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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒02‒23
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Rasmané OUEDRAOGO; Somlanare Romuald KINDA (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI)); Eric Nazindigouba KERE |
| Abstract: | According to several reports, natural disasters and climate change will intensify and dampen development if appropriate measures are not implemented. Our paper contributes to this literature and analyzes the impact of natural disasters on domestic resource mobilization in developing countries. Using propensity score matching estimators over the period of 1980-2012 for 120 developing countries, our results conclude that government revenues decrease in the aftermath of natural disasters. Moreover natural disasters that occur in border countries have a negative impact on government revenues of neighbor countries. However, the adverse effects of natural disasters are dampened in countries with high level of resilience capacity and stronger governance. |
| Keywords: | Natural disasters ; Tax revenue ; Resilience capacity ; Corruption. |
| JEL: | P52 E62 H20 O11 Q54 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1771&r=res |
| By: | Klemetsen, Marit E. (University of Oslo/Statistics Norway); Rosendahl, Knut Einar (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Lund Jakobsen, Anja (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impacts of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on the envi- ronmental and economic performance of Norwegian plants. The EU ETS is regarded as the cornerstone climate policy both in the EU and in Norway, but there has been considerable de- bate regarding its eects due to low quota prices and substantial allocation of free allowances to the manufacturing industry. Both quota prices and allocation rules have changed signicantly between the three phases of the ETS. The rich data allow us to investigate potential eects of the ETS on several important aspects of plant behavior. The results indicate a weak tendency of emissions reductions among Norwegian plants in the second phase of the ETS, but not in the other phases. We nd no signicant eects on emissions intensity in any of the phases, but positive eects on value added and productivity in the second phase. Positive eects on value added and productivity may be due to the large amounts of free allowances, and that plants may have passed on the additional marginal costs to consumers. |
| Keywords: | Tradable emissions quotas; emissions intensity; productivity; propensity score matching; dierence-in-dierences |
| JEL: | C23 C54 D22 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2016–02–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2016_003&r=res |
| By: | Achim Hagen (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Leonhard Kaehler (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Klaus Eisenack (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores transnational environmental agreements on climate change. As the Paris agreement of 2015 contains no binding emission reduction targets for nation states, understanding other forms of cooperation as complements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process becomes increasingly important. We thus aim to identify directions for further research on agreements with heterogeneous contracting parties. By building on empirical examples of emerging transnational environmental agreements, and on insights from the global governance literature, we discuss the scope and limits of the current economic literature on international environmental agreements. We argue that further game theoretical research would benefit from extending the analysis (i) to consider actors that are not nation state governments, and (ii) to consider multiple environmental agreements that are in force at the same time. We underpin this claim by suggesting two proposals for economic models that analyze climate clubs and city alliances. The results show that transnational environmental agreements can be individually rational and can improve the effectiveness of climate policies. |
| Keywords: | heterogeneous actors, international environmental agreements, transnational agreements |
| JEL: | C72 Q54 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:387&r=res |
| By: | Shintaro Kurachi (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University); Kazuaki Sato (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Leo Shimamura (Faculty of Economics, Keio University) |
| Abstract: | This article shows how the policy of imposing an environmental tax diffused through Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Tax policy continues to depend on political factors, even though globalization has progressed recently. However, policy coordination in international organizations and between developed countries also affects tax policy. There are three underlying factors for relating the introduction and enlargement of environmental tax to international cooperation. First, environmental problems have been internationalized. Particularly, global warming and acid rain are no longer just regional environmental problems, and international capital flows have enhanced these problems' importance. Second, environmental taxation may become an alternative means of raising financial resources in place of the decreasing income tax rate and may also facilitate international capital flows. Actually, the tax structures in developed countries have tended to move from direct to indirect taxation since the 1980s. Third, if a small country introduces environmental taxation in advance under the open global economy, its competiveness might decrease owing to increasing domestic product cost. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce deduction rules for industry incentives simultaneously with the introduction or increase of environmental tax. Environmental taxation may offer a double dividend, not only improving the environment but also reducing tax system costs. However, this measure may cause the double dividend to decrease. Considering this environmental problem and international aspects of environmental taxation together, international policy cooperation over environmental taxation or the introduction of global environmental taxation emerge as options for developed countries. Carbon tax was introduced in Finland (1990), Sweden (1991), Norway (1991), Denmark (1992), and the Netherlands (1992), in succession. The policy of imposing a carbon tax subsequently diffused among the European Union (EU) countries: for example, England (2001) and Germany (1998~). However, with the exception of Switzerland and Ireland, the policy of environmental taxation has not diffused since the 1990s. In EU countries, the share of tax revenue from environmental tax in the GDP and overall revenue has decreased. This article argues that the failure of the movement toward environmental taxation in the 1990s has a path dependency. Previous research shows that the Nordic Council coordinated carbon tax introduction in Nordic countries. Although the carbon tax rate that Nordic countries introduced was very low, a deduction was introduced to avoid decreasing competiveness (Andersen, M., E. Martin & A. Ryelund, 2006:11). The pace of environmental taxation policy diffusion has been slower and flatter than that of other environmental policies, although this mechanism was based not on legal harmonization and levied compulsory burden, but information exchange between policy makers (Busch, P. & H. J?rgens, 2005). The environmental tax rate was low and policy diffusion was slow because of the strong stance of domestic actors against a policy decision. On the other hand, to facilitate the introduction of environmental taxation in the Netherlands, the EC model proposed in the 1980s was adopted (Andersen, M., E. Martin & A. Ryelund, 2006:11). Simultaneously, the Netherlands took the position that "it should be evaluated from the point of view of whether introduction by one country may inspire international introduction" (Okuma, 1993:154). However, researchers do not always discuss how international cooperation in Nordic countries or the Netherlands affected environmental taxation coordination. Therefore, this article analyzes how the introduction of environmental (carbon) tax in Nordic countries and the Netherlands related to international cooperation in the EU or Nordic Council through consideration of environmental tax theory under the global economy and current policy discussion. This analysis shows the current problem of international cooperation regarding environmental taxation. The findings of this article are as follows. First, tax cooperation in the EU has failed thus far, and the character of cooperation has changed from active proposals against environmental and carbon taxation to tax harmonization to coordinate the competitive conditions in the single market. Thereby, the environmental tax structure corresponded sufficiently to international competiveness and this caused tax exemption and low tax rates. This measure increased political acceptability in each country, although the advantage of environmental tax, for example for cost efficiency, has decreased. Second, the chain introduction of carbon tax in Nordic countries was the result of cooperation using economic measures of environmental policy. The driving factors are (1) coordinating environmental protection and institutions to encourage voluntary domestic environmental legislation, (2) resolving the problem of international competiveness and carbon dioxide emissions, (3) finding alternate tax resources for decreasing income tax rates associated with the introduction of dual income taxation. However, while voluntary policy cooperation in Nordic countries made policy diffusion easier, it made the integration of tax rates more difficult, and this tax rate difference has remained. Third, the Netherlands was affected by the EC proposal, and supported it when the country introduced the carbon tax. At the same time, institutional design decreases the burden on industry from the point of view of international competiveness. After that, however, the Netherlands has been on an independent path, regardless of the failure of carbon tax harmonization in other EU countries. |
| Keywords: | Environment Taxation, Carbon Taxation, International Cooperation, EU, Nordic Countries |
| JEL: | H23 Q58 F53 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:keo:dpaper:2016-001&r=res |
| By: | Simon Hedlin; Cass R. Sunstein |
| Abstract: | Many officials have been considering whether it is possible or desirable to use choice architecture to increase use of environmentally friendly (?green?) products and activities. The right approach could produce significant environmental benefits, including large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and better air quality. This Article presents new data from an online experiment (N=1,245) in which participants were asked questions about hypothetical green energy programs. The central finding is that active choosing had larger effects than green energy defaults (automatic enrollment in green energy), apparently because of the interaction between people?s feelings of guilt and their feelings of reactance. This finding is driven principally by the fact that when green energy costs more, there is a significant increase in opt-outs from green defaults, whereas with active choosing, green energy retains considerable appeal even when it costs more.More specifically, we report four principal findings. First, forcing participants to make an active choice between a green energy provider and a standard energy provider led to higher enrollment in the green program than did either green energy defaults or standard energy defaults. Second, active choosing caused participants to feel more guilty about not enrolling in the green energy program than did either green energy defaults or standard energy defaults; the level of guilt was positively related to the probability of enrolling. Third, respondents were less likely to approve of the green energy default than of the standard energy default, but only when green energy cost extra, which suggests reactance towards green defaults when enrollment means additional private costs. Fourth, respondents appeared to have inferred that green energy automatically would come at a higher cost and/or be of worse quality than less environmentally friendly energy. These findings raise important questions both for future research and for policymaking. If they reflect real-world behavior, they suggest the potentially large effects of active choosing ? perhaps larger, in some cases, than those of green energy defaults. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qsh:wpaper:320286&r=res |