nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2005‒04‒16
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. The Pigouvian Tax Rule in the Presence of an Eco-Industry By Alain-Désiré Nimubona; Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
  2. Optimal Environmental Road pricing By Johansson-Stenman, Olof
  3. The Kyoto agreement and Technology Spillovers By Golombek, Rolf; Hoel, Michael

  1. By: Alain-Désiré Nimubona; Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
    Abstract: Pollution abatement goods and services are now largely being delivered by a specialized "eco-industry." This note reconsiders Pigouvian taxes in this context. We find that the optimal emission tax will depart from the marginal social cost of pollution according to the polluters' and the environment firms' relative market power. <P>La production des biens et services destinés à reduire la pollution incombe actuellement souvent à des firmes spécialisées qui forment ce que l'on appelle maintenant l'« éco-industrie ». Cette note reconsidère les taxes pigouviennes dans ce contexte. Il est démontré que la taxe optimale sur les émissions polluantes divergera du coût social marginal de la pollution selon les pouvoirs de marché relatifs des pollueurs et des entreprises environnementales.
    Keywords: Pigouvian taxes, environment industry, taxes pigouviennes, industries de l'environnement
    JEL: H23 L13
    Date: 2005–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2005s-21&r=res
  2. By: Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: An optimal first-best road charge should not only be differentiated with respect to factors that affect the direct external environmental and time costs from the road-user himself. Indirect effects, such as the fact that other cars will be more polluting when congestion increases, should also be taken into account. <p>
    Keywords: Road pricing; environmental costs; externalities; indirect effects
    JEL: Q58 R41 R48
    Date: 2005–03–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0168&r=res
  3. By: Golombek, Rolf (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research); Hoel, Michael (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
    Abstract: A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions will require development of new technologies if such reductions are to be achieved without excessive costs. An important question is whether an agreement of the Kyoto type, which does not include elements related to research and development (R&D) of new technologies, will give sufficient incentives to develop such new technologies. On the one hand, since greenhouse gas emissions will become costly for countries and private producers, countries and individual producers will have incentives to undertake effort and costs to develop new technologies. On the other hand, R&D in one country is not only advantageous for this country, but usually also for other countries. The reason for this is that producers in these countries in many cases will learn from the R&D project, for example, through(informal) networks, journals, and in some cases through the import of goods from the country where the new technology is developed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss properties of an international climate agreement of the Kyoto type when R&D investments undertaken in one country are beneficial also for other countries. We examine whether a Kyoto type of agreement can provide the correct social amount of aggregate emissions and R&D investments in new technologies. We argue that the outcome of a Kyoto type agreement will differ from the social optimum. In particular, for a given level of abatement a Kyoto type agreement provides too little R&D investments relative to the social optimum.
    Keywords: Climate policy; Kyoto; international environmental agreements; R&D; technology spillovers.
    JEL: P28 Q54
    Date: 2005–04–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2005_005&r=res

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