nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2016‒12‒04
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Gender and cooperative preferences on five continents By Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny
  2. Biased Judges: Evidence from French Environmental Cases By Pierre Bentata; Yolande Hiriart
  3. On the Social Value of Disclosed Information and Environmental Regulation By Jihad Elnaboulsi; W Daher; Y Saglam
  4. Environmental Regulation and Policy Design: The Impact of the Regulators Ecological Conscience on the Tax Setting Process By Jihad Elnaboulsi

  1. By: Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny
    Abstract: Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men.
    Keywords: Public goods; conditional cooperation; gender; experiment
    JEL: C91 D64 H41
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:30226&r=res
  2. By: Pierre Bentata (Université Paris 2 - Panthéon-Assas); Yolande Hiriart (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté)
    Abstract: Using an original database of 614 judgements in the French supreme courts from 1956 to 2010, we test for possible biases in judges’ decisions in the field of environmental accidents, focusing on a difference in treatment between private parties and the government as litigant. Two separate institutions deal with environmental cases in France, namely the Conseil d’Etat (Supreme Administrative Tribunal) for public utilities and central and local government, and the Cour de cassation (Supreme Civil Court) for private firms. We run bivariate Probit regressions to explain pro-defendant decisions and reversals of decisions. Overall, courts treat plaintiffs and defendants differently. A pro-defendant decision and a reversal of decision are less likely to occur: (i) when the appeal is initiated by the defendant rather than by the plaintiff; (ii) in the Conseil d’Etat ´ rather than in the Cour de cassation. The Conseil d’Etat ´ is harsher with defendants than the Cour de cassation. These results could be indicative of a bias of the lower administrative tribunals in favor of public utilities and/or the government.
    Keywords: environmental accidents, French cases, litigation, Appellate Courts, judicial review, judicial behavior, biased judges, administrative tribunals
    Date: 2015–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377922&r=res
  3. By: Jihad Elnaboulsi (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); W Daher (Gulf University for Science and Technology (GUST) - Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences); Y Saglam (Victoria University of Wellington - Victoria University of Wellington)
    Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive market with private information. We examine how environmental taxes should be optimally levied when the regulator faces asymmetric information about production and abatement costs in an irreversible observable policy commitment game. Under our setting, the paper investigates how information disclosure can improve the efficiency of the tax setting process and may offer an efficient complement to conventional regulatory approaches. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that access to publicly disclosed information improves the ability of the regulator to levy Örmsí specific environmental taxes. Despite its advantages, however, informational disclosure may harm the environmental policy it purports to enhance since it facilitates collusive behavior. We show that information sharing may occur and thus leads to a superior outcome in terms of industry output and emissions. Disclosure may undermine market performance and environmental policy.
    Keywords: Environmental Regulation, Emissions Taxes, Collusion, Disclosed Information, Private Information, Information Sharing
    Date: 2015–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377918&r=res
  4. By: Jihad Elnaboulsi (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté)
    Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive markets. We investigate how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a precommitment policy game and their e§ects on social welfare. The paper also examines the potential impacts of the regulatorís environmental conscience on policy setting. We start the analysis with a benchmark model where all players are environmentally dirty in the marketplace. We then extend the model to the case in which the market is composed of a mix of dirty and clean strategic players. We show that, in both cases, the regulator must necessarily trade o§ between regulation of environmental quality and the industry production ine¢ ciency problems. Furthermore, the results show how higher levels of concern for environmental issues outweigh the under taxation problem that arises in order to avoid further reductions in welfare. Finally, we show that the existence of clean players produces positive social externalities. Under an ex ante environmental policy game, higher social welfare outcomes are possible.
    Keywords: Environmental Policy, Emissions Tax, Environmental Conscience, Social Welfare, Strategic Behavior, Oligopoly Competition
    Date: 2015–09–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377913&r=res

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