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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒03‒08
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Gabriel Chan (Harvard Kennedy School); Robert Stavins (Harvard Kennedy School); Robert Stowe (Harvard Kennedy School); Richard Sweeney (Harvard Kennedy School) |
| Abstract: | The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. This paper, which draws upon a research workshop and a policy roundtable held at Harvard in May 2011, investigates critically the design, enactment, implementation, performance, and implications of this path-breaking application of economic thinking to environmental regulation. Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world’s atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation. |
| Keywords: | Cap-and-Trade, Market-Based Environmental Policy, Acid Rain, Sulfur Dioxide, Clean Air Act Amendments |
| JEL: | Q52 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.06&r=res |
| By: | Mary-Françoise Renard (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Hang Xiong (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether Chinese provinces set strategically their environmental stringency when faced with interprovincial competition for mobile capital. Using Chinese provincial data and spatial panel econometric models, we find that Chinese provinces do engage in this kind of strategic interaction, particularly among those with similar industrial structure. Furthermore, we haven't found evidence of asymmetric responsiveness suggested by the race to the bottom theory. Finally, the one-sided fiscal decentralization is likely to strengthen the strategic behavior. These empirical results call for a skeptical attitude towards China's decentralization of environment policy implementation as well as its fiscal arrangements. |
| Keywords: | China;strategic interaction;pollution;spatial panel |
| Date: | 2012–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00672449&r=res |
| By: | Howes, Stephen (Asian Development Bank Institute); Wyrwoll, Paul (Asian Development Bank Institute) |
| Abstract: | The developing economies of Asia are confronted by serious environmental problems that threaten to undermine future growth, food security, and regional stability. This study considers four major environmental challenges that policymakers across developing Asia will need to address towards 2030: water management, air pollution, deforestation and land degradation, and climate change. We argue that these challenges, each unique in their own way, all exhibit the characteristics of “wicked problems”. As developed in the planning literature, and now applied much more broadly, wicked problems are dynamic, complex, encompass many issues and stakeholders, and evade straightforward, lasting solutions. |
| Keywords: | asia environmental problems; food security; water management; air pollution; deforestation; land degradation; climate change; wicked problems |
| JEL: | O10 O44 O53 Q28 Q53 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2012–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0348&r=res |
| By: | Carfì, David; Schilirò, Daniele |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfì) to represent a basic green economy interaction among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions. |
| Keywords: | environmental sustainability; global green economy; coopetitive games; infinite game |
| JEL: | Q42 Q30 C78 C71 Q56 Q20 Q58 C72 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37018&r=res |
| By: | Hansson, Sven Ove (National Institute of Economic Research); Edvardsson Björnberg, Karin (National Institute of Economic Research); Vredin Johansson, Maria (National Institute of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We propose a framework for studies of efficiency in environmental poli-cies in the form of an iterative “policy cycle”. The policy cycle’s six ma-jor elements are goal-setting, choice of policy instruments (informa-tion/communication, voluntary agreements, economic instruments and regulation), enforcement, changes in behaviour of public and private agents, effects of policy measures and, finally, evaluation. Through itera-tions of the policy cycle (or parts of it), efficiency in environmental poli-cies can be improved. The policy cycle is applied to climate policies, both mitigation and adaptation and we identify important areas for future research. |
| Keywords: | Policy cycle; environmental efficiency; mitigation; adaptation; goal-setting; voluntary agreements; regulation; behavioural change; evaluation |
| Date: | 2011–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nierwp:0125&r=res |
| By: | Broberg, Thomas (National Institute of Economic Research); Forsfält, Tomas (National Institute of Economic Research); Östblom, Göran (National Institute of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | From the perspective of climate policy, a target for energy efficiency could imply costly overlapping regulation. We estimate, using a computable general equilibrium model of the Swedish economy, the potential economic cost of attaining the national 2020 energy intensity target by means of tax policy instruments. Our analysis shows that the efforts to meet the energy intensity target will also reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but at excessive costs compared to alternative climate policy instruments. Moreover, attainment of the energy intensity target will call for policy instruments additional to those needed for fulfilling the national climate policy target. The results are sensitive to the development of the nuclear energy production as the definition of energy intensity includes conversion losses in electricity production |
| Keywords: | climate policy; energy efficiency; carbon tax; overlapping regulation; general equilibrium; Sweden |
| Date: | 2011–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nierwp:0123&r=res |