nep-res New Economics Papers
on Resource Economics
Issue of 2004‒12‒12
four papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. Pessimism or optimism : a justification to voluntary contributions toward environmental quality By Johana Etner; Meglena Jeleva
  2. A theoretical measure of environmental efficiency By Pierre-André Jouvet; Philippe Michel; Gilles Rotillon
  3. Optimal growth with pollution : how to use pollution permits ? By Pierre-André Jouvet; Philippe Michel; Gilles Rotillon
  4. Transboundary pollution in the black sea : comparison of institutional arrangements By Basak Bayramoglu

  1. By: Johana Etner (GAINS et EUREQua); Meglena Jeleva (LEN-C3E et EUREQua)
    Abstract: This arrticle analyzes the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of the environmental risk. The environmental quality is assumed uncertain and influenced by current quality and individuals' contributions. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Agents' preferences are represented by the RDEU model. We show that the contribution level results from two effects : a wealth effect (environmental or financial) and a risk one. It appears that wealth effects (unless for extreme wealth levels) is not sufficient to explain the implication of agents in the improvement of the environmental quality and that risk and attitude towards risk should be taken into account.
    Keywords: Risk perception; pessimism; optimism; environmental quality
    JEL: D89 D69 H23
    Date: 2004–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04099&r=res
  2. By: Pierre-André Jouvet (GAINS et GREQAM); Philippe Michel (GREQAM et EUREQua); Gilles Rotillon (THEMA)
    Abstract: We study, in a simple model, the partial equilibrium of an industry with n firms endowed by different technologies which have different pollution effects. The price of input (labor) and the demand curve to the industry are given. Pollution is restricted by a tradable market of permits in the industry. We define an environmental efficiency factor for each firm. Given the total dotation of permits, the larger is the environmental efficiency factor, the larger is the firm's contribution to total production. to study the long run efficiency, we explicit the role of capital in production and obtain a proportional environmental efficiency factor. Last, we analyze the consequences of permits' allocations on the profitability of the firms.
    Keywords: Environmental efficiency factor, environmental performance, indicators, market of permits, undesirable output
    JEL: D2 D61 L19 Q28
    Date: 2004–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04011&r=res
  3. By: Pierre-André Jouvet (GAINS et GREQAM); Philippe Michel (GREQAM et EUREQua); Gilles Rotillon (THEMA)
    Abstract: We study optimal growth and its decentralization in an overlapping generations model. The decentralization of an optimal path needs some specific taxes in addition to lump-sum transfers if there are externalities. The introduction of market of permits allows to neutralize the external environmental effects. We shows that there is a unique management of permits such that the equilibrium coincides with the optimal path : all permits should be auctioned i.e. no permits to firms. This conclusion is in contradiction with the usual pratice of grandfathering.
    Keywords: Optimal growth, environment, market of permits
    JEL: D61 D9 Q28
    Date: 2004–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04012&r=res
  4. By: Basak Bayramoglu (Ceras-ENPC et EUREQua)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements : the noncooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the noncooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules.
    Keywords: Black Sea, dynamic games, environment, institutional arrangements, noncooperative games, transboundary pollution, water
    JEL: C72 C73 Q5 Q53
    Date: 2004–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04020&r=res

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