nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2005‒03‒06
two papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Environmental Kuznetz curves for CO2 : heterogeneity versus homogeneity By Vollebergh,Herman R.J.; Dijkgraag,Elbert; Melenberg,Bertrand
  2. Pollution standards, costly monitoring and fines By Arguedas,Carmen

  1. By: Vollebergh,Herman R.J.; Dijkgraag,Elbert; Melenberg,Bertrand (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We explore the emissions income relationship for CO2 in OECD countries using various modelling strategies. Even for this relatively homogeneous sample, we find that the inverted-U-shaped curve is quite sensitive to the degree of heterogeneity included in the panel estimations. This finding is robust, not only across different model specifications but also across estimation techniques, including the more flexible non-parametric approach. Differences in restrictions applied in panel estimations are therefore responsible for the widely divergent findings for an inverted-U shape for CO2. Our findings suggest that allowing for enough heterogeneity is essential to prevent spurious correlation from reduced-form panel estimations. Moreover, this inverted U for CO2 is likely to exist for many, but not for all, countries.
    JEL: C33 Q50 Q50 O50
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200525&r=res
  2. By: Arguedas,Carmen (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We investigate the features of optimal regulatory policies composed of pollution standards and probabilities of inspection, where fines for non-compliance depend not only on the degree of violation but alson on nongravity factors. We show that optimal policies can induce either compliance or noncompliance with the standards, the latter being more plausible when monitoring costs are large and, surprisingly, when gravity-based fines are large. Also, both tghe convexity of the sanctions and the level of the non-gravity-based penalties play a key role as to whether optimal policies induce noncompliance.
    JEL: D82 K32 K42 L51
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20059&r=res

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