nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2015‒10‒10
six papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Environmental Disasters and Migration By Mbaye, Linguère Mously; Zimmermann, Klaus F.
  2. On the Social Value of Disclosed Information and Environmental Regulation By Jihad C. Elnaboulsi; W. Daher; Yigit Saglam
  3. Some implications of environmental regulation on social welfare under learning-by-doing of eco-products By Koji Kotani; Makoto Kakinaka
  4. The Abnormal Returns of Corporate Environmental Initiatives in China: A Customer Awareness Perspective By Hugo Lam; Andy Yeung
  5. Beliefs, politics, and environmental policy By Antony Millner; Hélène Ollivier
  6. Strategic environmental regulation of multiple pollutants By Ambec, Stefan; Coria, Jessica

  1. By: Mbaye, Linguère Mously (African Development Bank); Zimmermann, Klaus F. (IZA and University of Bonn)
    Abstract: This paper reviews the effect of environmental disasters on migration. Although there is an increase of environmental disasters and migration over the past years, the relationship is complex. While some authors find that environmental disasters increase migration, others show that they have only a marginal or no effect or are even negative. Migration appears to be an insurance mechanism against environmental shocks. Remittances help to decrease households' vulnerability to shocks but also dampen their adverse effects. Finally, we discuss policy implications and future research avenues.
    Keywords: environmental shocks, forced migration, remittances, migration as insurance, floods, earthquakes, droughts
    JEL: J61 O15 Q54 Q56
    Date: 2015–09
  2. By: Jihad C. Elnaboulsi (CRESE, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté); W. Daher (Gulf University for Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Natural Science); Yigit Saglam (Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance)
    Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of environmental policy in imperfectly competitive market with private information. We examine how environmental taxes should be optimally levied when the regulator faces asymmetric information about production and abatement costs in an irreversible observable policy commitment game. Under our setting, the paper investigates how information disclosure can improve the efficiency of the tax setting process and may o¤er an e¢ cient complement to conventional regulatory approaches. From a policy perspective, our ?ndings suggest that access to publicly disclosed information improves the ability of the regulator to levy ?rms? speci?c environmental taxes. Despite its advantages, however, informational disclosure may harm the environmental policy it purports to enhance since it facilitates collusive behavior. We show that information sharing may occur and thus leads to a superior outcome in terms of industry output and emissions. Disclosure may undermine market performance and environmental policy.
    Keywords: Environmental Regulation, Emissions Taxes, Collusion, Disclosed Information, Private Information, Information Sharing.
    JEL: D81 D82 H23 L51 Q58
    Date: 2015–10
  3. By: Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Makoto Kakinaka (International University of Japan)
    Abstract: This paper examines the significance of environmental regulation in an economy where an eco-product supplied by a single producer is differentiated from a conventional product generating negative externalities. We develop two types of the model: one is a static model without learning effect of eco-product planning, and the other is a dynamic model with learning effect. We show that the regulation should be adopted when the marginal cost of the eco-product production is high enough in a static setting. In a dynamic model, however, whether the regulation improves social welfare is dependent not only on current marginal costs of the eco-product but also on the degree of dynamic learning effect. Particularly, the regulation could improve social welfare when learning effect is either small or large enough, while it could deteriorate social welfare in an intermediate case. Although intuitions tell us that the value of the regulation appears to be monotonically increasing in learning effect, our results suggest that the value possesses a nonmonotone U-shaped feature with respect to learning effect. The optimal decision of the regulation in a dynamic setting could be converse to that of a static setting, providing important policy implications of learning potentials.
    Keywords: eco-product, environmental regulation, product differentiation, learning-by-doing
    Date: 2015–09
  4. By: Hugo Lam (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University); Andy Yeung (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University)
    Abstract: The abnormal returns of corporate environmental initiatives (CEIs) in developed countries such as USA has been intensively studied, but there is a scarcity of related research in the context of developing countries such as China. This may be due to the belief that firms in China are unable to get any positive returns from their CEIs because of the relatively low environmental awareness of Chinese customers. While we agree that the abnormal returns of CEIs in China, on average, might be not statistically significant, we argue that the magnitude of the abnormal returns should vary across CEIs depending on the customer awareness of the specific CEIs concerned. As a result, we hypothesize that the abnormal returns will be more positive for those CEIs with higher customer awareness, such as recent (rather than early) CEIs, product-driven (rather than process-driven) CEIs, and third-party verified (rather than self-declared) CEIs. We will conduct an event study based on the CEIs announcements of public firms listed in China to test our hypotheses.
    Keywords: corporate environmental initiatives; abnormal returns; event study; China.
  5. By: Antony Millner; Hélène Ollivier
    Abstract: The public often perceives environmental problems differently from the experts who study them. The regulatory response to these problems also often does not coincide with experts’ recommendations. These two facts are mutually consistent – it is unlikely that regulations based on factual claims that are substantially different from voters’ opinions would be political feasible. Given that the public’s beliefs constrain policy choices, it is vital to understand how they come about, whether they will be biased, and how the inevitable heterogeneity in people’s beliefs filters through the political system to affect policy. We survey recent theoretical and empirical work on individual inference, social learning, and the supply of information by the media, and identify the potential for biased beliefs to arise. We then examine the interaction between beliefs and politics. We ask whether national elections and votes in legislatures can be expected to result in accurate collective decisions, how heterogeneous beliefs may induce strategic political actors to alter their policy choices, and how persuasion by experts and lobbies affects the information at policy-makers’ disposal. We conclude by suggesting that the relationship between beliefs and policy choices is a relatively neglected aspect of the theory of environmental regulation, and a fruitful area for further research.
    Date: 2015–08
  6. By: Ambec, Stefan; Coria, Jessica
    Abstract: We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control global and local pollution such as greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost function of the polluting firms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated by distinct entities (global versus local), potentially with different instruments that are designed according to some specific agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the timing of the regulations matter for efficiency. Emissions of local pollution are distorted if the local regulators anticipate that global pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The regulation is too (not enough) stringent when abatement efforts exhibit economies (diseconomies) of scope. In contrast, we obtain efficiency if the global pollutant is regulated by tax provided that the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a lump-sum way.
    Keywords: Environmental regulation, multiple-pollutants, policy spillovers, emission tax, emission standard, emissions trading
    JEL: D62 Q50 Q53 Q54 Q58
    Date: 2015–09–21

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