Abstract: |
This chapter reviews literature on the distributional effects of environmental
and energy policy. In particular, many effects of such policy are likely
regressive. First, it raises the price of fossil-fuel-intensive products,
expenditures on which are a high fraction of low-income budgets. Second, if
abatement technologies are capital-intensive, then any mandate to abate
pollution may induce firms to use more capital. If demand for capital is
raised relative to labor, then a lower relative wage may also hurt low-income
households. Third, pollution permits handed out to firms bestow scarcity rents
on well-off individuals who own those firms. Fourth, low-income individuals
may place more value on food and shelter than on incremental improvements in
environmental quality. If high-income individuals get the most benefit of
pollution abatement, then this effect is regressive as well. Fifth, low-income
renters miss out on house price capitalization of air quality benefits.
Well-off landlords may reap those gains. Sixth, transition effects could well
hurt the unemployed who are already at some disadvantage. These six effects
might all hurt the poor more than the rich. This paper discusses whether these
fears are valid, and whether anything can be done about them. |