nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2011‒11‒01
six papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post? By Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
  2. Lessons Learned from Implementing the Sustainable Development Program in the State of Acre in Brazil By Cristina Dengel; John Horton
  3. Polluting Industrialization By Karine Constant; Carine Nourry; Thomas Seegmuller
  4. Distributional biases in the analysis of climate change By Peter Skott; Leila Davis
  5. Kuznets curve and environmental performance: evidence from China By Halkos, George; Tzeremes, Nickolaos
  6. On the Natural and Economic Difficulties to Fulfilling the Human Right to Water By Christopher Jeffords; Farhed Shah

  1. By: Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
    Abstract: In this paper we present a model of international environmental agreements in the presence of threshold effects. The model is in the tradition of models of international environmental agreements formulated as games in partition function form. Games in partition function form allow the incorporation of external effects between players. The model is applied to global climate change agreements. The agreement involves a contract between nations as to the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how these benefits are to be shared. Benefits to emissions abatement are subject to a threshold. Consequently, we model climate as a global threshold public good. This allows a mechanism to explore incentives and disincentives for signing agreements consequent to a critical number of other players committing to an agreement. We show that thresholds may destabilize what would be an otherwise stable agreement and that combining an emissions tax with an international agreement can be used to restore stability.
    Keywords: International environmental agreements; threshold public good; gamma core; global warming and emissions taxation
    JEL: C71 H41 Q54 H23
    Date: 2011–10–25
  2. By: Cristina Dengel; John Horton
    Abstract: The IDB's strategy in Brazil seeks to promote and further the reform and modernization of the public sector, to support efforts to improve the competitiveness of Brazilian goods, to support the efforts to reduce social inequalities and poverty and, finally, to address the problems of environmental and natural resource management. The Sustainable Development Program in the State of Acre supported the four elements of this strategy by including activities to strengthen the capacity for environmental management at the state level thus promoting modernization of the state, by bolstering competitiveness through improvement of the quality of the transportation infrastructure, by actions to foster the productivity of rural communities and small producers thus supporting efforts to reduce inequality and by actions for conservation and protection of the Amazon rainforest. This note gives an overview of key achievements and challenges to reach such results as well as outline the key lessons learned accumulated over the course of the project.
    Keywords: Environment & Natural Resources :: Biodiversity & Natural Resources Management, Infrastructure & Transport, Rural & Urban Development :: Rural Development, Agriculture & Food Security :: Plant, Animal, & Food Production, Social Development :: Poverty, amazon rainforest, environment conservation, inequality
    Date: 2011–08
  3. By: Karine Constant (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Carine Nourry (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Thomas Seegmuller (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)
    Abstract: Recently, many contributions have focused on the relationship between capital accumulation, growth and population dynamics, introducing fertility choice in macro-dynamic models. In this paper, we go one step further highlighting also the link with pollution. We develop a simple overlapping generations model with paternalistic altruism according to wealth and environmental concerns. One can therefore explain a simultaneous increase of capital intensity, population growth and pollution, namely a polluting industrialization. We show in addition that a permanent productivity shock, possibly associated to technological innovations, promotes such a polluting development process, escaping a trap where the economy is relegated to a low capital intensity, population growth and pollution.
    Keywords: Growth; Population dynamics; Pollution; Altruism; Development
    Date: 2011–10–19
  4. By: Peter Skott (University of Massachusetts Amherst); Leila Davis (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
    Abstract: The economic analysis of global warming is dominated by models based on optimal growth theory. These representative-agent models have an intrinsic distributional bias in favor of the rich. The bias is compounded by the se of revenue-neutrality in the allocation of emission permits. The result is mitigation recommendations that are biased downwards. JEL Categories: Q13, I3, E1
    Keywords: representative agent, welfare, global warming, inequality.
    Date: 2011–10
  5. By: Halkos, George; Tzeremes, Nickolaos
    Abstract: The paper investigates China’s environmental performance-economic development relationship for the time period of 1965-2009. The results indicate that after 1990 China increased its environmental performance mainly driven by the implementation of several environmental policies. In addition when we taking into account several factors contributed to China’s economic growth, the empirical evidences suggest the existence of an inverted “U” shape relationship between China’s environmental performance and economic development. However, when only the influence of the industrial sector is taken into account the shape of the established relationship changes from an inverted “U” to “N” shape, indicating that the main determinant of China’s environmental inefficiencies over the years was the heavily industrialization.
    Keywords: Environmental performance; Environmental Kuznets Curve; China; Economic Growth
    JEL: Q50 C14 O10 P28 C01
    Date: 2011–10
  6. By: Christopher Jeffords (University of Connecticut); Farhed Shah (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: We present, to the best of our knowledge, the first economic model of the human right to water using a nonrenewable resource model inclusive of a backstop technology. The right is interpreted as a minimum consumption requirement the government is obligated to fulfill in the event that any one household cannot do so independently. Differing by income levels, households maximize utility by purchasing a composite consumption good and water from two distinct, government-owned sources. Facing physical and financial constraints, the government uses fiscal policy to address potential human rights violations. Reducing the analysis to two-periods, we develop a novel approach to compare total welfare levels from a joint human rights and economics perspective. We define a human rights welfare standard and discuss cases where traditional social welfare measures would meet, surpass, or violate this standard. We thus offer a unique way to merge economic analysis with human rights research.
    Keywords: Nonrenewable resource, water, minimum consumption requirement, human right to water, government policy
    JEL: D19 D69 D63 Q38
    Date: 2011–10

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