nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2005‒02‒13
one paper chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth By Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I

  1. By: Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I
    Abstract: We analyse the impact of micro-founded political institutions on environmental policy and economic growth. We model an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over the environment (as well as in age). Labour taxation and capital taxation is used to finance a public good and a public production factor, period by period. The underlying political institution is a parliament. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. The benchmark is when all decisions are taken in parliament. We compare this constitution with an independent regulator, elected in parliament. The regulatory regime causes lower pollution, but production inefficiency.
    Keywords: bargaining; comparative politics; endogenous growth; environmental policy; overlapping generations; taxation; voting
    JEL: D62 D72 E20 E62 H20 H55 O41 Q58
    Date: 2004–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4670&r=res

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