nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2018‒09‒17
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities By Hammond, Peter J
  2. A novel dataset of emission abatement sector extended input-output table for environmental policy analysis By Ke Wang; Jiayu Wang; Yi-Ming Wei; Chi Zhang
  3. Going Green: Environment Protest, Policy and CO2 Emissions, in U.S. States, 1990-2007 By Munoz, John; Olzak, Susan; Soule, Sarah A.

  1. By: Hammond, Peter J (Department of Economics,and CAGE (Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy), University of Warwick)
    Abstract: Whether an economic agent's decision creates an externality often depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made. Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality occurs just in case one agent's economic welfare or production possibilities are directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary externality occurs just in case one consumer's economic welfare or producer's profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other agents' decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strategyproof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no individual agent's action can affect market clearing prices - i.e., there are no pecuniary externalities JEL classification numbers: D63 ; D70 ; D90 ; Q54 ; Q56
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:42&r=res
  2. By: Ke Wang; Jiayu Wang; Yi-Ming Wei; Chi Zhang
    Abstract: Environmentally extended input-output table (EEIOT), a balanced matrix of industrial commodity and environmental resources, is widely used to evaluate environmental policy impacts. However, the existing EEIOTs contain energy consumption and pollution emission but neglect emission abatement cost and benefit. In this study, a novel Chinese emission abatement sector extended input-output table (EAS-IOT) is developed through introducing abatement cost, emission charge and abatement benefit into the conventional input-output table. Furthermore, this new EAS-IOT is applied to estimate the environmental efficiency and assess the effects of environmental policies on economy and environment. Results show that the new framework of EAS-IOT has advantage on solving the problem of biased efficiency estimation related to the conventional input-output table.
    Keywords: Data on emission abatement cost and benefit; extended input-output table; emission abatement sector; environmental policy
    JEL: Q54 Q40
    Date: 2018–09–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biw:wpaper:119&r=res
  3. By: Munoz, John (Stanford University); Olzak, Susan (Stanford University); Soule, Sarah A. (Stanford University)
    Abstract: A major goal of the environmental movement is to conserve or improve the natural environment, but evidence showing that environmental mobilization produces positive environmental outcomes is mixed. This paper addresses a fundamental question about the relative impact of pro-environmental mobilization and the scope of an environmental policy regime on the natural environment. Using panel data at the state level from 1990-2007, we explore how environmental protest and environmental policies independently (or jointly) reduce CO2 emissions in U.S. states. We find that the level of emissions in a state declines in states with increases in pro-environmental protest, net of the effects of the range of environmental policies enacted, gasoline taxes, liberal attitudes, reliance on the fossil fuel industry, number of registered lobbyist organizations, average state product, and population size.
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3698&r=res

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