nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2014‒10‒13
six papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities By Luca Lambertini; Arsen Palestini; Alessandro Tampieri
  2. Environmental regulatory stringency and the market for abatement goods and services in China By Jing Lan; Alistair Munro
  3. Tradable Emission Permits & Environmental Maintenance in an Overlapping Generations General Equilibrium Model By Jules-Eric TCHAPCHET TCHOUTO
  4. Evaluation of Carbon Abatement Policies with Assistance to Carbon Intensive Industries in Japan By Azusa Okagawa; Kanemi Ban
  5. The cost of pollution on longevity, welfare and economic stability By Natacha Raffin; Thomas Seegmuller
  6. Effects of Green Tax Reforms in Spain. A New Analytical Approach Integrating Micro and Macro-Economic Models By Xavier LABANDEIRA; José M. LABEAGA; Miguel RODRÍGUEZ

  1. By: Luca Lambertini (Department of Economics, University of Bologna); Arsen Palestini (MEMOTEF, Sappienza university of Rome); Alessandro Tampieri (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)
    Abstract: We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo- poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.
    Keywords: Capital accumulation, asymmetric duopoly, dynamic games
    JEL: C73 H23 L13 O31
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-19&r=res
  2. By: Jing Lan (College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University); Alistair Munro (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)
    Abstract: We provide an examination of the linkage between environmental regulation stringency and the demand for and supply of abatement goods and services. To that end we construct a five-equation simultaneous model that links environmental regulation stringency to abatement output through various underlying simultaneous mechanisms. This system is then estimated using a panel of 679 eco-firms in 78 industrial Chinese cities during the implementation period of collection and use of pollution discharge fees (promulgated by the Chinese State Council) from 2003 to 2007. We find that higher fees are generally associated with higher abatement supply but for some industries – notably wastewater treatment – there is evidence of ‘output restriction’, meaning that higher charges lead to a reduction in supply for established firms.
    Date: 2014–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ngi:dpaper:14-18&r=res
  3. By: Jules-Eric TCHAPCHET TCHOUTO
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:000238:23800141&r=res
  4. By: Azusa Okagawa; Kanemi Ban
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:000240:24000046&r=res
  5. By: Natacha Raffin; Thomas Seegmuller
    Abstract: This paper presents an overlapping generations model where pollution, private and public healths are all determinants of longevity. Public expenditure, financed through labour taxation, provide both public health and abatement. We study the complementarity between the three components of longevity on welfare and economic stability. At the steady state, we show that an appropriate fiscal policy may enhance welfare. However, when pollution is heavily harmful for longevity, the economy might experience aggregate instability or endogenous cycles. Nonetheless, a fiscal policy, which raises the share of public spending devoted to health, may display stabilizing virtues and rule out cycles. This allows us to recommend the design of the public policy that may comply with the dynamic and welfare objectives.
    Keywords: Longevity; Pollution; Welfare; Complex dynamics.
    JEL: J10 O40 Q56 C62
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-47&r=res
  6. By: Xavier LABANDEIRA; José M. LABEAGA; Miguel RODRÍGUEZ
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:003306:330600086&r=res

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