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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2013‒12‒06
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Grimaud, André; Neubauer, Mauricio; Rougé, Luc |
| Abstract: | We study an economy in which a final good is produced by two sectors. One uses a non-renewable and polluting resource, the other a renewable and clean resource. A specific type of research is associated to each sector. The public authorities levy a carbon tax and simultaneously subsidize both research sectors. We study the impact of such a policy scheme on the rate of resource extraction and emissions. The subsidy to research in the clean sector goes in the opposite direction of the effects of the carbon tax. If the tax creates a green paradox, the subsidy moderates it; if the tax slows down resource extraction, then the subsidy generates a green paradox |
| Keywords: | carbon tax, directed technical change, green paradox, R&D policy |
| JEL: | O32 O41 Q20 Q32 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:27734&r=res |
| By: | Clémence Christin (Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, France); Jean-Philippe Nicolai (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Jerome Pouyet (Paris School of Economics, France) |
| Abstract: | Under imperfect competition, the effect of a cap-and-trade system on indus- try profits depends on the type of abatement technology that is used by firms: industries that use process-integrated technologies are more affected than those using end-of-pipe abatement technologies. The interaction between environmental policy and the evolution of the market structure is then studied. In particular, a reserve of pollution permits for new entrants is justified when the industry uses a process-integrated abatement technology, while a system with a preemption right may be justified in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology. |
| Keywords: | Cap-and-trade system; imperfect competition; abatement technologies. |
| JEL: | L13 Q53 Q58 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:13-186&r=res |
| By: | Lenka Wildnerova (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne - PRES HESAM) |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to explore the environmental policies introduced by the government that cares about the welfare of its citizens and the contributions from the lobby groups. Our addition to the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling lobby groups, where we distinguish between local and global pollution. We showed that in some cases, the environmental lobbying might have a negative impact on the tax level, which is not true for the local lobbying. Even more interesting result shows that the presence of supergreens might increase the pollution level in the home country. Our results for the cooperative policies prove that the introduced tax will imply lower global emissions. We demonstrated that the asymmetries in some parameters will reinforce the tax levels in the case of national lobby and supergreens if the asymmetry parameter in the foreign country is larger. |
| Keywords: | environmental lobbying, lobby groups, pollution tax, emission leakage, large countries, local lobby, supergreens |
| Date: | 2013–07–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00906165&r=res |
| By: | Shital Sharma |
| Abstract: | This research studies the link between environmental regulation and plant level productivity in two U.S. manufacturing industries: pulp and paper mills and oil refineries using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models. Data on abatement spending, emissions and abated emissions are used in different DEA models to study plant productivity outcomes when accounting for abatement spending or emissions regulations. Results indicate that pulp and paper mills and oil refineries in the U.S. suffered decreases in productivity due to pollution abatement activities from 1974 to 2000. These losses in productivity are substantial but have been slowly trending downwards even when the regulations have tended to become more stringent and emission of pollutants has declined suggesting that the best practice has shifted over time. Results also show that the reported abatement expenditures are not able to explain all the losses arising out of regulation suggesting that these abatement expenditures are consistently under-reported. |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:13-51&r=res |
| By: | Papageorgiou, Chris; Saam, Marianne; Schulte, Patrick |
| Abstract: | Recently Acemolgu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (AER 2012) formulated a model in which a high macroeconomic elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty production represents a crucial condition for green growth. Until now it has never been systematically estimated. Using a novel panel of cross-country sectoral data, we formulate specifications of nested CES production functions that allow to estimate a special case of this parameter: the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy inputs. Contrary to what is expected based on the earlier interfuel substitution literature, we find evidence that this elasticity exceeds one. -- |
| Keywords: | clean and dirty energy inputs,aggregate elasticity of substitution,CES function,cross-country sectoral data,environmental policy |
| JEL: | O44 O47 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13087&r=res |
| By: | Robert W. Hahn; Robert A. Ritz |
| Abstract: | We evaluate a recent U.S. initiative to include the social cost of carbon (SCC) in regulatory decisions. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic test of the extent to which applying the SCC has affected national policy. We examine all economically significant federal regulations since 2008, and obtain a surprising result: Putting a value on changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not generally affect the ranking of the preferred policy compared with the status quo. Overall, we find little evidence that use of the SCC has affected U.S. policy choices to date. We offer an explanation related to the political economy of regulation. |
| Keywords: | Cost-Benefit Analysis; Social Cost of Carbon; Climate Policy; Regulatory Innovation |
| JEL: | H43 K32 Q51 Q58 |
| Date: | 2013–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1346&r=res |
| By: | Idrissa Sibailly (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, LEI - Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle - Centre de Recherche en Économie et STatistique (CREST)) |
| Abstract: | This note investigates the impact of (international) technology transfer on optimal pollution taxation. To use a patented pollution abatement technology, the polluters subject to the emissions tax only pay fixed license fees to an (international) eco-industry (whose profits are shared among national and foreign suppliers). The second-best emissions tax is shown to decrease as the exogenous share of imported technology increases. When the domestic polluting industry is imperfectly competitive, this tax is always lower than the marginal damage. In contrast, when the polluting industry is perfectly competitive, the second-best emissions tax is lower than the marginal damage only in the case of incoming technology transfer. If the technology is transferred domestically, the second-best emissions tax is equal to the marginal damage. These results contrast with the literature on the impact of market power in the eco-industry on optimal policy design, initiated by David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005). |
| Keywords: | Pigouvian Taxes, Eco-Industry, Technology Transfer, International Trade |
| Date: | 2013–11–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00911464&r=res |