nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2008‒03‒25
two papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Weitzman revisited: Emission standards vs. taxes with uncertain control costs and market power of polluting firms By Clemens Heuson
  2. Emission standards vs. taxes: The case of asymmetric Cournot duopoly and uncertain control costs By Clemens Heuson

  1. By: Clemens Heuson (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in most actual regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand takes a first step in closing this gap. It investigates the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and various degrees of the polluting firms’ market power.
    Keywords: Cournot oligopoly, external diseconomies of pollution, cost uncertainty, emission standard, emission tax
    JEL: D62 D89 L13 Q58
    Date: 2008–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0299&r=res
  2. By: Clemens Heuson (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual environmental regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly.
    Keywords: asymmetric Cournot duopoly, external diseconomies of pollution, cost uncertainty, emission standard, emission tax
    JEL: D62 D89 L13 Q58
    Date: 2008–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0300&r=res

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