nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2015‒08‒25
five papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. On Abatement Services: Market Power and Efficient Environmental Regulation By Damien Sans; Sonia Schwartz; Hubert Stahn
  2. About Polluting Eco-Industries: Optimal Provision of Abatement Goods and Pigouvian Fees By Damien Sans; Sonia Schwartz; Hubert Stahn
  3. Environmental Policy and Inequality: A Matter of Life and Death By Karine Constant
  4. How Green is my Firm? Workers' Attitudes and Behaviors towards Job in Environmentally Related Firms By Joseph Lanfranchi; Sanja Pekovic
  5. The carbon-constrained EOQ model with carbon emission dependent demand By V Hovelaque; L Bironneau

  1. By: Damien Sans (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Sonia Schwartz (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Hubert Stahn (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université)
    Abstract: In this paper, we study an eco-industry providing an environmental service to a competitive polluting sector. We show that even if this eco-industry is highly concentrated, a standard environmental policy based on a Pigouvian tax or a pollution permit market reaches the first-best outcome, challenging the Tinbergen rule. To illustrate this point, we first consider an upstream monopoly selling eco-services to a representative polluting firm. We progressively extend our result to heterogeneous downstream polluters and heterogeneous upstream Cournot competitors. Finally, we underline some limits of this result. It does not hold under the assumption of abatement goods or downstream market power. In this last case, we obtain Barnett's result.
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01182200&r=res
  2. By: Damien Sans (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Sonia Schwartz (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Hubert Stahn (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université)
    Abstract: In this article we introduce a polluting eco-industry. Depending on the level of the damage, we find one of two optimal equilibria. If the damage is low, we generalize the usual results of the economic literature to the polluting eco-industry: the dirty firm partially abates their emissions, only efficient eco-industry firms produce and the abatement level increases with the damage. However, we obtain very specific results if the damage is high. In this case, not all efficient eco-industry firms produce. The abatement level and the number of active eco-industry firms both decrease as the damage increases. We finally show that a well-designed Pigouvian tax implements these equilibria in a competitive economy.
    Date: 2014–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01083464&r=res
  3. By: Karine Constant (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the economic implications of an environmental policy when we take into account the life expectancy of heterogeneous agents. In a framework where everyone suffers from pollution, but health status depends also on individual human capital, we find that the economy may be stuck in a trap where inequalities persistently grow, when the initial level of pollution is too high. Therefore, we study whether a tax on pollution associated with an investment in pollution abatement can be used to reduce inequalities and to improve endogenous growth. We obtain that a tighter environmental policy may allow the economy to escape the inequality trap and hence to converge to a long-term equilibrium without inequality, while it enhances the long-term growth rate. However, if inequalities or pollution are initially too high, such a result does not hold for reasonable tax rates.
    Date: 2015–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01174052&r=res
  4. By: Joseph Lanfranchi (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Sorbonne Universités, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé); Sanja Pekovic (University Paris-Dauphine DRM-DMSP (CNRS UMR 7088) - DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine - DMSP - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine - CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)
    Abstract: The implementation of environmental standards can be facilitated by motivating workers with pro-social preferences. Therefore, we study if employees working for firms achieving registration for environmental-related standards are more likely to display positive attitudes toward their job, to be actively involved in their jobs and to donate effort. Using a French matched employer-employee database, we find that these "green employees" report a significantly higher perception of usefulness and equitable recognition at work. Besides, they are more likely to work uncompensated overtime hours. Finally, if the adoption of environmental standards is shown to have no direct influence on job involvement, we expose how it indirectly impacts job involvement through the mediation of employees' reported perception of usefulness and equitable recognition at work.
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01081059&r=res
  5. By: V Hovelaque (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); L Bironneau (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1)
    Abstract: Currently companies are looking for solutions to reduce carbon emissions associated with their operations. Operational adjustments, such as modifications in batch sizes or order quantities, have proven to be an effective way to decrease emissions. In this paper, a novel model is proposed that takes into account the link between an inventory policy (EOQ), total carbon emissions, and both price and environmental dependent demand. In the case of an exogenous price, two optimal quantities are determined which maximize a retailer's profit and which minimize carbon emissions. Conditions that allow a company to maximize profit while minimizing emissions and mechanisms that allow a firm to maximize its profit and to decrease its carbon emissions are determined. In the case of an endogenous price, some empirical results are also discussed. When a firm optimizes its profit through both its selling price and its order quantity, some experiments match empirical observations. On the one hand, an environmental strategy is more significant for cheaper and green-labeled products. On the other hand, a public mechanism such as a carbon tax will decrease total and marginal emissions.
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01103463&r=res

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