nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2013‒05‒19
eight papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Optimal Learning on Climate Change: Why Climate Skeptics should reduce Emissions By Sweder van Wijnbergen; Tim Willems
  2. Intra-Industry Reallocations and Long-run Impacts of Environmental Regulations By Yoshifumi Konishi; Nori Tarui
  3. Curbing emissions through (efficient) carbon liabilities: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective By Billette de Villemeur, Etienne; Leroux, Justin
  4. The Green Paradox and Learning-by-doing in the Renewable Energy Sector By Daniel Nachtigall; Dirk Rübbelke
  5. What Can be Learned from Behavioural Economics for Environmental Policy? By Markus Pasche
  6. Economic Effects of Global Warming under By Da Rocha, José María; Gutiérrez Huerta, María José; Villasante, Sebastián
  7. Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model By Gerard van der Laan; Nigel Moes
  8. Understanding Tariff Deficit and its Challenges By Espinosa Alejos, María Paz

  1. By: Sweder van Wijnbergen (University of Amsterdam); Tim Willems (Oxford University)
    Abstract: Climate skeptics argue that the possibility that global warming is exogenous implies that we should not take additional action towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions until we know more. However this paper shows that even climate skeptics have an incentive to reduce emissions: such a change of direction facilitates their learning process on the causes of global warming. Since the optimal policy action depends on these causes, they are valuable to know. Although an increase in emissions would also ease learning, that option is shown to be inferior because emitting greenhouse gases is irreversible. Consequently the policy implications of the different positions in the global warming debate turn out to coincide - thereby diminishing the relevance of this debate from a policy perspective. Uncertainty is no reason for inaction.
    Keywords: climate policy, global warming, climate skepticism, active learning, irreversibilities
    JEL: D83 Q54 Q58
    Date: 2012–08–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2012085&r=res
  2. By: Yoshifumi Konishi (Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University); Nori Tarui (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)
    Abstract: We investigate the long-run impact of environmental regulations on the intra-industry distribution of firm-level productivity and the resulting aggregate variables. In a general-equilibrium model that accounts for endogenous entry/exit of heterogeneous firms, neither the average productivity of firms nor the mass of firms is independent of the choice of policy instruments (i.e. emissions tax vs. emissions trading) or permit allocation rules. The equilibrium price of permits under emissions trading is lower than the emissions tax rate that would support the same aggregate emissions. An incomplete emissions market results in a net increase in combined aggregate emissions.
    Keywords: Emissions Tax; Emissions Trading; Heterogeneous Firms; Endogenous Entry/Exit; Melitz Model; Incomplete Regulation; Emissions Leakage
    JEL: Q50 Q52 Q58
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201307&r=res
  3. By: Billette de Villemeur, Etienne; Leroux, Justin
    Abstract: We propose a new climate policy that is efficient, robust, and asks for payments proportional to realized climate damage. In each period, countries are made liable for their share of the responsibility in the current damage. Efficiency follows from countries' anticipations of climate change, hence of future payments. Robustness is achieved thanks to the introduction of a market for carbon liabilities. Rather than being based on the expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with a carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on observed realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of countries.
    Keywords: Climate Change; Ex-ante vs ex-post approach; Carbon Liability
    JEL: H23 K13 Q54
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:46953&r=res
  4. By: Daniel Nachtigall; Dirk Rübbelke
    Abstract: We investigate the effect of climate policies on fossil fuel use in the presence of a clean alternative technology that exhibits learning-by-doing. In a two-period framework, the costs of clean and regenerative energy in the second period are decreasing with the amount of this energy produced in the first one. While a carbon tax on present fossil fuels always reduces the use of the conventional energy source, the effect of a subsidy for regenerative energy is ambiguous and depends on the size of the learning effect. For small learning effects, a subsidy reduces the present use of fossil fuels since their substitute becomes comparatively cheap. However, for larger learning effects, a subsidy leads to the green paradox as the cost reduction in the clean energy sector reduces the future demand for conventional energy and brings forward extraction. We conclude that the best way to reduce present CO2 emissions is the implementation of a carbon tax. If the learning effect is small, the carbon-tax revenues should additionally finance the subsidy for the renewable energy.<br />
    Date: 2013–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2013-09&r=res
  5. By: Markus Pasche (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: Behavioural economics attracted attention from environmental economists: it should help to understand why people do not respond to environmental policy measures, based on neoclassical assumptions, as predicted by theory. Moreover, understanding motives and driving forces behind pro-social, pro-environmental and cooperative behaviour should help to improve environmental policy design. The aim of this paper is a critical discussion of the way how this branch of research is interpreting the explanatory power and the normative (policy) implications of behavioural economics.
    Keywords: Behavioural economics, environmental economics, policy design, methodology
    JEL: B41 D0 D70 Q57 Q58
    Date: 2013–05–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-020&r=res
  6. By: Da Rocha, José María; Gutiérrez Huerta, María José; Villasante, Sebastián
    Abstract: Global warming of the oceans is expected to alter the environmental conditions that determine the growth of a fishery resource. Most climate change studies are based on models and scenarios that focus on economic growth, or they concentrate on simulating the potential losses or cost to fisheries due to climate change. However, analysis that addresses model optimization problems to better understand of the complex dynamics of climate change and marine ecosystems is still lacking. In this paper a simple algorithm to compute transitional dynamics in order to quantify the effect of climate change on the European sardine fishery is presented. The model results indicate that global warming will not necessarily lead to a monotonic decrease in the expected biomass levels. Our results show that if the resource is exploited optimally then in the short run, increases in the surface temperature of the fishery ground are compatible with higher expected biomass and economic profit.
    Keywords: stock growth uncertainty, European sardine fishery,, global warming
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:10021&r=res
  7. By: Gerard van der Laan (VU University Amsterdam); Nigel Moes (VU University Amsterdam)
    Abstract: In this paper we study international river pollution problems. We introduce a model in which the agents (countries) located along a river derive benefit while causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs of experiencing pollution from all upstream agents. We find that total pollution in the model decreases when the agents decide to cooperate. The resulting gain in social welfare can be distributed among the agents based on the property rights over the river. Using principles from international water law we suggest 'fair' ways of distributing the property rights and therefore the cooperative gain.
    Keywords: international river, pollution, externality, property rights, value
    JEL: C70 D60 Q53
    Date: 2012–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2012006&r=res
  8. By: Espinosa Alejos, María Paz
    Abstract: Regulators and market participants have become increasingly concerned about the Spanish electricity tariff deficit due to its size and the difficulties to control its growth. The deficit can be traced to inefficiencies in market organization and solutions should be designed to mitigate those inefficiencies. Tariff deficits have allowed for the transfer of part of the present costs of electricity services to future consumers, but this situation has reached a limit and a deep revision of regulation in this market cannot be postponed. In general, solutions that interfere with market prices and signals are not appropriate.
    Keywords: regulated activities, energy policy, electricity market, renewable energy
    JEL: L51 Q4
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:10012&r=res

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