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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒12‒13
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Matthew E. Kahn; Randall Walsh |
| Abstract: | This paper surveys recent literature examining the relationship between environmental amenities and urban growth. In this survey, we focus on the role of both exogenous attributes such as climate and coastal access as well as endogenous attributes such as local air pollution and green space. A city's greenness is a function of both its natural beauty and is an emergent property of the types of households and firms that locate within its borders and the types of local and national regulations enacted by voters. We explore four main issues related to sustainability and environmental quality in cities. First, we introduce a household locational choice model to highlight the role that environmental amenities play in shaping where households locate within a city. We then analyze how ongoing suburbanization affects the carbon footprint of cities. Third, we explore how the system of cities is affected by urban environmental amenity dynamics and we explore the causes of these dynamics. Fourth, we review the recent literature on the private costs and benefits of investing in "green" buildings. Throughout this survey, we pay careful attention to empirical research approaches and highlight what are open research questions. While much of the literature focuses on cities in the developed world, we anticipate that similar issues will be of increased interest in developing nation's cities. |
| JEL: | Q4 Q5 R1 R3 R4 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20503&r=res |
| By: | Ralf Martin |
| Abstract: | Policies on climate change that encourage 'clean innovation' while displacing 'dirty innovation' could have a positive impact on short-term economic growth while avoiding the potentially disastrous reduction in GDP that could result from climate change over the longer term. |
| Keywords: | Innovation spill-overs, Climate Change, Growth, Patents, Clean technology, Optimal climate policy |
| JEL: | O30 O44 Q54 Q55 Q58 H23 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:ceppap:017&r=res |
| By: | Siriwardana, Mahinda |
| Abstract: | This paper examines both economic and environmental impacts of the two new free trade agreements (FTAs) that Australia has recently negotiated with Japan and South Korea using the GTAP-E general equilibrium model. We analyse two trade policy scenarios: first a ‘Free trade scenario’ where bilateral tariffs are eliminated between Australia and Japan, and Australia and South Korea; second a ‘Green trade scenario’ where the ‘Free trade scenario’ is complemented by an environmental policy using an emissions trading scheme (ETS). The results indicate that two trade agreements enhance Australia’s trade at a modest expense on the environment. The paper illustrates that an ETS between Australia, Japan and Korea is an expensive policy to mitigate emissions arising from FTAs. |
| Keywords: | Free Trade Agreement, Australia, GTAP-E model, Emissions, Emissions Trading Scheme, International Relations/Trade, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:nzar14:187405&r=res |
| By: | Esther Duflo; Michael Greenstone; Rohini Pande; Nicholas Ryan |
| Abstract: | In collaboration with a state environmental regulator in India, we conducted a field experiment to raise the frequency of environmental inspections to the prescribed minimum for a random set of industrial plants. The treatment was successful when judged by process measures, as treatment plants, relative to the control group, were more than twice as likely to be inspected and to be cited for violating pollution standards. Yet the treatment was weaker for more consequential outcomes: the regulator was no more likely to identify extreme polluters (i.e., plants with emissions five times the regulatory standard or more) or to impose costly penalties in the treatment group. In response to the added scrutiny, treatment plants only marginally increased compliance with standards and did not significantly reduce mean pollution emissions. To explain these results and recover the full costs of environmental regulation, we model the regulatory process as a dynamic discrete game where the regulator chooses whether to penalize and plants choose whether to abate to avoid future sanctions. We estimate this model using original data on 10,000 interactions between plants and the regulator. Our estimates imply that the costs of environmental regulation are largely reserved for extremely polluting plants. Applying the cost estimates to the experimental data, we find the average treatment inspection imposes about half the cost on plants that the average control inspection does, because the randomly assigned inspections in the treatment are less likely than normal discretionary inspections to target such extreme polluters. |
| JEL: | D22 L51 Q56 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20590&r=res |