nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2016‒10‒30
two papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Pollution, Unequal Lifetimes and Fairness By Grégory Ponthière
  2. Do you trust me? – Go Fish! A Study on Trust and Fisheries Management By Eggert, Håkan; Kataria, Mitesh; Lampi, Elina

  1. By: Grégory Ponthière (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: Pollution is a major cause of mortality, leading to substantial inequalities in lifetime well-being across individuals. This paper characterizes the optimal level of pollution in a two-period OLG economy where pollution deteriorates survival conditions. We compare two long-run social optima: on the one hand, the average utilitarian optimum, where the long-run average well-being is maximized, and, on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian optimum, where the well-being of the worst-o¤ at the stationary equilibrium is maximized. It is shown that the ex post egalitarian optimum involves a higher level of pollution in comparison with the utilitarian optimum. This result is robust to introducing health expenditures in the survival function. Finally, we examine the decentralization of those two social optima, and we compare the associated optimal taxes on capital income aimed at internalizing the pollution externality.
    Keywords: Fairness,Mortality,Pollution,OLG model
    Date: 2014–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01095463&r=res
  2. By: Eggert, Håkan (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Lampi, Elina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: This paper investigates trust among stakeholders in fisheries management. We asked the general public, environmental bureaucrats, and recreational and commercial fishers whether they believed various stakeholders have sufficient knowledge to take a stance regarding fisheries management issues in a choice experiment they themselves had just been exposed to. We found that the general public and recreational fishers tend to trust bureaucrats to have sufficient knowledge, while bureaucrats distrust the general public. The commercial fishers in our sample deviate from the other respondents with high self-trust and low trust in both the general public and bureaucrats. In addition, bureaucrats tend to think that their colleagues are more knowledgeable than them. When looking at observable characteristics, we find that, regardless of comparison group, males show higher trust in their own knowledge than do females, and those with higher education believe they are more knowledgeable than people in general.
    Keywords: Trust; Fisheries Management; Overconfidence; Choice experiment
    JEL: Q22
    Date: 2016–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0675&r=res

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