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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2010‒09‒18
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Leroux, Justin (HEC Montréal, CIRANO and CIRPEE); de Villemeur, Étienne (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI & GREMAQ)) |
| Abstract: | Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a "global insurance scheme" to be fincanced according to countries responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, raher than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities. |
| JEL: | D62 D63 Q54 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:23125&r=res |
| By: | Sophie Bernard (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON) |
| Abstract: | In a stylized model of international trade, a monopolist in the North exports second-hand products to a representative firm in the South to be reused as intermediate goods, with potential trade gains. The degree of reusability of waste products is a crucial choice variable in the North. This is because with a lack of international vigilance, non-reusable waste can be mixed illegally with the reusable waste. I explore the driving forces for the movement of illegal waste, paying particular attention to the role of local waste regulations, such as the EU's Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment directive. Under mild conditions, it is shown that increased regulation stringency in the North leads its firm to reduce the degree of reusability of its products. As a result, the flow of non-reusable waste to the South increases, providing another channel for the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | second-hand products, illegal waste, environmental regulation, trade |
| JEL: | F18 L10 O20 Q53 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ott:wpaper:1006e&r=res |
| By: | Luisito Bertinelli (CREA, University of Luxembourg); Benteng Zou (CREA, University of Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | Adopting clean technologies is a long term process which requires structural changes in production and consumption habits. In the present paper, we focus more on short term issues related to pollution reduction and analyze a pollution abatement game in a 2-country dynamic model. Transboundary pollution is treated as a common state variable while pollution reduction is reached via abatement rather than the adoption of cleaner technologies. Symmetric open-loop and Markovian Nash equilibrium are studied and compared as well as the analysis of Markovian strategies of more than two countries case around the steady state. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:10-07&r=res |
| By: | Étienne Billette de Villemeur; Justin Leroux |
| Abstract: | Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a “global insurance scheme” to be financed according to countries’ responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, rather than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Cost Sharing, Responsibility, Compensation |
| JEL: | D62 D63 Q54 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1030&r=res |