nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2009‒05‒02
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Green R&D versus End-of-Pipe Emission Abatement: A Model of Directed Technical Change By Michael Rauscher
  2. Environmental Technology Transfer via Free Trade By Takeshi Iida; Kenji Takeuchi
  3. Bringing Growth Theory "Down to Earth" By Lopez, Ramon; Stocking, Andrew
  4. Tragedies on Natural Resources a Commons and Anticommons Approach By Manuel Coelho, José Filipe and Manuel Ferreira

  1. By: Michael Rauscher (University of Rostock)
    Abstract: The paper looks at a model of directed technical change in an environmental-economics context. Firms can do conventional or "green" R&D or they can abate emissions at the end of pipe. The paper has two main foci. On the one hand, it investigates the impact of environmental regulation on the allocation of resources to conventional R&D, green R&D, and end- of-pipe abatement. On the other hand, it addresses the question whether stricter emission standards should be used to support green R&D and/or economic growth.
    Keywords: economic growth and the environment, directed technical change
    JEL: Q55 O41
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ros:wpaper:106&r=res
  2. By: Takeshi Iida (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University); Kenji Takeuchi (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University)
    Abstract: This paper considers a model of international duopoly with global pollution to investigate the impact of tariff policy and licensing contracts on environmental technology transfer. Our main finding is that free trade is not always preferable.When the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is within a certain range, there is a possibility that the total world welfare is higher under a positive tariff rate than under a zero tariff rate. This implies that the protection of IPR beyond the range is a prerequisite for the justification of free trade.We also show how developing countries are induced to sign a licensing contract.Even if the licensing does not directly improve the competitiveness of the firm in the developing country, raising the tariff rate can increase the revenue of the country. In contrast, when there is no licensing agreement, the local government sets a lower tariff rate and diffuses the products of foreign firms,because the products of local firms are associated with pollution.
    Keywords: Environmental technology transfer; Free trade; Tariff protection, Licensing
    JEL: D43 F13 L13 Q56
    Date: 2009–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:0904&r=res
  3. By: Lopez, Ramon; Stocking, Andrew
    Abstract: Explicitly accounting for certain basic physical laws governing the âearthâ sector dramatically enriches our ability to explain a high degree of diversity in observed patterns of economic growth. We provide a theoretical explanation of why some countries have been able to sustain a more or less constant and positive rate of economic growth for many decades while so many others have failed to do so. The analysis predicts that countries that have an over abundance of physical capital (a concept that is precisely defined in the text) may be unable to sustain a positive rate of economic growth over the long run. Too much physical capital may affect the dynamics of the economy ultimately leading to stagnation. The plausibility of the growth model introduced here is demonstrated by its ability to predict some important stylized facts for which standard endogenous growth models generally cannot account.
    Keywords: endogenous growth theory, unbalanced growth, structural change, stagnation, Environmental Economics and Policy, International Development, Labor and Human Capital, Political Economy, E22, Q01, O41,
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:umdrwp:48944&r=res
  4. By: Manuel Coelho, José Filipe and Manuel Ferreira
    Abstract: Ambiguous concepts blur analytical and policy prescription clarity. In the literature on Natural Resources it would be difficult to find a concept as misunderstood as commons. This paper clarifies this confusion and establishes an adequate conceptualisation. A typology of property-rights regimes relevant to common property resources is presented and a new concept – anticommons - is introduced. The reflex of this regimes distinction on the design of the natural resources policy is discussed and this conceptualisation is used to study exemplar cases in the area of fisheries and aquaculture policy in Portugal. Key Words: Property rights, commons, anticommons, entrepreneur, fisheries
    JEL: K11 Q20
    Date: 2009–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp212009&r=res

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