nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2012‒05‒22
eight papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Global Green Economy and Environmental Sustainability: a Coopetitive Model By David Carf\`i; Daniele Schilir\`o
  2. The Political economy of environmental policy with overlapping generations By Karp, Larry; Rezai, Amon
  3. Do "green" state measures make import patterns "climate-friendly"? The case of the Asia-Pacific region By Martin Wermelinger
  4. Exiting the crisis in the right direction: A sustainable and shared prosperity plan for Europe By Spencer, Thomas; Lucas , Chancel; Emmanuel , Guerin
  5. Indicators to Assess the Effectiveness of Climate Change Projects By Nancy McCarthy; Paul Winters; Ana María Linares; Timothy Essam
  6. Green Industrial Policy: Trade and Theory By Karp, Larry; Stevenson, Megan
  7. Is There a Pollution Haven Effect? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China By Lu, Yi; Wu, Mingqin; Yu, Linhui
  8. Fiscal policy in Chile: Hindering sustainable development by favoring myopic growth By Ramón E. López; Eugenio Figueroa

  1. By: David Carf\`i; Daniele Schilir\`o
    Abstract: This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy, taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular, we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carf`{\i}) to represent a global green economy interaction, among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1205.2872&r=res
  2. By: Karp, Larry; Rezai, Amon
    Abstract: A two-sector OLG model illuminates previously unexamined intergenerationaleffects of a tax that protects an environmental stock. A traded asset capitalizes the economic returns to future tax-induced environmental improvements, benefiting the current asset owners, the old generation. Absent a transfer, the tax harms the young generation by decreasing their real wage. Future generations benefit fromthe tax-induced improvement in environmental stock. The principalintergenerational conflict arising from public policy is between generationsalive at the time society imposes the policy, not between generations alive at different times. A Pareto-improving policy can be implemented under various political economy settings.
    Keywords: Natural Resources and Conservation, Economics, open-access resource, two-sector overlapping generations, resource tax, generational conflict, environmental policy, dynamic bargaining
    Date: 2012–05–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt67v8k1v5&r=res
  3. By: Martin Wermelinger
    Abstract: This paper estimates to what extent "green" crisis-era measures have an impact on the "climate-friendliness" of imports in the Asia-Pacific region. Testable predictions and the empirical strategy are derived from the seminal paper of Eaton and Kortum (2002). The empirical results show that at the intensive margin implemented "green" measures are associated with an increase of sourcing from more rather than less energy intensive countries. One reason for this surprising result may be that governments have presented the state interventions as being "green" although the main purpose was not the environment. At the extensive margin, results are slightly more promising. The implementation of "green" measures seems to decrease the likelihood that imports are sourced from a relatively more energy intensive origin. However, the results are not very strong as to statistical and economic significance. In sum, only limited evidence for environmental benefits of "green" crisis-era interventions through the import channel exist. The implementation of such measures may in fact be associated with an environmental degradation of imports. Moreover, supplier countries being "close" competitors to the interventionist country (in terms of technology levels) relatively loose import share if discriminatory "green" measures are implemented. Stated differently, the alleged "green" measures protect domestic against foreign suppliers with similar technology levels.
    Keywords: international trade, trade policy, green growth
    JEL: F13 F18
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsr:wpaper:y:2012:i:079&r=res
  4. By: Spencer, Thomas; Lucas , Chancel; Emmanuel , Guerin
    Abstract: This paper investigates the synergies between the policy response to the European crisis and the green economy. We begin by examining the causes of the European crisis, including the potential role played by resource constraints, in particular the rise in oil prices 2004-2008. Then we develop a matrix to assess the synergies between the crisis response and the green economy. We survey the literature on three green economy instruments, namely environmental fiscal reform, green investment and environmental innovation. We then assess their coherence with and potential contribution to the current crisis response.
    Keywords: European crisis; green economy; european climate policy; environmental fiscal reform; green stimulus
    JEL: H54 Q56 H23 Q43
    Date: 2012–05–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38802&r=res
  5. By: Nancy McCarthy; Paul Winters; Ana María Linares; Timothy Essam
    Abstract: Determining reasonable indicators for climate change projects is complicated by the long-term horizon of both mitigation and adaptation project impacts as well as the uncertainty associated with climate change impacts. Actions taken now are often designed to have an impact in the uncertain and distant future and may not directly mitigate or adapt to climate change, but be taken as a step to prepare for future actions. Further complicating identification of indicators is the fact that there is a spectrum of projects, from the pure climate change-focused projects to those that provide climate change benefits as one part of an overall development program, and finally to those with only incidental indirect effects. The objective of this document is to discuss SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely) indicators that can be used for assessing the impact of climate change projects, including those that seek to adapt to the expected impacts of climate change and those that promote low carbon emissions growth strategies to mitigate greenhouse gases.
    Keywords: Environment & Natural Resources :: Biodiversity & Natural Resources Management, Environment & Natural Resources :: Climate Change, impact evaluation guidelines
    JEL: H43 Q54 Q56
    Date: 2012–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:67878&r=res
  6. By: Karp, Larry; Stevenson, Megan
    Abstract: This paper studies the reality and the potential for green industrial policy. We provide a summary of the green industrial policies, broadly understood, for five countries. We then consider the relation between green industrial policies and trade disputes, emphasizing theBrazil-US dispute involving ethanol and the broader US-China dispute. The theory of public policy provides many lessons for green industrial policy. We select four of these lessons, involving the Green Paradox, the choice of quantities versus prices with endogenous investment, the coordination issues arising from emissions control, and theability of green industrial policies to promote cooperation in reducing a global public bad like carbon emissions.
    Keywords: Natural Resources and Conservation, Economics, green industrial policy, trade conflicts, green paradox, asymmetric information, coordination games, participation games
    Date: 2012–01–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt5qc631q9&r=res
  7. By: Lu, Yi; Wu, Mingqin; Yu, Linhui
    Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether there is a pollution haven effect, specifically, the effect of environmental regulations on firm location. Our identification uses the Two Control Zones (TCZ) policy implemented by the Chinese government in 1998. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimation shows that cities with tougher environmental regulations attract less foreign direct investment (FDI). Specifically, being listed as a TCZ city causes the amount of FDI to drop by 41%. Our results are robust to various robustness checks on the validity of the DID estimation and other estimation concerns.
    Keywords: Pollution haven effect; Difference-in-differences estimation; Two control zones; Natural experiment
    JEL: D21 L25 R11
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38787&r=res
  8. By: Ramón E. López; Eugenio Figueroa
    Abstract: We show that the tax system in Chile is insufficient, inefficient and inequitable. Insufficient because it does not yield enough revenues for the state to promote human capital development and to face poverty in a more comprehensive way; inefficient because it is highly unbalanced causing most of the tax burden to be concentrated in very few taxes while neglecting the use of the least distortion-prone tax mechanisms available; inequitable because it forces the middle and low income groups to shoulder most of the tax burden while allowing the super rich to get away paying one of the lowest tax rates among middle income and advanced countries. The consequence of the combined effect of the two sides of this fiscal policy - taxation and public expenditures - is to artificially increase the capital intensity of the economy, to deepen its dependency on natural resource based and environmentally dirty industries, to handicap the creation of human capital and to delay the evolution towards a knowledge-based economy. Fiscal policy has thus negatively affected the long run growth potential of the economy and has contributed to perpetuate a highly unequal distribution of wealth and to exacerbate environmental and natural resource degradation.
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp346&r=res

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