nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2018‒04‒09
nine papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Regulating Mismeasured Pollution: Implications of Firm Heterogeneity for Environmental Policy By Eva Lyubich; Joseph S. Shapiro; Reed Walker
  2. Do small cities need more public transport subsidies than big cities? By Börjesson, Maria; Fung, Chau Man; Proost, Stef; Yan, Zifei
  3. Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities By Hammond, Peter J
  4. Trade, Environment and Income Inequality: An Optimal Taxation Approach By Philippe Bontems; Estelle Gozlan
  5. Addressing the Climate Problem: Choice between Allowances, Feed-in Tariffs and Taxes By Eirik S. Amundsen; Peder Andersen; Jørgen Birk Mortensen
  6. Optimal recycling under heterogeneous waste sources and the environmental Kuznets curve By Fouad El Ouardighi; Konstantin Kogan; Raouf Boucekkine
  7. Social Norms and Pro-Environment Behaviours: Heterogeneous Response to Signals By Mikolaj Czajkowski; Katarzyna Zagórska; Nick Hanley
  8. A bottom-up approach to environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis By Johannes Friedrich Carolus; Nick Hanley; Søren Bøye Olsen; Søren Marcus Pedersen
  9. Toxic Emissions and Executive Migration By Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Zigan Wang

  1. By: Eva Lyubich (UC Berkeley); Joseph S. Shapiro (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Reed Walker (University of California, Berkeley, IZA, & NBER)
    Abstract: This paper provides the ?rst estimates of within-industry heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity for the entire U.S. manufacturing sector. We measure energy and CO2 productivity as output per dollar energy input or per ton CO2 emitted. Three ?ndings emerge. First, within narrowly de?ned industries, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity across plants is enormous. Second, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity exceeds heterogeneity in most other productivity measures, like labor or total factor productivity. Third, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity has important implications for environmental policies targeting industries rather than plants, including technology standards and carbon border adjustments.
    JEL: F18 H23 Q56
    Date: 2018–01
  2. By: Börjesson, Maria (VTI); Fung, Chau Man (KU Leuven); Proost, Stef (KU Leuven); Yan, Zifei (CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI))
    Abstract: This paper compares the optimal public transport subsidies for a representative bus corridor in a small city (Karlstad) and in a big city (Stockholm) in Sweden. In the smaller city, the optimization of the fare is more important for welfare, whereas in the larger city, the frequency is more important. Moreover, the optimal subsidy is higher in small than in large cities because of larger positive externalities of reduced waiting and schedule delay costs, whereas the negative crowding externalities are larger in the large city. The bus subsidy is important for the income distribution in the small city.
    Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis; Transport plan; Public transport; Subsidies; External costs; Fares; Frequencies; Bus stops; Redistribution
    JEL: R41 R42 R48
    Date: 2018–03–23
  3. By: Hammond, Peter J (Department of Economics, and CAGE (Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy), University of Warwick,)
    Abstract: Whether an economic agent's decision creates an externality often depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made. Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality occurs just in case one agent's economic welfare or production possibilities are directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary externality occurs just in case one consumer's economic welfare or producer's profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other agents' decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strategyproof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no individual agent's action can affect market clearing prices - i.e., there are no pecuniary externalities.
    Keywords: Externalities ; pecuniary externalities ; strategyproof mechanisms ; institutional externalities
    JEL: D63 D70 D90 Q54 Q56
    Date: 2018
  4. By: Philippe Bontems (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics); Estelle Gozlan (ECO-PUB - Economie Publique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)
    Abstract: In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under- or over-internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade-off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.
    Abstract: Dans une petite économie ouverte, quel système fiscal est optimal pour un gouvernement concerné par l’environnement et les inégalités de revenu, lorsque la redistribution est coûteuse? Et comment la libéralisation des échanges affecte-t-elle les niveaux de pollution et les inégalités dans cette économie, lorsque les taxes sont optimales et ajustées de manière endogène? A l’aide d'un modèle d'équilibre général en information asymétrique avec deux biens, deux facteurs (main-d'œuvre qualifiée et non qualifiée) et la pollution, cet article caractérise le système fiscal mixte optimal (impôt non-linéaire sur le revenu et taxes/subventions linéaires sur la production et la consommation) en présence d’externalités de production et de consommation. Alors que les taux marginaux d’imposition sur le revenu sont pas directement affectés par les externalités environnementales, les conditions sont dérivées pour lesquelles la sous- ou sur-internalisation des dommages est optimale pour des considérations redistributives. En supposant que la redistribution opère en faveur des travailleurs non qualifiés et que le secteur polluant est relativement intensif en main-d'œuvre non qualifiée, les simulations suggèrent que la libéralisation du commerce implique un arbitrage clair entre la réduction des inégalités et la le contrôle de la pollution lorsque la pollution est une externalité de production; ce n'est pas nécessairement le cas avec une externalité de consommation. Enfin, une augmentation dans le poids des travailleurs non-qualifiés dans l’objectif du gouvernement se traduit paradoxalement par moins de pollution et plus d'inégalités de revenu.
    Keywords: Environnement,Inégalités de revenu,international trade,environmental control,modèle d'équilibre général,asymétrie d'information,inégalité des richesses,commerce international,taxation optimale,protection de l'environnement
    Date: 2018
  5. By: Eirik S. Amundsen; Peder Andersen; Jørgen Birk Mortensen
    Abstract: Instruments chosen to pursue climate related targets are not always efficient. In this paper we consider an economy with three climate related targets for its electricity generation: a given share of “green” electricity, a given expansion of “green” electricity, and a given reduction of “black” (fossil based) electricity. At its disposal the country has three instruments: an allowance system (tradable green certificates), a subsidy system (feed-in tariffs) and a Pigouvian fossil tax. Each of these instruments may be used to attain any of the given targets. Within the setting of the model it is verified that each kind of the target has only a single efficient instrument under certainty, and that there is a deadweight loss of using other instruments to achieve the target. Similarly, there is also an analysis of instrument choice when several targets are to be attained at the same time. The paper also discusses the case of simultaneous targets as well as the relevance of the various targets.
    Keywords: energy policy, green certificates, subsidies, Pigouvian taxes, climate change
    JEL: C70 Q28 Q42 Q48
    Date: 2018
  6. By: Fouad El Ouardighi (Operation management Department - Essec Business School); Konstantin Kogan (Bar-Ilan University [Israël]); Raouf Boucekkine (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)
    Abstract: We investigate how the relationship between economic growth and pollution is affected by the source of pollution: production or consumption. We are interested in polluting waste that cannot be naturally absorbed, but for which recycling efforts aim to avoid massive pollution accumulation with harmful consequences in the long run. We distinguish the cases where recycling efforts are capital-improving or capital-neutral. Based on both environmental and social welfare perspectives, we determine how the interaction between growth and polluting waste accumulation is affected by the source of pollution, i.e., either consumption or production, and by the fact that recycling may or may not act as an income generator, i.e., either capital-improving or capital-neutral recycling efforts. Several new results are extracted regarding optimal recycling policy and the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Beside the latter concern, we show both analytically and numerically that the optimal control of waste through recycling allows to reaching larger (resp., lower) consumption and capital stock levels under consumption-based waste compared to production-based waste while the latter permits to reach lower stocks of waste through lower recycling efforts.
    Keywords: Economic growth,Capital,Consumption,Polluting waste,recycling efforts JEL Classification Q57,C61
    Date: 2017–11
  7. By: Mikolaj Czajkowski (University of Warsaw, Department of Economics, Dluga 44/50, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland); Katarzyna Zagórska (University of Warsaw, Department of Economics, Dluga 44/50, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland); Nick Hanley (University of Glasgow, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health & Comparative Medicine)
    Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated an effect on pro-environment behaviours such as household recycling from communicating social norm information to respondents. In this paper, we extend this work by considering the effects of varying (i) the absolute size (strength) of the norm (ii) its geographic scope (iii) whether the norm is stated in relative terms. We also show how previous behaviours interact with social norm information. The context is a stated preference choice experiment on recycling behaviours by households in Poland. The main finding to emerge is that social norm effects on preferences for recycling seem to be very context-dependent. There is no evidence of generalizable effects which would be useful to policy designers.
    Keywords: recycling, social norms, stated preferences, choice modelling
    JEL: D04 D91 Q51
    Date: 2018–02
  8. By: Johannes Friedrich Carolus (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Nick Hanley (University of Glasgow, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health & Comparative Medicine); Søren Bøye Olsen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Søren Marcus Pedersen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: Cost-Benefit Analysis is a method to assess the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. CBAs are usually applied in a top-down approach, in the sense that a decision-making body first decides on which policies or projects are to be considered, and then applies a set of uniform criteria to identifying and valuing relevant cost and benefit flows. This paper investigates the possible advantages, prerequisites and limitations of applying CBA in what may be considered an alternative, “bottom-up”. Instead of starting out with a pre-defined policy option, the suggested approach begins with the underlying environmental problem, and then assesses costs and benefits of various strategies and solutions suggested by local and directly affected stakeholders. For empirical case studies concerning two river catchments in Sweden and Latvia, the bottom-up CBA approach utilises local knowledge, assesses plans which are not only developed for local conditions but are also likely to be more acceptable to local society, and sheds additional light on possible distributional effects. By not only benefitting from, but also supporting participative environmental planning, bottom-up CBA is in line with the growing trend of embedding stakeholder participation into environmental policy and decision-making.
    Keywords: Environmental Planning, Stakeholder Approach, Participatory Approaches, Ecosystem Services, Water Framework Directive, Catchment Management
    JEL: B41 D61
    Date: 2018–02
  9. By: Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Zigan Wang
    Abstract: We study the impact of toxic emissions on the migration of corporate executives. We link data on the opening of industrial plants emitting toxic air pollutants with information on the career paths of executives at all S&P 1500 firms over the 1996-2014 period. We find that (1) the opening of toxic emitting plants increases the rate at which executives leave geographically close firms and move to firms in less polluted areas, (2) stock returns fall when these “treated” executives announce their departures, and (3) the replacement executives have less experience than the departing executives.
    JEL: G3 J61 J63 Q5 R32
    Date: 2018–03

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