nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2007‒06‒02
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la Republica

  1. Depletion of Non-Renewable Resources and Endogenous Technical Change By Juergen Antony
  2. Governance and Environmental Policy Integration in Europe: What Can We learn from the EU Emission Trading Scheme? By Michela Catenacci; Barbara Buchner; Alessandra Sgobbi
  3. Tenure Rights and Stewardship of Marine Resources: A co-managed Swedish shrimp fishery in a marine reserve By Eggert, Håkan; Ulmestrand,, Mats

  1. By: Juergen Antony (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Non-renewable resources are an obstacle for positive long run growth if they are essential for production, households solve an intertemporal Ramsey problem and population is growing. Modern growth models predict that growth is positively related to growth in production factors. Hence, there are opposing forces at work if labor as one factor is growing and the use of the non-renewable resource as another factor is shrinking. The paper develops a semi-endogenous growth model with one labor and one resource using sector and derives conditions for stable positive long run growth in per capita production and consumption.
    Keywords: non-renewable resources, semi-endogenous growth
    JEL: Q32 O31 O33
    Date: 2007–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0291&r=res
  2. By: Michela Catenacci (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Barbara Buchner (International Energy Agency); Alessandra Sgobbi (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)
    Abstract: The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is a landmark environmental policy, representing the world’s first large-scale greenhouse gas (GHG) trading program. The coexistence of state actors and top-down processes with stakeholders participation and flexible abatement strategies make the EU ETS a powerful instrument of cross sectoral integration of environmental concerns, which benefits from a high level of interaction among the actors involved and a significant degree of information exchange. However, the same peculiarities of the system make it difficult to identify a correspondence with a single mode of governance. The EU ETS shows characteristics of the decision making processes and institutions engaged, the tools and instruments used as well as the actors involved, which change according to the different levels of governance, and belong both to the old and to the new modes of governance. The emission trading scheme represents a clear example of Multi-Level governance, where the different modes of governance interact among them and affect each other.
    Keywords: Environmental Policy Integration, Climate Change, Emission Trading, EU Policy
    JEL: H23 F53 Q28
    Date: 2007–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.54&r=res
  3. By: Eggert, Håkan (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Ulmestrand,, Mats (Institute of Marine Research, Swedish Board of Fisheries)
    Abstract: Economic theory predicts that open access leads to myopic behaviour of fishermen, while improving property rights leads to more long-term decisions of fishermen. In this study, we report the experiences from a co-managed fishery within the Gullmar fjord, which is a marine reserve by the Swedish West coast. A group of fishermen initiated an informal co-management of the fishery in 2002, which was later formalized. Six fishermen were granted exclusive collective user right to 100 fishing days annually during 2004-06, which they distributed evenly within the group. First, we note a dramatic increase in real revenues, where the price differential in comparison with Swedish off-shore shrimp grew from 15% to 75% during 2000-07. Second, the fishermen within the reserve voluntarily increased the mesh size from the legal minimum requirement of 35 mm to 45 mm in order to leave specimen to grow as long as it is optimal. Finally, a small informal market where fishers bought and sold fishing days within the group emerged, which indicates the potential scope for using individual transferable quotas as a means to reduce overcapacity that exist also in Swedish fisheries.
    Keywords: Co-management; Fisheries; Marine reserves; Property rights
    JEL: Q22
    Date: 2007–05–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0253&r=res

This nep-res issue is ©2007 by Maximo Rossi. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.