nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2010‒07‒17
six papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. What are Households Willing to Pay for Better Tap Water Quality ? A Cross-Country Valuation Study By Olivier Beaumais; Anne Briand; Katrin Millock; Céline Nauges
  2. Global Climate Change and the Resurgence of Tropical Disease: An Economic Approach By Douglas Gollin; Christian Zimmermann
  3. Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania By Caporale, Guglielmo Maria; Rault, Christophe; Sova, Robert; Sova, Ana Maria
  4. Are compact cities environmentally friendly? By Carl Gaigné; Stéphane Riou; François Thisse
  5. Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes By Coria, Jessica; Villegas-Palacio, Clara
  6. Irregular behaviour in stating preferences for nature protection. A Choice Experiment in Belarus By Marek Giergiczny; Sviataslau Valasiuk; Tomasz Żylicz; Pere Riera

  1. By: Olivier Beaumais (CARE - Centre d'analyse et de recherche en économie - Université de Rouen : EA2260); Anne Briand (CARE - Centre d'analyse et de recherche en économie - Université de Rouen : EA2260); Katrin Millock (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Céline Nauges (LERNA-INRA - Toulouse School of Economics)
    Abstract: Using a unique cross-section sample from 10 OECD countries, we estimate willingness to pay for better quality of tap water. On the pooled sample, households are only willing to pay 7.5% of the median annual water bill to improve the quality of tap water. The highest relative willingness to pay for better tap water quality was found in the countries with the highest percentage of respondents being unsatisfied with tap water quality because of health concerns. The median willingness to pay in Mexico, Korea and Italy was estimated at 10.1%, 6.4% and 8.8% of the median water bill. The marginal willingness to pay increased with income, education, environmental concern, trust in information from government, and specific concerns with water quality.
    Keywords: Contingent valuation, tobit model, water quality, willingness to pay.
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00497453_v1&r=res
  2. By: Douglas Gollin (Williams College); Christian Zimmermann (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: We study the impact of global climate change on the prevalence of tropical diseases using a heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model. In our framework, households can take actions (e.g., purchasing bed nets or other goods) that provide partial protection from disease. However, these actions are costly and households face borrowing constraints. Parameterizing the model, we explore the impact of a worldwide temperature increase of 3C. We find that the impact on disease prevalence and especially output should be modest and can be mitigated by improvements in protection efficacy.
    Keywords: DSGE model, climate change, tropical disease, incomplete markets
    JEL: I1 O11 E13 E21 Q54
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2010-12&r=res
  3. By: Caporale, Guglielmo Maria (Brunel University); Rault, Christophe (University of Orléans); Sova, Robert (CREST & University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Sova, Ana Maria (CREST & University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: According to the pollution haven hypotheses differences in environmental regulation affect trade flows and plant location. Specifically, environmental stringency should decrease exports and increase imports of "dirty" goods. This paper estimates a gravity model to establish whether the implementation of more stringent regulations in Romania has indeed affected its competitiveness and decreased exports towards its European trading partners. Our findings do not provide empirical support to the pollution haven hypothesis, i.e. environmental stringency is not found to affect significantly total trade, or its components (pollution intensive trade and pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade).
    Keywords: environmental stringency, competiveness, gravity model
    JEL: F14 Q28
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5029&r=res
  4. By: Carl Gaigné; Stéphane Riou; François Thisse
    Abstract: .There is a large consensus among international institutions and national governments to favor urban-containment policies –the compact city– as a way to improve the ecological performance of the urban system. This approach overlooks a fundamental fact: what matters for the ecological outcome of cities is the mix between the level of population density and the global pattern of activities. As expected, when both the intercity and intra-urban distributions of activities are given, a higher population density makes cities more environmentally friendly. However, once we account for the fact that cities may be either monocentric or polycentric as well as for the possible relocation of activities between cities, the relationship between population density and the ecological performance of cities appears to be much more involved. Indeed, because changes in population density affect land rents and wages, firms and workers are incited to relocate, thus leading to new commuting and shipping patterns. We show that policies favoring the decentralization of jobs in big cities may be more desirable because they both reduce pollution and improve welfare.
    Keywords: greenhouse gas, commuting costs, transport costs, cities; urban-containment policy
    JEL: D61 F12 Q54 Q58 R12
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rae:wpaper:201005&r=res
  5. By: Coria, Jessica (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Villegas-Palacio, Clara (Facultad de Minas. Universidad Nacional de Colombia &)
    Abstract: In practice, targeted monitoring seems to be a strategy frequently used by regulators. In this paper, we study the effects of targeted monitoring strategies on the adoption of a new abatement technology and, consequently, on the aggregate emissions level when firms are regulated with uniform taxes. The results suggest that a regulator aiming to stimulate technology adoption should decrease the adopters’ monitoring probability and/or increase the non-adopters’ monitoring probability. In contrast to previous literature, we find that, in some cases, a regulator whose objective is to minimize aggregate emissions should exert a stronger monitoring pressure on firms with higher abatement costs.<p>
    Keywords: technology adoption; environmental policy; imperfect compliance; targeted enforcement
    JEL: K31 K42 L51 Q55
    Date: 2010–07–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0455&r=res
  6. By: Marek Giergiczny (Warsaw Ecological Economics Center, University of Warsaw); Sviataslau Valasiuk (Warsaw Ecological Economics Center, University of Warsaw); Tomasz Żylicz (Warsaw Ecological Economics Center, University of Warsaw); Pere Riera (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)
    Abstract: Using choice experiment, this paper investigates how Belarusian citizens value planned Zvanets mire protection programmes. Two approaches are used to analyze ignored attributes: a debriefing question, and estimating parameters at the individual level. We have found inconsistencies between people’s declarations on ignoring certain attributes in the follow-up questions and the results of modelling at the individual level. These inconsistencies lead to statistically significant differences in WTP estimates obtained.
    Keywords: willingness to pay (WTP), choice experiment (CE), random parameter logit (RPL) model, lexicographic preferences, nature protection, wetlands
    JEL: Q50 Q51
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2010-08&r=res

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