nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2019‒01‒21
two papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. A Meta-Analysis of the Literature on Climate Change and Migration By Michel Beine; Lionel Jeusette
  2. The deterrence effect of linear versus convex penalties in environmental policy: laboratory evidence By Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía

  1. By: Michel Beine; Lionel Jeusette
    Abstract: Recent surveys of the literature on climate change and migration emphasize the important diversity of outcomes and approaches of the empirical studies. In this paper, we conduct a meta-analysis in order to investigate the role of the methodological choices of these empirical studies in finding some particular results concerning the role of climatic factors as drivers of human mobility. We code 45 papers representative of the literature in terms of methodological approaches. This results in the coding of more than 80 variables capturing the methodology of the main dimensions of the analysis. These dimensions include authors’ reputation, type of mobility, measures of mobility, type of data, context of the study, econometric methods and last but not least measures of the climatic factors. We look at the influence of these characteristics on the probability of finding any effect of climate change, of finding a displacement effect, of finding an increase in immobility and of finding evidence in favour of a direct versus an indirect effect. Our results high- light the role of some main methodological choices, such as the frequency of the data on mobility, the level of development, the measures of human mobility and of the climatic factors as well as the econometric methodology.
    Keywords: climate change, human mobility, econometric regressions, meta-analysis, natural disasters
    JEL: C83 F22 J61 Q54
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7417&r=all
  2. By: Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía
    Abstract: We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory instruments (emission standards and tradable pollution permits). We find that a convex penalty, as compared to a linear penalty, increases the market price of pollution permits and the violation rate of firms. The effect of the structure of the fine on the price of permits operates through an increase in the ask-prices of sellers, not on the bids by suppliers. With convex penalties, sellers are not willing to sell a permit at a price as low as with linear penalties. We do not observe an effect of convex penalties on the compliance status of firms with emission standards. These results call for attention on the possible effect that the type of penalties may have on the cost-effectiveness of pollution control programs based on tradable pollution permits.
    Keywords: Environmental policy, enforcement, penalty structure, emissions standards, emissions trading, laboratory experiments
    JEL: C91 K42 L51 Q58
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:90946&r=all

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