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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒09‒24
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Fabien Prieur (Université Paris Nanterre); Benteng Zou (CREA, Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the history of climate politics in the US over the last decades, this paper aims at studying the impact of indirect competition for political influence, through environmental awareness raising vs disinformation campaigns, on environmental and economic performance. The analysis of the game in which groups devote efforts to bring the majority’s concern closer to their views shows a strong asymmetry in the results. Strategic interaction may lead the economy to a better situation in the long run, compared to what would prevail in the absence of lobbying. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people’s awareness is initially closer to that of the industrial group. By contrast, economies with very aggressive conservative groups and with people originally well aware of environmental problems can never benefit from the outcome of the game of political influence. The latter result is reinforced when one accounts for different lobbying powers and supremacy of industrial groups. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now. |
| Keywords: | Public persuasion, environmentalists, industrialists, environmental awareness, information campaigns, disinformation, game of political influence |
| JEL: | D72 C73 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:17-16&r=res |
| By: | Tiziano Distefano (Department of Environmental, Land and Infrastructure Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, Italy); Simone D'Alessandro (Department of Economics and Management, Università di Pisa, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Our work contributes to explain the observation of two facts at odds: the number of signatories of international environmental agreements (IEA) has grown in time, meanwhile, the aggregate global level of greenhouse gas emissions is increasing at exponential rate. We introduce a novel multi-scale framework, composed by two tied games, to show under which conditions a country is able to fulfill the IEA: an Evolutionary Game which describes the economic structure through the interaction of households and rms' strategies; and a 2x2 one-shot Game, with asymmetric nations that negotiate on the maximum share of emissions. The distance between international environmental targets and country's emissions performances is explained in terms of heterogeneous economic structure, without the need to impose any free-riding behaviour. Consumer's environmental consciousness (micro level) together with global income (and technological) inequality (macro level), are found to be the key variables towards the green transition path. We provide analytical results paired with numerical simulations. |
| Keywords: | International environmental agreements, asymmetry, evolutionary process, Multi-level perspective, climate change |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C73 H41 F53 Q20 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srt:wpaper:0517&r=res |
| By: | Xavier Pautrel (University of Angers (GRANEM)-TEPP) |
| Abstract: | We re-examine the impact of environmental taxation on health and output, in the presence of labor market frictions. Our main findings are that matching process and wage bargaining introduce new channels of transmission of environmental taxation on the economy such that assuming perfect labor market leads to over-estimate the positive impact of environmental taxation on health. We also demonstrate that rising abatement expenditures as a way of tightening the environmental policy would be better for health than increasing environmental tax in the presence of market labor imperfections. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Policy, Health, Labor Market, Search, Unemployment |
| JEL: | I1 J2 J64 Q58 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2017.36&r=res |