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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒12‒20
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Edward J. Balistreri (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines); Daniel T. Kaffine (Department of Economics, University of Colorado, at Boulder); Hidemichi Yonezawa (Institute of the Environment, University of Ottawa) |
| Keywords: | climate policy, border tax adjustments, carbon leakage, trade and carbon taxes |
| JEL: | F18 Q54 Q40 K33 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mns:pbrief:wp2014-03&r=res |
| By: | Pierre Bentata (Université de Paris 2, CRED); Yolande Hiriart (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE, IUF) |
| Abstract: | Using an original database of 614 judgements in the French supreme courts from 1956 to 2010, we test for possible biases in judges’ decisions in the field of environmental accidents, focusing on a difference in treatment between private parties and the government as litigant. Two separate institutions deal with environmental cases in France, namely the Conseil d’E´tat (Supreme Administrative Tribunal) for public utilities and central and local government, and the Cour de cassation (Supreme Civil Court) for private firms. We run bivariate Probit regressions to explain pro-defendant decisions and reversals of decisions. Overall, courts treat plaintiffs and defendants differently. A pro-defendant decision and a reversal of decision are less likely to occur: (i) when the appeal is initiated by the defendant rather than by the plaintiff; (ii) in the Conseil d’Etat rather than in the Cour de cassation. The Conseil d’Etat is harsher with defendants than the Cour de cassation. These results could be indicative of a bias of the lower administrative tribunals in favor of public utilities and/or the government. |
| Keywords: | environmental accidents, French cases, litigation, Appellate Courts, judicial review, judicial behavior, biased judges, administrative tribunals |
| JEL: | K13 K32 K41 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-17&r=res |
| By: | Acemoglu, Daron (Massachusetts Institute of Technology and CIFAR); Akcigit , Ufuk (University of Pennsylvania); Hanley, Douglas (University of Pittsburgh); Kerr, William R. (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a microeconomic model of endogenous growth where clean and dirty technologies compete in production and innovation–in the sense that research can be directed to either clean or dirty technologies. If dirty technologies are more advanced to start with, the potential transition to clean technology can be difficult both because clean research must climb several rungs to catch up with dirty technology and because this gap discourages research effort directed towards clean technologies. Carbon taxes and research subsidies may nonetheless encourage production and innovation in clean technologies, though the transition will typically be slow. We characterize certain general properties of the transition path from dirty to clean technology. We then estimate the model using a combination of regression analysis on the relationship between R&D and patents, and simulated method of moments using microdata on employment, production, R&D, firm growth, entry and exit from the US energy sector. The model’s quantitative implications match a range of moments not targeted in the estimation quite well. We then characterize the optimal policy path implied by the model and our estimates. Optimal policy makes heavy use of research subsidies as well as carbon taxes. We use the model to evaluate the welfare consequences of a range of alternative policies. |
| Keywords: | carbon cycle; directed technological change; environment; innovation; optimal policy |
| JEL: | C65 O30 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2015–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2015_026&r=res |
| By: | Marcelo Caffera, Alejandro Lagomarsino (Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Universidad de Montevideo) |
| Abstract: | This paper fills a gap in the literature by providing empirical estimates of the effect that enforcement actions by municipal and national authorities have on the level of both reported and actual emissions (as measured by sampling inspections) of industrial plants. In a regulatory framework where non-complying is ubiquitous and most violations are not followed by a sanction, we provide evidence consistent with under-reporting of BOD discharges by industrial plants. Previous empirical analyses on environmental enforcement either did not deal with this question or were not able to find such evidence. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lae:wpaper:201466&r=res |
| By: | Marcela Jaime Torres (University of Gothenburg – University of Concepcion) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of an information campaign aimed at encouraging residential water-savings in Colombia. The experiment was organized as a randomised control trial, consisting of monthly delivery of consumption reports including normative messages during one year. We first evaluate the direct and indirect effects of the campaign, and then we investigate whether indirect effects are due to social networks. Results indicate that social information and appeal to norm-based behaviour has decreased water use by 5.4% during the first year following the intervention. We also find significant but short-term evidence of spillover effects. Nevertheless, these effects cannot be explained by social networks alone when social connectedness is proxied by both social and geographic proximity. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lae:wpaper:201469&r=res |