nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2015‒08‒19
seven papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Inequality as pollution, pollution as inequality By Eloi Laurent
  2. Environmental quality, public debt and economic development By Mouez Fodha; Thomas Seegmuller
  3. Reconcile the fight against transboundary pollution and economic convergence into an union ? By Théophile Bassene; Albert Millogo
  4. Scope of Economic Incentives and Abatement Technologies to Regulate a Natural System's Resilience in a General Equilibrium Model By David Tobón Orozco; Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa; Carlos Andrés Molina Guerra
  5. Pollution, Unequal Lifetimes and Fairness By Grégory Ponthière
  6. Land use dynamics and the environment By Carmen Camacho; Agustín Pérez-Barahona
  7. US Climate Policy: A Critical Assessment of Intensity Standards By Christoph Böhringer; Xaquín Garcia-Muros; Mikel Gonzalez-Eguino; Luis Rey

  1. By: Eloi Laurent (OFCE - OFCE - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: Ecological crises born with the Anthropocene have arrived at a paradoxical juncture: as environmental degradations gradually become unbearable, environmental concern seems to become intolerable. One can think of two powerful forces at play behind this striking paradox sidestepping environmental emergency when it is most warranted (...).
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Mouez Fodha (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Thomas Seegmuller (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université)
    Abstract: This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax and/or public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental-poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state.
    Date: 2014
  3. By: Théophile Bassene (Université de Strasbourg); Albert Millogo (UTLN - Université de Toulon)
    Abstract: In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of environmental policy in economic union in the presence of transboundary pollution. We seek to determine the environmental policy instrument capable of reconciling effective fight against transboundary pollution and economic convergence. With an overlapping generations modelization, we show that when transboundary pollution emanates from the least developed country of the Union, applying the polluter pays principle leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium from an of view overall. Only a technological cooperation effectively fights against transboundary pollution without compromising the economic convergence process.
    Abstract: Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à l'efficacité de la politique environnementale dans une union économique en présence d'une pollution transfrontalière. Nous cherchons à déterminer l'instrument de politique environnementale capable de concilier lutte efficace contre la pollution transfrontalière et convergence économique. A l'aide d'une modélisation à générations imbriquées, nous montrons que lorsque la pollution transfrontalière émane du pays le moins avancé de l'union, appliquer le principe du pollueur-payeur conduit à un équilibre sous-optimal d'un point de vue global. Seule une coopération technologique permettrait de lutter efficacement contre la pollution transfrontalière sans compromettre le processus de rattrapage économique.
    Date: 2015–04–24
  4. By: David Tobón Orozco (Universidad de Antioquia); Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa (Universidad de Antioquia); Carlos Andrés Molina Guerra
    Abstract: This paper discusses a general equilibrium model consisting of a productive sector generating externalities on another sector having clean production, and on consumers, affecting the property of resilience of a natural system that feeds the economic system. The scope of efficiency of economic incentives is analyzed simultaneously with production activities in the polluting sector and the use of a pollution abatement technology. Our model predicts a boomerang effect: the polluting sector could find itself in a worse situation in the equilibrium with externalities; this sector initiated the problem, but at the end it is highly affected. In any case, the use of economic incentives helps keep pollution levels to maintain more valuable equilibria of nature.
    Keywords: Isagen, Colombia, Public utility, privatization
    JEL: D50 H23 Q56
    Date: 2015
  5. By: Grégory Ponthière (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: Pollution is a major cause of mortality, leading to substantial inequalities in lifetime well-being across individuals. This paper characterizes the optimal level of pollution in a two-period OLG economy where pollution deteriorates survival conditions. We compare two long-run social optima: on the one hand, the average utilitarian optimum, where the long-run average well-being is maximized, and, on the other hand, the ex post egalitarian optimum, where the well-being of the worst-o¤ at the stationary equilibrium is maximized. It is shown that the ex post egalitarian optimum involves a higher level of pollution in comparison with the utilitarian optimum. This result is robust to introducing health expenditures in the survival function. Finally, we examine the decentralization of those two social optima, and we compare the associated optimal taxes on capital income aimed at internalizing the pollution externality.
    Date: 2014–12
  6. By: Carmen Camacho (CNRS, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - [-]); Agustín Pérez-Barahona (ECO-PUB - Economie Publique - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - AgroParisTech, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X)
    Abstract: This paper builds a benchmark framework to study optimal land use, encompassing land use activities and environmental degradation. We focus on the spatial externalities of land use as drivers of spatial patterns: land is immobile by nature, but local actions affect the whole space since pollution flows across locations resulting in both local and global damages. We prove that the decision maker problem has a solution, and characterize the corresponding social optimum trajectories by means of the Pontryagin conditions. We also show that the existence and uniqueness of time-invariant solutions are not in general guaranteed. Finally, a global dynamic algorithm is proposed in order to illustrate the spatial-dynamic richness of the model. We find that our simple set-up already reproduces a great variety of spatial patterns related to the interaction between land use activities and the environment. In particular, abatement technology turns out to play a central role as pollution stabilizer, allowing the economy to reach a time-invariant equilibrium that can be spatially heterogeneous.
    Date: 2014–10–13
  7. By: Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Xaquín Garcia-Muros (Basque Centre for Climate Change, Bilbao, Spain); Mikel Gonzalez-Eguino (Basque Centre for Climate Change, Bilbao, Spain); Luis Rey (Basque Country (UPV-EHU), Bilbao, Spain)
    Abstract: Intensity standards have gained substantial momentum as a regulatory instrument in US climate policy. Based on numerical simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model we show that intensity standards may rather increase than decrease counterproductive carbon leakage. Moreover, standards can lead to considerable welfare losses compared to emission pricing via carbon taxation or an emissions trading system. The tradability of standards across industries is a mechanism that can reduce these negative effects.
    Keywords: Unilateral climate policy; carbon leakage, intensity sstandard, computable general equilibrium
    JEL: D21 H23 D58
    Date: 2015–07

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