nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2017‒08‒20
two papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Embedding Cooperation in General-equilibrium Models By John E. Roemer
  2. Tailored Feedback and Worker Green Behavior: Field Evidence from Bus Drivers By Adriaan (A.R.) Soetevent; Gert-Jan Romensen

  1. By: John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science & Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: Humans cooperate a great deal in economic activity, but our two major models of equilibrium – Walrasian competitive in markets and Nash in games – portray us as only non-cooperative. In earlier work, I have proposed a model of cooperative decision making (Kantian optimization); here, I embed Kantian optimization in general equilibrium models and show that ‘Walras-Kant’ equilibria exist and often resolve inefficiencies associated with income taxation, public goods and bads, and non-traditional firm ownership, which typically plague models where agents are Nash optimizers. In four examples, introducing Kantian optimization in one market – often the labor market – suffices to internalize externalities, generating Pareto efficient equilibria in their presence. The scope for efficient decentralization via markets appears to be significantly broadened with cooperative behavior.
    Keywords: Kantian optimization, Cooperation, General equilibrium, Market socialism, Global emissions control, Worker-owned firms, Externalities, Public goods
    JEL: D50 D60 D62 D70 D91 E19 H21 H23 H41
    Date: 2017–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2098&r=res
  2. By: Adriaan (A.R.) Soetevent (University of Groningen, The Netherlands; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands); Gert-Jan Romensen (University of Groningen, The Netherlands;)
    Abstract: How to engage workers in conservation efforts when the company pays the bill? In a field experiment with 409 bus drivers, we investigate the potential of targeted peer-comparison feedback and on-the-road coaching. Drivers receive individualized reports with peer-comparison messages on multiple driving dimensions. In addition, coaches quasi randomly provide drivers with in person coaching moments on the bus. Based on 800,000 trip-level observations, we find that the targeted peer-comparison treatments do not improve driving. On-the-road coaching significantly improves driving on multiple dimensions but only temporarily. Further analysis reveals negative interaction effects between the two programs.
    Keywords: peer comparisons; coaching; worker motivation; fuel conservation
    JEL: D2 M5 Q5
    Date: 2017–08–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170073&r=res

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