nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2005‒04‒24
five papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Fishery Management Under Multiple Uncertainty By Gautam Sethi; Christopher Costello; Anthony Fisher; Michael Hanemann; Larry Karp
  2. The Effect of Pollution Permit Allocations on Firm-Level Emissions By Meredith Fowlie; Jeffrey Perloff
  3. Is Inequality Harmful for the Environment in a Growing Economy? By Hubert Kempf; Stéphane Rossignol
  4. Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements By Carlo Carraro; Johan Eyckmans; Michael Finus
  5. Environmental Awareness and Happiness By Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell; John M. Gowdy

  1. By: Gautam Sethi (Bard College, Bard Center for Environmental Policy); Christopher Costello (UC Santa Barbara, Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management); Anthony Fisher (University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation); Michael Hanemann (Univerisity of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation); Larry Karp (University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation)
    Date: 2004–10–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1021&r=res
  2. By: Meredith Fowlie (University of California, Berkeley); Jeffrey Perloff (University of California, Berkeley, and Giannini Foundation)
    Abstract: According to the Coase theorem, if property rights to pollute are clearly established and emissions markets nearly eliminate transaction costs, the market equilibrium will be independent of how the permits are initially allocated across firms. Using panel data from Southern California's RECLAIM program, we find that initial allocations are a statistically significant determinant of firm-level emissions. This relationship between allocation and emissions is stronger among firms with relatively high transaction costs. Thus, care must be exercised in the initial allocation of permits to ensure efficiency.
    Keywords: emissions trading, transaction costs,
    Date: 2004–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1047&r=res
  3. By: Hubert Kempf (Université Paris-1 Panthéon Sorbonne); Stéphane Rossignol (Université de Versailles, and EUREQua Université Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be devoted to supporting growth or abating pollution. The decision over the public programs is done in a direct democracy, with simple majority rule. We prove that the median voter is decisive and show that inequality is harmful for the environment: the poorer the median voter relative to the average individual, the less she will tax and devote resources to the environment, preferring to support growth.
    Keywords: Inequality, Environment, Pollution abatement policy, Growth, Political economy
    JEL: D31 O11 Q50 Q58
    Date: 2005–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.5&r=res
  4. By: Carlo Carraro (University of Venice); Johan Eyckmans (Europese Hogeschool Brussel and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën); Michael Finus (University of Hagen)
    Abstract: The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.
    Keywords: Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers
    JEL: C72 H23 Q25 Q28
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.50&r=res
  5. By: Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell (Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies & Faculty of Economics and Econometrics (SCHOLAR), University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); John M. Gowdy (Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy NY 12180-3590, USA)
    Abstract: The focus of this paper is on the relationship between an individual's environmental attitudes (or awareness) and well-being. We use an ordered probit model to examine the relationship between individual measures of subjective well-being and environmental attitudes regarding ozone pollution and species extinction. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey we find a negative correlation between well-being and concern about ozone pollution and a positive correlation between well-being and concern about species extinction. These relationships hold when explanatory variables are included indicating whether or not the person lives in a polluted environment and whether or not the person engages in outdoor leisure activities. These relationships also hold when we control for individual psychological traits. Our results are an important step in clarifying some of the subtleties of the relationship between environmental quality and well-being. This research area is important in addressing the related issues of sustainability and environmental policy design.
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rpi:rpiwpe:0503&r=res

This nep-res issue is ©2005 by Maximo Rossi. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.