nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2005‒07‒11
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. VALORACIÓN DE LOS BENEFICIOS ECONÓMICOS PROVISTOS POR EL SISTEMA DE PARQUES NACIONALES NATURALES: UNA APLICACIÓN DEL ANÁLISIS DE TRANSFERENC By Fernando Carriazo; Ana María Ibañez; Marcela Garcia
  2. Externalities and compensation: primeval games and solutions By Ju,Yuan; Borm,Peter
  3. Polluting emissions standards and clean technology trajectories under competitive selection and supply chain pressure By Maïder SAINT-JEAN (E3i, IFReDE-GRES)

  1. By: Fernando Carriazo; Ana María Ibañez; Marcela Garcia
    Abstract: El Sistema de Parques Nacionales Naturales provee servicios ambientales a la economía del país que, debido a su naturaleza de bienes públicos, no se equiparan con la asignación presupuestal destinada a su manejo y administración. La protección de extensas áreas territoriales con ecosistemas naturales valiosos contribuye a la conservación del recurso hídrico, al ecoturismo y al secuestro de carbono. Hoy el Sistema está compuesto por 49 áreas protegidas, cubre 10 millones de hectáreas y comprende nueve por ciento del territorio nacional. El objetivo de esta estudio es valorar los servicios provistos por el SPNN a la economía nacional. El estudio aproxima los beneficios económicos del consumo doméstico de agua potable en $32 mil millones de pesos mensuales. Los beneficios totales anuales por ecoturismo oscilan en un rango entre $2.3 y $6.9 mil millones de pesos. La venta de carbono por la conservación de sumideros de carbono significaría para Colombia beneficios por hectárea protegida entre $556.449 y $1.669.406, es decir US$297 y US$891 por hectárea.
    Keywords: transferencia de beneficios
    JEL: Q25
    Date: 2003–10–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000138:001055&r=res
  2. By: Ju,Yuan; Borm,Peter (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of inter-individual externalities, this paper constructs a new game-theoretic framework: primeval games. These games are used to design normative compensation rules for the underlying compensation problems: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. Characterizations of the marginalistic rule and the concession rule are provided and specific properties of the primeval rule are studied.
    JEL: C71 D62 D63
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200571&r=res
  3. By: Maïder SAINT-JEAN (E3i, IFReDE-GRES)
    Abstract: Based on a model of industrial dynamics, this paper examines the impact of polluting emissions standards on trajectories of clean technologies implemented by firms subject to competitive selection and supply chain pressure. The model incorporates a few stylised facts on the relationships between environmental regulation, innovation and diffusion. The main objective is to highlight the forces influencing the long term dynamics of an industry faced with evolving emissions standards in a ‘history-friendly’ way. The paper gives guidance to the conditions of dynamic efficiency of emissions standards taking into account the coevolution of technology, user requirements and market structure. We show that emission standards not only play a significant role in orienting research and innovation activities of supplier firms, but they are also likely to support the diffusion of environmental innovation in the supply chain. In some cases, emission standards lead to prevent both a situation of lock-in on the supply side and a situation of behavioural inertia on the user side. Standards may thus lead to preserve a certain form of technological and behavioural diversity. Based on the computer simulations, it will be shown that the efficiency of standards depends on the nature of performance standards (process or product), on the market structure and on the timing of intervention.
    Keywords: environmental innovation; industrial dynamics; environmental supply chain pressure; emission standards
    JEL: O33 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2005-16&r=res

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