy in an international duopoly: Environmental tax vs. production subsidy By Lidia Vidal-Meliá; Eva Camacho-Cuena; Miguel Ginés-Vilar
  4. Estimating the Economic Impacts of Climate Change Using Weather Observations By Charles D. Kolstad; Frances C. Moore
  5. “Green regions and local firms’ innovation” By Lorena M. D’Agostino; Rosina Moreno

  1. By: William Brock; Anastasios Xepapadeas
    Abstract: We study climate change policies by using the novel pattern scaling approach of regional transient climate response to develop an economyclimate model under conditions of deep uncertainty associated with: (i) temperature dynamics, (ii) regional climate change damages, and (iii) policy in the form of carbon taxes. We analyze both cooperative and noncooperative outcomes in a regional model. Under deep uncertainty, robust control policies are more conservative regarding emissions, the higher the aversion to ambiguity, while damage uncertainty seems to produce more conservative behavior than climate dynamics uncertainty. Cooperative policies tend to be more conservative than noncooperative policies for similar concerns about uncertainty but, as concerns about uncertainty increase, policies tend to move closer to each other. Asymmetries in concerns about uncertainty tend to produce large deviations in regional emissions policy at the noncooperative solution. If aversion to ambiguity is sufficiently high, optimal regulation aiming to attain a cooperative steady state or a steady state that satisfies conditions for a Nash equilibrium might not be possible. The result is associated with the existence of regional hot spots and temperature spillovers across regions, a situation which emerges in the real world. In such cases, deep uncertainty about the impacts of climate change makes robust regulation infeasible.
    Keywords: Regional climate change policy, Regional temperature anomalies, Deep uncertainty, Robust control, Cooperative and noncooperative solutions.
    JEL: Q54 Q58 D81
    Date: 2019–01–26
  2. By: Ilya Stepanov (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Johan Albrecht (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: The issue of instrument choice is vital for climate policy. Carbon pricing is used next to a range of traditional energy taxes and renewable energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and minimal renewable generation targets. Several countries introduced carbon taxes alongside existing energy taxes such as excise duties on vehicle fuels. Since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has attached a direct price to the GHG emissions of ETS companies. The combination of multiple instruments and explicit and indirect carbon price signals created a complex and frequently changing institutional landscape that blurs the contribution of each policy instrument. Can the decarbonization of the European economy be attributed to carbon price instruments or to renewable energy policies together with other fiscal instruments? This paper clarifies the relative impact of explicit carbon price instruments (carbon taxes and EU ETS) compared to other instruments, namely renewable energy policies and indirect carbon price signals (general energy taxes). The methodology is based on the calculation of the implicit carbon price in existing fiscal systems. On the basis of panel data for 30 European countries 1995–2016, several fixed-effect regression estimations were performed. The results indicate a greater but decreasing impact of price instruments on carbon intensity compared to renewable energy policies and a greater but decreasing relative impact of indirect price signals compared to explicit ones.
    Keywords: energy taxes, carbon tax, cap-and-trade, renewable energy policy, climate change, climate policy
    JEL: Q52 Q58 Q48
    Date: 2019
  3. By: Lidia Vidal-Meliá (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Eva Camacho-Cuena (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Miguel Ginés-Vilar (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes how international trade affects the governments’ decision on their industrial policy in the context of bilateral international trade and imperfect competition. We model an international duopoly with market size asymmetry and product heterogeneity. Each firm produces two different products, one for the domestic market and the other one for the foreign market, where the firms’ production generates local emissions. The findings of our paper show the important role of market asymmetry in determining the optimal industrial policy in a setting where both, firms and regulators, act strategically. The government in each country decides, as industrial policy between two option: an emission tax or a production subsidy. We find that the governments in small countries have incentives to set an environmental tax to the firms competing in international markets with similar size. This is the case even if the government in the large market decided to set a production subsidy, as long as market size asymmetry is low enough. Instead, if firms in a small country compete in large markets, that is, increasing the market size asymmetry between countries, it is then optimal for the government in the small country to give up emission taxes and pay productions subsidies to keep the firms’ competitiveness in the home and foreign markets if the government in the big country subsidizes production. In this case, an increase in the firms’ profits offsets the effects of emission damages on the country social welfare.
    Keywords: Environmental tax, Production subsidy, Market size asymmetry, Product heterogeneity, Imperfect markets
    JEL: F18 H23 L13 Q56
    Date: 2019
  4. By: Charles D. Kolstad; Frances C. Moore
    Abstract: This paper reviews methods that have been used to statistically measure the effect of climate on economic value, using historic data on weather, climate, economic activity and other variables. This has been an active area of research for several decades, with many recent developments and discussion of the best way of measuring climate damages. The paper begins with a conceptual framework covering issues relevant to estimating the costs of climate change impacts. It then considers several approaches to econometrically estimate impacts that have been proposed in the literature: cross-sections, linear and non-linear panel methods, long-differences, and partitioning variation. For each method we describe the kind of impacts (short-run vs long-run) estimated, the type of weather or climate variation used, and the pros and cons of the approach.
    JEL: H41 Q51 Q54
    Date: 2019–02
  5. By: Lorena M. D’Agostino (Department of Economics and Management. University of Trento); Rosina Moreno (AQR-IREA Research Group.)
    Abstract: Technological innovation is essential to achieve simultaneously economic, environmental and social goals (i.e. the green growth). Indeed, many studies found that environmental innovation spurs overall innovation. However, this topic has not been investigated by taking into account the geographical context. Therefore, our paper seeks to investigate whether ‘green regions’, with an increased public and private commitment in environmental issues, are related to innovation of local firms. Using data on Spanish manufacturing firms and regions, we find that environmental technologies (especially in green energy), environmental investments, and environmental management at the level of regions are positively associated to local firms’ innovation.
    Keywords: innovation; region; firm; green patents; environment JEL classification: R11; O31; O44
    Date: 2019–01

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