nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2009‒03‒14
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Environmental Regulation and Investment: Evidence from European Industries By Andrea M. Leiter; Arno Parolini; Hannes Winner
  2. Environmental Policy under Ambiguity By Leon Vinokur
  3. Productive Base Sustainability under Climate Change: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence By Dimitra, Vouvaki; Anastasios, Xepapadeas
  4. Public, private and nonprofit regulation for environmental quality By Lucie Bottega; Jenny De Freitas

  1. By: Andrea M. Leiter; Arno Parolini; Hannes Winner
    Abstract: This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the relationship between environmental regulation and firm behavior. In particular, we ask whether and how strongly investment decisions of firms respond to stringency in environmental regulation. Environmental stringency is measured as (i) an industry's total current expenditure on environmental protection, and (ii) a country's revenue from environmental taxes. Focusing on European industry level data between 1995 and 2005, we estimate the differential impact of environmental stringency on four types of investment: gross investment in tangible goods, in new buildings, in machinery, and in `productive' investment (investment in tangible goods minus investment in abatement technologies). Both environmental variables enter positively, and their quadratic terms exhibit significantly negative parameter estimates. This, in turn, indicates a positive but diminishing impact of environmental regulation on investment.
    Keywords: Investment, environmental regulation, pollution abatement costs
    JEL: D92 H23 Q52
    Date: 2009–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-04&r=res
  2. By: Leon Vinokur (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to extend existing literature on carbon allowance allocation, investigating the impact of uncertainty and ambiguity, due to the lack of future Environmental policy, on the total production in the market. Specifically, we show that an increase in uncertainty has no effect on the total output, whereas an increase in ambiguity leads to a decrease in the total output. An output-based allocation model in Cournot Oligopoly will be used. We will adopt the National Allocation Plan (NAP) of UK for the Second Phase (2005-07) as a case study.
    Keywords: Carbon allowances, Permits allocation, EU ETS, Uncertainty
    JEL: D2 D8 Q4
    Date: 2009–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp638&r=res
  3. By: Dimitra, Vouvaki; Anastasios, Xepapadeas
    Abstract: Climate change is one of the most urgent and severe problems on the international agenda and one of the basic factors that determine sustainability conditions. This paper attempts to reveal the connection between productive base sustainability for two large groups of countries, developed and developing, and the state of the environment, which is proxied by the stock of carbon dioxide (CO2) which is mostly responsible for the creation of the global warming phenomenon. Three different policy scenaria for the evolution of global CO2 emissions empirically con.rm the strong association between the state of the environment and productive base sustainability, and provide the foundations for the formulation of sustainability policy.
    Keywords: Productive base sustainability, current change in social welfare, accounting prices, non-optimizing economies
    JEL: Q01
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7490&r=res
  4. By: Lucie Bottega (LAMETA, Université de Montpellier 1); Jenny De Freitas (Universitat de les Illes Balears)
    Abstract: This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a for-proft private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.
    Keywords: Environmental quality, certification, green advertisement, NGO, self-regulation.
    JEL: D62 L15 L31 L51 Q50
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubi:deawps:33&r=res

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