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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2009‒05‒30
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Natacha Raffin (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | This article aims at investigating the interplay between environmental quality, health and development. We consider an OLG model, where human capital dynamics depend on the current environment, through its impact on children's school attendance. In turn, environmental quality dynamics depend on human capital, through maintenance and pollution. This two-way causality generates a co-evolution of human capital and environmental quality and may induce the emergence of an environmental poverty trap characterized by a low level of human capital and deteriorated environmental quality. Our results are consistent with empirical observation about the existence of Environmental Kuznets Curve. Finally, the model allows for the assessment of an environmental policy that would allow to escape the trap. |
| Keywords: | Education, environmental quality, growth, health. |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00384500_v1&r=res |
| By: | Julien Chevallier (EconomiX - CNRS : UMR7166 - Université de Paris X - Nanterre) |
| Abstract: | In international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered permits by the regulator based on recent emissions might pave the way for dominant positions. Stemming from this politically given market imperfection, this chapter develops a differential Stackelberg game with two types of non cooperative agents: a large potentially dominant agent, and a competitive fringe whose size are exogenously determined. The strategic interactions are modeled on an intra-industry permits markets where agents can freely bank and borrow permits. This chapter contributes to the debate on initial permits allocation and market power by focusing on the effects of allowing banking and borrowing. A documented appraisal on whether or not such provisions should be included is frequently overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Numerical simulations provide a quantitative illustration of the results obtained. |
| Keywords: | Emissions Trading; Banking; Borrowing; Market Power. |
| Date: | 2009–05–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00388207_v1&r=res |
| By: | Foa, Roberto |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses two vital concerns in the debate on adaptation to climate change. First, how can countries prepare to manage the impact of climate-change induced natural disasters? Second, how can countries ensure that they have the governmental institutions required to manage the phenomenal challenge of adaptation to climate change? A range of economic and institutional measures are tested for their potential effects on natural disaster resilience and the quality of environmental governance. The findings suggest an important role is played by social and political institutions in determining the ability of countries to adapt to climate change and respond to natural disasters, in particular in the degree to which countries have succeeded in gender empowerment and the development of a robust civil society and nonprofit sector. As the climate change challenge moves from that of"proving the facts"to that of"implementing change,"the authors suggest that international policymakers, donors, and activists must increasingly focus on building domestic policy environments that are conducive to the delivery of more effective environmental legislation, for example through implementation of gender quotas and provision of support to civil society groups. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics&Policies,Population Policies,Natural Disasters,Governance Indicators,Hazard Risk Management |
| Date: | 2009–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4939&r=res |