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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2013‒06‒16
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Vasiliki Manousi (Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business); Anastasios Xepapadeas (Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business) |
| Abstract: | We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in both a cooperative and a noncooperative framework, in which we study open loop and feedback solutions. Our results suggests that greenhouse gas accumulation is relatively higher when geoengineering policies are undertaken, and that at noncooperative solutions incentives for geoengineering are relative stronger. A disruption of geoengineering efforts at a steady state will cause an upward jump in global temperature. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Mitigation, Geoengineering, Cooperation, Differential Game, Open Loop - Feedback Nash Equilibrium |
| JEL: | Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.41&r=res |
| By: | Claire Brunel and Arik Levinson (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | Researchers have long been interested in whether environmental regulations discourage investment, reduce labour demand, or alter patterns of international trade. But estimating those consequences of regulations requires devising a means of measuring their stringency empirically. While creating such a measure is often portrayed as a data collection problem, we identify four fundamental conceptual obstacles, which we label multidimensionality, simultaneity, industrial composition, and capital vintage. We then describe the long history of attempts to measure environmental regulatory stringency, and assess their relative success in light of those obstacles. Finally, we propose a new measure of stringency that would be based on emissions data and could be constructed separately for different pollutants. |
| Keywords: | JEL Codes: |
| Date: | 2013–01–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~13-13-02&r=res |
| By: | Bofinger, Heinrich; Strand, Jon |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a new methodology for calculating the"carbon footprint"of air travel whereby emissions from travel in premium (business and first) classes depend heavily on the average class-specific occupied floor space. Unlike methods currently used for the purpose, the approach properly accounts for the fact that the relative number of passenger seats in economy and premium classes is endogenous in the longer term, so adding one additional premium trip crowds out more than one economy trip on any particular flight. It also shows how these differences in carbon attributable to different classes of travel in a carbon footprint calculation correspond to how carbon surcharges on different classes of travel would differ if carbon emissions from international aviation were taxed given a competitive aviation sector globally. The paper shows how this approach affects carbon footprint calculations by applying it to World Bank staff travel for calendar year 2009. |
| Keywords: | Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Roads&Highways,Montreal Protocol,Environmental Economics&Policies |
| Date: | 2013–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6471&r=res |
| By: | TAKARADA Yasuhiro |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the welfare effects of the enforcement of emissions trading systems when the government initially imposes sectorally differentiated environmental regulations. The implementation of emissions trading is generally considered to be welfare enhancing because it equalizes the marginal abatement costs between sectors. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a small open economy is harmed by the enforcement of emissions trading if there is a reasonable relation between the import tariff rate (pollution content tariff) and the initial disparity of environmental regulations across sectors. To avoid welfare deterioration, the government should decrease the import tariff in accordance with mitigation of the sectoral difference in regulations through emissions trading. Our result suggests that the enforcement of emissions trading systems should be accompanied by trade liberalization. Second, in a two-country model, we show that international emissions trading may harm the home country that implements sectorally differentiated environmental regulations and buys emission permits but benefits the foreign country that implements uniform environmental regulations and sells emission permits, if the home country exports clean goods and the foreign country exports pollution intensive goods. The home country may lose from permit trading because its terms of trade deteriorate through changes in production caused by permit trading. This result suggests that a country with sectorally differentiated country should purchase emission permits at a sufficiently low price to benefit from international emission trading. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:13042&r=res |
| By: | Wood, Peter J.; Heindl, Peter; Jotzo, Frank; Löschel, Andreas |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the linking of price-based and quantity-based provision of a public good by two parties in the example of pollution control under a global quantity constraint, using a stochastic partial-equilibrium model. One country chooses a price-based instrument (tax) and trades with another that lets its emissions price adjust. The expected cost for the price-setting country and the combined expected cost is higher than if both countries choose a quantity-based instrument, and the country with the quantity instrument stands to benefit in terms of expected net costs. The effect increases when the relative size of the country with the price-based constraint increases; and increases with respect to the degree of correlation in ex-ante uncertain abatement costs. While the quantity-setting country benefits from lower expected costs in most circumstances, the variance in cost can be much higher if its costs are correlated with the price-setting country. The optimal ex-ante tax rate differs from that under quantity-quantity linking. These results have important implications for instrument choice for the regulation of greenhouse gases and other pollutants and for the design of international agreements when there are domestic preferences for price regulation. The model is applicable to situations involving the provision of a fixed quantity of a public good beyond pollution control. -- |
| Keywords: | Instrument Choice,Linking,Climate Policy,Prices vs. Quantities |
| JEL: | Q52 H23 K32 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13025&r=res |
| By: | Curtis, John A.; di Cosmo, Valeria; Deane, Paul |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effect on Ireland's Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the UK's unilateral policy to implement a carbon price floor for electricity generation based on fossil-fuel. We simulate electricity markets and find that, subject to efficient use of the interconnectors between the two markets, a carbon price floor will lead to carbon leakage, with associated emissions in the Republic of Ireland increasing by 8% and SEM's electricity prices increasing by 2.4%. As the carbon price floor does not affect the number of ETS allowances no change is anticipated in aggregate European emissions. We also find that the EU's proposal to postpone ETS allowance auctions will reduce Irish emissions somewhat but that the trade opportunities associated with the UK carbon price floor means that emissions reductions in Ireland will be lower than might have been otherwise. A carbon price floor will result in substantial tax revenues and had the carbon price floor been implemented in Northern Ireland the larger share of taxes remitted would be paid by Republic of Ireland customers within the SEM. A carbon price floor in the Republic of Ireland is a potential policy option that would generate revenues in excess of ?250 million but associated electricity prices increases in excess of 17% would have significant negative welfare and competitiveness effects. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp458&r=res |