nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2016‒04‒16
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. The Market for Wastewater Sludge (Biosolids) By Villy Søgaard
  2. Social Norms and Information Diffusion in Water-saving Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Colombia By Jaime Torres, Mónica Marcela; Carlsson, Fredrik
  3. The political drivers of renewable energies policies By Isabelle Cadoret; Fabio Padovano
  4. Framing and Minimum Levels in Public Good Provision By Martinsson, Peter; Medhin, Haileselassie; Persson, Emil

  1. By: Villy Søgaard (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
    Abstract: Despite public approval from the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Miljøstyrelsen), farmers have proven reluctant to accept wastewater sludge as a source of fertilizer. They are in fact still being paid for accepting it. Based on interviews with key stakeholders, a review of the literature, and theoretical reflections this paper analyses the barriers to the recycling of wastewater sludge.
    Keywords: Sludge, recycling, wastewater treatment
    JEL: Q13 Q15 Q21 Q24 Q25 Q53 Q55
    Date: 2016–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sdk:wpaper:123&r=res
  2. By: Jaime Torres, Mónica Marcela (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: This paper investigates direct and spillover effects of a social information campaign aimed at encouraging residential water savings in Colombia. The campaign was organized as a randomized field experiment, consisting of monthly delivery of consumption reports, including normative messages, for one year. Results indicate that social information and appeals to normbased behavior reduce water use by up to 6.8% in households directly targeted by the campaign. In addition, we find evidence of spillover effects: households that were not targeted by the campaign reduced water use by 5.8% in the first six months following the intervention. Nevertheless, neither direct nor spillover effects can be attributed to social networks for any of our chosen proxies of social and geographic proximity.
    Keywords: Peer effects; social norms; randomized evaluation; water utilities
    JEL: C93 D03 L95 O12
    Date: 2016–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0652&r=res
  3. By: Isabelle Cadoret (UR1 - Université de Rennes 1, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Fabio Padovano (Roma Tre University, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes how political factors affect the deployment of renewable energy (RE) sources and compares their explanatory power to that of other economic, energy and environmental drivers that have received greater attention in the literature so far. The sample encompasses the EU countries bound to attain the target of 20% share of gross final energy consumption by 2020. The panel data analysis shows that lobbying by the manufacturing industry negatively affects RE deployment, whereas standard measures of government quality show a positive effect; furthermore left wing parties promote the deployment of RE more than right wing ones.
    Keywords: renewable energy sources, energy policy, quality of government, lobbying, political ideology
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01290360&r=res
  4. By: Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Medhin, Haileselassie (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Persson, Emil (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations.
    Keywords: Choice architecture; Framing; Public goods; Minimum level; Experiment; Ethiopia.
    JEL: C91 H41
    Date: 2016–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0656&r=res

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