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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒06‒11
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Mikołaj Czajkowski (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Katarzyna Zagórska (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Nick Hanley (University of Glasgow, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health & Comparative Medicine) |
| Abstract: | Previous research on pro-environment behaviours demonstrated an effect of communicating social norms to subjects. In this paper, we extend this work by isolating the effects of information about (i) the absolute level (strength) of the norm (ii) its geographic proximity (iii) whether the norm is stated in relative terms. We also show how previous pro-environmental behaviours interact with social norm information. The context is a stated preference choice experiment on recycling behaviours by households in Poland. The main finding to emerge is that social norm effects on preferences seem to be very context-dependent; there is no evidence of generalizable effects which would be useful to policy designers. |
| Keywords: | recycling, social norms, stated preferences, choice modelling |
| JEL: | D04 D91 Q51 Q53 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2018-13&r=res |
| By: | Guilló, María Dolores (University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory); Magalhaes, Manuela (University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory) |
| Abstract: | The aim is to advance in the analytical framework of green growth and to shed light on the concept of long run sustainability. We extend the Green Solow model by including a land-capital input and land degradation as a by-product of economic activity. In this framework, the effectiveness of technological progress in abatement depends on the degree of environmental stress, measured as the excess of output growth over land-capital growth. We build land-capital data at the country level using the Enhanced Vegetation Index and calibrate the model for the USA economy. In addition, we estimate the growth equation of per capita CO2 emissions over the period 2000-2011. We find convergence at the global level, statistical significance of the environmental stress parameter and a negative effect of land-capital investment on the growth rate of emissions, implying that in the long run the positive environmental effect is stronger than the production effect. |
| Keywords: | Green-Solow; Enhanced Vegetation Index; convergence; CO2 emissions |
| JEL: | O10 O13 O40 O44 P16 |
| Date: | 2018–06–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2018_002&r=res |
| By: | Lööf, Hans (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); Andreas, Andreas (Jönköping International Business School (JIBS) & Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS)); Wulandari, Febi (Jönköping International Business School (JIBS)) |
| Abstract: | Facing the challenge of climate change, innovations that imply environmental benefits create business opportunities for entrepreneurs. This paper analyzes innovation capabilities of startups in Cleantech and how the innovation outcomes of those startups develop over time. Based on the Mannheim Foundation Panel and applying propensity score matching, a cohort of 566 Cleantech startups is analyzed and compared with a control group of non-Cleantech startups. We find that startups in Cleantech have, on average, higher innovation capabilities compared with all startups. However, Cleantech startups are a heterogeneous group including ventures using common technology and those developing new technology. Our econometric evidence shows that, ceteris paribus, Cleantech startups are more likely to combine existing technology in a novel way. Finally, we find that Cleantech startups do, on average, develop more market novelties in later years compared to theirs peers. |
| Keywords: | Innovative startups; green innovations; Cleantech; capabilities; policies |
| JEL: | M13 O13 O25 O31 |
| Date: | 2018–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0467&r=res |
| By: | Gary D. Libecap |
| Abstract: | Douglass North asked why some societies historically and contemporarily have rising per-capita incomes and individual welfare, whereas others do not? He argued that successful economies had property rights that encouraged markets, trade, and investment in new production and organizational methods. In other economies, transaction costs, especially those due to the political process, blocked more efficient property rights. Property rights grant decision making over valuable resources and are the basis for investment, and market exchange. They mold the economy and the distribution of wealth and political power. Politicians and coalitions of privileged elites with stakes in the status quo join to preserve it. Inefficiencies create their own constituencies. There is no clear remedy for general citizens in North’s cases. Despite the power of North’s argument, transaction costs are not clear in aggregate studies of economies. They are more apparent in US common-pool resource problems with large, continuing losses in resource rents. This evidence runs counter to the facile arguments in the welfare and environmental economics literatures for addressing externalities that are reminiscent of the simplistic recommendations in the growth and economic history literatures that North challenged. If the observed costly political response to open access losses is characteristic of regulation in general, then welfare losses permeate developed economies as well and are more pervasive than the dramatic examples of development failure examined by North and others. Mitigation requires competitive interest groups that benefit from more secure property rights and greater resource rents to offset powerful elites that align with politicians and capture bureaucratic agencies to achieve particularistic benefits that undermine general welfare. |
| JEL: | K11 K32 N4 N42 N5 N52 Q15 Q2 Q22 Q25 Q28 Q32 Q38 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24585&r=res |