nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2009‒07‒17
one paper chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets By Juan Pablo Montero

  1. By: Juan Pablo Montero (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)
    Abstract: As with other commodity markets, markets for trading pollution permits have not been immune to market power concerns. In this paper, I survey the existing literature on market power in permit trading but also contribute with some new results and ideas. <br><br>I start the survey with Hahn’s (1984) dominant-firm (static) model that I then extend to the case in which there are two or more strategic firms that may also strategically interact in the output market, to the case in which current permits can be stored for future use (as in most existing and proposed market designs), to the possibility of collusive behavior, and to the case in which permits are auctioned off instead of allocated for free to firms. <br><br>I finish the paper with a review of empirical evidence on market power, if any, with particular attention to the U.S. sulfur market and the Southern California NOx market.
    Keywords: Market power, emissions trading, pollution permits, storable permits.
    JEL: D40 L13 Q58
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:355&r=res

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