nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2017‒06‒04
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Climate change and trade policy interactions: Implications of regionalism By Harro van Asselt
  2. Who Should Own a Renewable Technology? Ownership Theory and an Application By Talat S. Genc; Stanley S. Reynolds
  3. The social cost of fishery subsidy reforms By José-María Da-Rocha; Javier García-Cutrín; Raul Prellezo; Jaume Sempere

  1. By: Harro van Asselt (Stockholm Environment Institute)
    Abstract: This report investigates the implications of regionalism for the interaction between trade and climate policy. It examines the implications of regional climate governance for international trade and conversely the implications of regional trade governance for climate change action. Regional approaches to climate change governance are discussed with a specific focus on the rise of “climate clubs” and their implications for international trade. Moreover, regional trade agreements and their current environmental provisions related to climate change are also examined. Building on these analyses, this report explores the various ways in which regional trade agreements could address climate change objectives, and draws lessons from recent developments in regional trade governance for the further evolution of such agreements.
    Keywords: climate clubs, climate coalitions, free trade agreements, regional trade agreements, Trade and environment
    JEL: F13 F18 Q54 Q56 R11
    Date: 2017–05–31
  2. By: Talat S. Genc (Department of Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph ON Canada); Stanley S. Reynolds (Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721 USA)
    Abstract: We investigate the market implications of ownership of a new low-cost production technology. We relate our theoretical findings to measuring the impact of renewable energy penetration into electricity markets and examine how the ownership of renewable capacity changes market outcomes (prices, outputs, emissions). As the current public policies influence the renewable energy ownership, this research provides useful insights for policy makers. We show that ownership of renewable capacity will matter when there is market power in energy market. We apply our findings to the Ontario wholesale electricity market to analyze the impact of different ownership structures for wind capacity expansions. We show that consumers enjoy better air quality under the largest firm's ownership, but at the expense of higher prices. We find that market structure and the shape of generation cost functions are the key drivers explaining the impact of renewable ownership on market outcomes.
    Keywords: Market structure, technology ownership, renewable energy, greenhouse gas emissions
    JEL: D4 L1 Q5 Q4 Q2
    Date: 2017
  3. By: José-María Da-Rocha (ITAM and Universidad de Vigo); Javier García-Cutrín (Universidad de Vigo); Raul Prellezo (AZTI); Jaume Sempere (El Colegio de México)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of reducing a subsidy on fuel in a general equilibrium model for a fishery with heterogeneous fishing plants (vessels). It considers the impact of the stock effect, which determines the participation of fishing plants in a likely increased stock abundance. In equilibrium, the productivity of the fleet is endogenous as it depends on the stock of fish along the equilibrium path. The model concludes that any impact of a fuel subsidy drop will depend on the stock effect. If that effect is large, fishing firms will benefit from the stock recovery and the elimination of the subsidy will increase future returns on investment. The model is particularized to industrial shrimp fisheries in Mexico. It is shown that the complete elimination of a subsidy increases biomass, capitalization, marginal productivity, and consumption and reduces inequality when the effect of the induced increase in the stock is considered. However, if that effect is not considered capital and consumption decrease, and inequality increases, increasing the social costs of a fuel subsidy drop.
    Keywords: subsidies, general equilibrium model, fisheries, social costs
    JEL: Q22 Q28
    Date: 2017–04

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