nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2014‒02‒08
six papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. CARBON TARIFFS REVISITED By Christoph Böhringer; André Müller; Jan Schneider
  2. Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision By Robert Hahn; Robert Ritz
  3. Imperfect resource substitution and optimal transition to clean technologies By VARDAR, N. Baris
  4. The Principal-Agent Model with Multilateral Externalities: An Application to Climate Agreements By Carsten Helm; Franz Wirl
  5. Do Environmental Policies Hurt Trade Performance? By Jean-Louis Combes; Pascale Combes Motel; Somlanare Romuald KINDA
  6. Economic Status, Air Quality, and Child Health: Evidence from Inversion Episodes By Jans, Jenny; Johansson, Per; Nilsson, Peter

  1. By: Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); André Müller (Ecoplan, Bern, Switzerland); Jan Schneider (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Concerns about adverse impacts on domestic energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries are at the fore of the political debate about unilateral climate policies. Tariffs on the carbon embodied in imported goods from countries without emission pricing appeal as a measure to reduce carbon leakage and protect domestic EITE industries. We show that the introduction of carbon tariffs can do more harm than good to domestic EITE industries. Two determinants drive the sign and magnitude of EITE impacts. Firstly, the composition of embodied emissions in goods: if a large share of embodied carbon is imported in intermediate inputs, industries might suffer from carbon tariffs. Secondly, the share of domestic output that is supplied to the export market: while carbon tariffs level the playing field on domestic markets, they increase the cost-disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors from abroad in foreign markets.
    Keywords: carbon tariffs, unilateral climate policy, multi-region input-output analysis, CGE
    JEL: Q58 D57 D58
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:364&r=res
  2. By: Robert Hahn; Robert Ritz
    Abstract: We present a model of altruistically-minded-yet rational-players contributing to a public good. A key feature is the tension between altruism and "crowding-out" effects (players' efforts are strategic substitutes). We find that more altruistic behaviour can raise or reduce welfare, depending on the fine details of the environment. It is almost always optimal for a player to act more selfishly than her true preference. We discuss applications to a range of public good problems, including global climate policy. Our results highlight that it may be difficult to infer social preferences from observed behaviour.
    Keywords: Altruism, climate policy, crowding out, public goods
    JEL: D03 H23 H41 Q58
    Date: 2014–01–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1403&r=res
  3. By: VARDAR, N. Baris (Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: Non-renewable and renewable resources are imperfect substitutes due to technical and geographical constraints. What is the role of imperfect substitution on the optimal transition path to the clean technologies? We address this question by characterizing the optimal growth path and resource use of an economy. We show that the economy initially starts with using the non-renewable and renewable resources simultaneously and gradually increases the share of renewable. The outcome can be either (i) the economy switches to a backstop at a certain date or (ii) the initial regime lasts forever. The results show that the economy converges to a steady state even if the backstop is too costly and a green, zero-carbon economy is the optimal final state in any case. We also present some simulation results to illustrate the shapes of the optimal paths. This analysis allows us to discuss the policy implications and question the existence of the Green Paradox.
    Keywords: imperfect substitution, optimal transition, non-renewable resource, renewable resource, backstop, simultaneous use, switching, Green Paradox
    JEL: Q43 Q42 Q30 Q20
    Date: 2014–01–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2013072&r=res
  4. By: Carsten Helm (University of Oldenburg - Public Economics & ZenTra); Franz Wirl (University of Vienna, Center of Business Studies)
    Abstract: We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an interna- tional climate agreement given private information about the willingness- to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payo§ for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.
    Keywords: private information, multilateral externalities, mecha- nism design, environmental agreements, type-dependent outside options
    JEL: D82 Q54 H87
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zen:wpaper:32&r=res
  5. By: Jean-Louis Combes (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Pascale Combes Motel (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Somlanare Romuald KINDA (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)
    Abstract: This paper contributes to the controversial literature on the relationship between environmental policies and international trade. It provides new evidence about the effect of a gap in environmental policies between trading partners on trade flow on a sample of developed and developing countries over the 1980-2010 period. The paper innovates on two aspects. First, while previous studies have used partial measures of environmental regulations (input-oriented or output-oriented indicators), an index of a country's environmental policy is computed. This index is calculated as the difference between observed pollution levels and "structural" pollution i.e. pollution predicted by determinants of environmental degradation as identified and modelled in the literature. This index is therefore a measure of "revealed" efforts made by countries aiming at downsizing environmental degradation. Second, the effect of these revealed environmental policies is assessed on bilateral trade flows in a gravity model. A particular attention is paid to similarities in environmental policies. Our results show that a gap in domestic efforts towards environmental protection between trading partners has no effect on exports. Moreover, the results do not appear to be conditional on the level of development of the countries trading nor on the characteristics of exported goods (manufactured goods and primary commodities).
    Keywords: Trade;Environmental policies;Gravity Model
    Date: 2014–01–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00939249&r=res
  6. By: Jans, Jenny (Uppsala University); Johansson, Per (IFAU); Nilsson, Peter (IIES, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: On normal days, the temperature decreases with altitude, allowing air pollutants to rise and disperse. During inversion episodes, a warmer air layer at higher altitude traps pollutants close to the ground. We show how readily available NASA satellite data on vertical temperature profiles can be used to measure inversion episodes on a global scale with high spatial and temporal resolution. Then, we link inversion episode data to ground level pollution monitors and to daily in- and outpatient records for the universe of children in Sweden during a six-year period to provide instrumental variable estimates of the effects of air quality on children's health. The IV estimates show that the respiratory illness health care visit rate increases by 8 percent for each 10 μm/m³ increase in PM10; an estimate four times higher than conventional estimates. Importantly, by linking the health care data to detailed records of parental background characteristics, we show that children from low-income households suffer significantly more from air pollution than children from high income households. Finally, we provide evidence on the importance of several mechanisms that could contribute to the difference in the impact of air pollution across children in rich and poor households.
    Keywords: instrumental variable, environmental policy, inversions, health, air pollution, nonparametric regression, socio-economic gradient in health
    JEL: Q53 I1 I3 J24
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7929&r=res

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