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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2010‒11‒13
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Jevan Cherniwchan |
| Abstract: | This paper argues the compositional shift from agricultural to industrial production - industrialization - is a central determinant of changes in environmental quality as economies develop. A simple two-sector model of neoclassical growth and the environment in a small open economy is developed to examine how industrialization affects the environment. The model is estimated using sulfur emissions data for 68 countries over the period 1970-2000. The results show the process of industrialization is a significant determinant of observed changes in emissions: a 1% increase in industry's share of total output is associated with an 24% increase in the level of emissions per capita. |
| JEL: | O41 Q56 |
| Date: | 2010–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2010-28&r=res |
| By: | Frederik Carlsson (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); Mitesh Kataria (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Alan Krupnick (Resources for the Future); Elina Lampi (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); Åsa Löfgren (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); Ping Qin (Peking University, College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering); Thomas Sterner (Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg); S. Chung (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Using a choice experiment, we investigated preferences for distributing the economic burden of decreasing CO2 emissions in the two largest CO2-emitting countries: the United States and China. We asked respondents about their preferences for four burden-sharing rules to reduce CO2 emissions according to their country's 1) historical emissions, 2) income level, 3) equal right to emit per person, and 4) current emissions. We found that U.S. respondents preferred the rule based on current emissions, while the equal right to emit rule was clearly least preferred. The Chinese respondents, on the other hand, preferred the historical rule, while the current emissions rule was the least preferred. Respondents overall favored the rule that was least costly for their country. These marked differences may explain the difficulties countries face in agreeing how to share costs, presenting a tough hurdle to overcome in future negotiations. We also found that the strength of the preferences was much stronger in China, suggesting that how mitigation costs are shared across countries is more important there. |
| Keywords: | Climate, burden-sharing, fairness, China, United States |
| JEL: | Q51 Q52 Q54 |
| Date: | 2010–11–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-074&r=res |
| By: | Terry L. Anderson; Ragnar Arnason; Gary D. Libecap |
| Abstract: | We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not fixed in situ, but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into valuable goods and services. Our analysis shows how grandfathering increases rents by raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing incentives for collective action. |
| JEL: | D23 K11 N5 Q22 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16519&r=res |
| By: | Stavins, Robert N. |
| Abstract: | The straightforward way to slow climate change is to reduce the quantity of greenhouse gases (in particular, carbon dioxide) dumped into the atmosphere, giving the planet more time to recycle the offending chemicals. But in light of our late start, chances are we’re going to need all the help we can get to prevent brutal changes in weather, widespread coastal fl ooding and perhaps even the spread of diseases now confi ned to the tropics. Hence the logic in giving nature a helping hand in sequestering atmospheric carbon. |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:reg:wpaper:13&r=res |
| By: | Alpízar, Francisco; Carlsson, Fredrik; Naranjo, Maria A. |
| Abstract: | The risk of losing income and productive means due to adverse weather can differ significantly among farmers sharing a productive landscape and is, of course, hard to estimate or even “guesstimate” empirically. Moreover, the costs associated with investments in adaptation to climate are likely to exhibit economies of scope. We explore the implications of these characteristics on Costa Rican coffee farmers’ decisions to adapt to climate change, using a framed field experiment. Despite having a baseline of high levels of risk aversion, we still found that farmers more frequently chose the safe options when the setting is characterized by unknown risk (that is, poor or unreliable risk information). Second, we found that farmers, to a large extent, coordinated their decisions to secure a lower adaptation cost and that communication among farmers strongly facilitated coordination. |
| Keywords: | risk, ambiguity, technology adoption, climate change, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D81 H41 Q16 Q54 |
| Date: | 2010–11–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-18-rev-efd&r=res |