nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2012‒06‒25
eleven papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Centralized versus decentralized biorefinery configurations for cellulosic ethanol: Can we reconcile environmental sustainability and profitability? By Egbendewe-Mondzozo, Aklesso; Swinton, Scott M.; Bals, Bryan D.; Dale, Bruce E.
  2. Green Havens and Pollution Havens By Steven Poelhekke; Frederick van der Ploeg
  3. Unrevealing Public Preferences for Climate Change Policies in Spain: A Hybrid Mixture Model By Loureiro, Maria L.; Labandeira, Xavier; Hanemann, Michael
  4. Green Hypocrisy?: Environmental Attitudes and Residential Space Heatin g Expenditure By Lange, Ian; Moro, Mirko; Traynor, Laura
  5. Natural Resource Wealth: The challenge of managing a windfall By Frederick van der Ploeg; Anthony J Venables
  6. Protection of environmental water within a market-based framework: an examination of legal approaches in Colorado, Alberta and Australia By Owens, Katherine
  7. Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem? By Tim Swanson; Ben Groom
  8. Political influence on environmental sanction charges in Swedish municipalities By Sjöberg, Eric
  9. Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems By Matthew Ranson; Robert N. Stavins
  10. Sustainability Economics of Groundwater Usage and Management By Knapp, Keith C.; Franklin, Bradley
  11. Greening Africa? Technologies, endowments and the latecomer effect By Paul Collier; Anthony J Venables

  1. By: Egbendewe-Mondzozo, Aklesso; Swinton, Scott M.; Bals, Bryan D.; Dale, Bruce E.
    Abstract: This paper compares environmental and profitability outcomes for a centralized biorefinery for cellulosic ethanol that does all processing versus a biorefinery linked to a decentralized array of local depots that pretreat biomass into concentrated briquettes. The analysis uses a spatial bioeconomic model that maximizes profit from crop and energy products, subject to the requirement that the biorefinery must be operated at full capacity. The model draws upon biophysical crop input-output coefficients simulated with the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model, as well as market input and output prices, spatial transportation costs, ethanol yields from biomass, and biorefinery capital and operational costs. The model was applied to 82 cropping systems simulated across 37 sub-watersheds in a 9-county region of southern Michigan in response to ethanol prices simulated to rise from $1.78 to $3.36 per gallon. Results show that the decentralized local biomass processing depots lead to lower profitability but better environmental performance, due to more reliance on perennial grasses than the centralized biorefinery. Simulated technological improvement that reduces the processing cost and increases the ethanol yield of switchgrass by 17% could cause a shift to more processing of switchgrass, with increased profitability and environmental benefits.
    Keywords: biomass production, bioenergy supply, bioeconomic modeling, cellulosic ethanol, environmental trade-off analysis, local biomass processing, spatial configuration, Environmental Economics and Policy, Production Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2012
  2. By: Steven Poelhekke; Frederick van der Ploeg
    Abstract: We test for pollution haven effects in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) for different sectors using a comprehensive and exhaustive dataset for outward FDI from the Netherlands, one of the most environmentally stringent countries and a major source of global FDI. Our evidence suggests that in the sectors natural resources extraction and refining, construction, retail, food processing, beverages and tobacco, and utilities, a less stringent environmental policy in the host country significantly attracts FDI. What is important for these pollution haven effects is not only regulation but also enforcement of environmental policy. In contrast to earlier results, it is not only footloose industries that display pollution haven effects, but also the traditional pollution-intensive industries. But for the sectors machines, electronics and automotive and transportation and communication a more stringent and better enforced environmental policy attracts more FDI as this may help their reputation for sustainable management and CSR. These sectors display green haven effects. These findings have important implications for the sector distribution of FDI in destination countries.
    Keywords: pollution haven, green haven, FDI, environmental policy, regulation, enforcement, strategic effects, footloose industries, CSR
    JEL: F18 F23 F13 Q50
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Loureiro, Maria L.; Labandeira, Xavier; Hanemann, Michael
    Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade,
    Date: 2012
  4. By: Lange, Ian; Moro, Mirko; Traynor, Laura
    Abstract: In the UK, the largest proportion of household energy use is for space heating. Popular media make claims of a green hypocrisy: groups which have the strongest attitude towards the environment have the highest emissions. This study examines whether environmental attitudes and behaviours are associated with space heating energy use using data from the British Household Panel Survey. Results find that environmentally friendly attitudes generally do not lead to lower heating expenditures though environmentally friendly behaviours are associated with lower heating expenditure. Also, the effect of these attitudes and behaviours do not change as income increase.
    Keywords: green hypocrisy; heating expenditures; environmental attitudes; BHPS
    Date: 2012–05
  5. By: Frederick van der Ploeg; Anthony J Venables
    Abstract: Many countries have failed to use natural resource wealth to promote growth and development. They have been damaged by volatility of revenues, have failed to save a sufficiently high proportion of their resource revenues and failed to make high return investments to support diversification of their economies. This paper explores the reasons for these failures and discusses policies to improve performance.
    Keywords: resource curse, managing windfalls, fiscal rules, volatility, absorptive capacity, Dutch disease, public investment
    JEL: E60 F34 F35 F43 H21 H63 O11 Q33
    Date: 2012
  6. By: Owens, Katherine
    Abstract: It is uncertain whether market-based water allocation regimes can be successfully deployed to deliver water for environmental needs, with uneven results demonstrated across jurisdictions that have experimented with markets as a regulatory tool. The Paper will compare and evaluate the regulatory and institutional tools adopted in Australia, Colorado and Alberta for environmental water requirements. It will then outline four key lessons that have emerged from the comparative analysis that can inform the design and implementation of market-based water allocation regimes to promote environmental objectives.
    Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2012–02
  7. By: Tim Swanson (Andre Hoffmann Chair of Environmental Economics, Graduate Institute- Geneva, and Director of the Centre for International Environmental Studies); Ben Groom (School for Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London)
    Abstract: We distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones, where international cooperation is required. Global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions, in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands. The basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted, and those that have not. We demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by Nash, Rubinstein and others. There are benefits from global land conversion, and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted. Since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual (benefit sharing agreements, prior informed consent clauses) or very extreme (incremental cost contracts), the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved. For this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur, as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date.
    Keywords: Global Biodiversity, International Environmental Policy, Nash Bargaining, Rational Threats
    JEL: Q24 Q28
    Date: 2012–05
  8. By: Sjöberg, Eric (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: Earlier literature has established that enforcement of the Swedish Environmental Code varies greatly across municipalities. This is problematic due to differences in application of the law and from an efficiency perspective. This study shows that the variation can to some extent be explained by the ruling political coalition. Green Party representation in the ruling coalition is estimated to have a positive effect on the number of environmental sanction charges handed out by the local environmental offices. A difference in differences approach and IV- estimation is used to address the endogeneity issues. I argue for the random distribution of local party representation in the municipal council and use the absence of local parties as an instrument for Green Party representation in the ruling coalition.
    Keywords: Environmental code; Decentralization; Law enforcement
    JEL: K32 K42 Q01
    Date: 2012–06–11
  9. By: Matthew Ranson; Robert N. Stavins
    Abstract: The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.
    JEL: Q28 Q38 Q48 Q5 Q58
    Date: 2012–06
  10. By: Knapp, Keith C.; Franklin, Bradley
    Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy, Land Economics/Use, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2012–06–04
  11. By: Paul Collier; Anthony J Venables
    Abstract: Africa is well endowed with potential for hydro and solar power, but its other endowments – shortages of capital, skills, and governance capacity – make most of the green options relatively expensive, while its abundance of hydro-carbons makes fossil fuels relatively cheap. Current power shortages make expansion of power capacity a priority. Africa’s endowments, and the consequent scarcities and relative prices, are not immutable and can be changed to bring opportunity costs in Africa closer to those in the rest of the world. The international community can support by increasing Africa’s supply of the scarce factors of capital, skills, and governance.
    Keywords: Africa, climate change, energy, renewable, leapfrog, latecomer
    JEL: Q54 Q5 Q40 O55
    Date: 2012

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