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on Regulation |
| By: | Pollitt, M. G. |
| Abstract: | The issue of when and how to intervene in energy markets in the face of large negative shocks to energy supply is one that has been exercising the European Union, individual European governments and European companies over recent years. This is the topic this paper seeks to address. The 2021-23 European energy price shock saw historically unprecedented rises in both wholesale electricity and gas prices, following 25 years of attempts to build single European integrated energy markets. Europe – at the political and corporate level - was largely unprepared for the size of this market induced price shock when it hit. This paper looks at the lessons that were learned about how to handle future large rises in the wholesale price of electricity and gas and the extent to which these are being tested in the 2026 energy crisis, arising from the war induced closure of the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, effecting both oil, gas and fossil products. The paper explores the likely benefits and costs of pre-defined trigger points for partially defined government interventions in energy prices, in the light of evolving European energy policy. We discuss how flexible pre-commitments to intervene in a certain way might offer more protection to investors and more reassurance to consumers than the sorts of arbitrary interventions we have seen in the past. We suggest that the policy community – which includes corporations and their trade bodies - should work together to build resilience ahead of future energy crises. |
| Keywords: | Energy Price Crisis, Rationing, Excess Profit Taxes |
| JEL: | L94 |
| Date: | 2026–11–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2688 |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | Agentic AI systems extend the range of tasks, decisions and actions that users can delegate to AI. This paper examines competition within agentic AI markets and how it may affect competition more broadly. It considers implications for the supply of such systems, including concentration, vertical integration and platform gatekeeping, as well as their downstream use. It explores potential pro-competitive effects, such as reduced transaction costs and stronger demand-side pressure, alongside risks including collusion, market foreclosure and reduced transparency. It aims to identify key risk factors and assess how competition authorities and policymakers may respond. |
| Keywords: | AI, antitrust, artificial intelligence, Collusion, competition, Information sharing, Market Power, Mergers, Technology |
| JEL: | D83 K21 L13 L15 L41 L86 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–11–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:dafaac:339-en |
| By: | Nicholas Carollo (Federal Reserve Board of Governors); Jason Hicks (University of Victoria); Andrew Karch (University of Minnesota); Morris M. Kleiner (University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs and NBER) |
| Abstract: | Despite a dramatic increase in government regulation over the past century, relatively little is known about how new regulatory institutions emerge and evolve over long periods of time. In this paper, we examine the history and political economy of occupational licensing, a major category of labor regulation in the United States. We first develop a theoretical framework in which licensing arises as an endogenous policy choice shaped by potential social welfare considerations and professional association influence. We then evaluate the model’s empirical implications using a new historical database that records the adoption of state and federal licensing requirements for hundreds of occupations from 1870 to 2020. We show, first, that occupations whose tasks plausibly pose greater risks to consumers are more extensively licensed and were regulated earlier, on average, within states. Second, market size is strongly associated with the timing of policy adoption in the early 20th century, while political and institutional characteristics are more influential in later decades. Using an occupation-specific shift-share instrument for immigration-driven supply shocks, we find that an exogenous increase labor market competition raises the likelihood of regulation, consistent with incumbent practitioners’ incentives to restrict entry. Finally, we show that state professional associations substantially increase the probability of regulation immediately after their founding, highlighting the importance of political organization. Together, these findings demonstrate that a combination of public and private interests, as well as broader institutional factors, jointly influenced the adoption and diffusion of occupational licensing and regulation across states. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vic:vicddp:2602 |
| By: | Jonathan Hall (Amazon, Inc.); Jason Hicks (University of Victoria); Morris M. Kleiner (University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs and NBER); Yun taek Oh (University of Nevada - Reno) |
| Abstract: | We examine whether occupational licensing improves service quality and safety using trip-level Uber data that include driver ratings and telematics-based measures of driving behavior. Exploiting quasi-random assignment from proximity-based dispatch, we compare trips served by licensed and unlicensed drivers in two settings: a crossborder comparison between New York City and New Jersey, and a deregulation event in Houston. Across settings and specifications, including instrumental variable estimates, we find no consistent evidence that licensing improves consumer outcomes. In Houston, post-deregulation entrants are indistinguishable from previously licensed drivers on ratings and driving behavior, despite differing markedly in experience and age. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vic:vicddp:2603 |
| By: | Soo-Dong Kim (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | A price cap is a policy tool that cushions the spread of price shocks in an emergency and keeps economic activity going. It can be expected to help anchor inflation expectations, blunt the incentives for precautionary buying and hoarding, and make costs more predictable for firms and the public sector, while buying a critical window in which to secure alternative sources of supply and prepare fiscal measures.<p> A comparison of major economies shows both direct price management and subsidy-based policies cushioning price increases. From March to August 2026, energy prices in South Korea, China, and Thailand rose an average of 15 percent year on year, 9.9 percentage points less than the 24.9 percent recorded in the United States and Germany, while in Japan, which stabilized prices through subsidies, they fell by an average of 4.5 percent. Korea’s results have been relatively good, less because it eliminated price increases than because it kept them from widening further. From August to September, the year-on-year rise in Korea’s gasoline prices held almost steady, moving from 11.8 to 11.9 percent, while the rates in Thailand, the United States, and Germany widened again over the same period. Exchange rates, taxes, and the lag before price changes pass through all play a part, however, so care is needed before reading the observed gaps between countries as the net effect of the price cap.<p> Going forward, policy should combine temporary cushioning, targeted support, supply stability, and conditional normalization, rather than expand price ceilings across the board. That means adjusting the caps to reflect international prices and supply and demand conditions, settling losses transparently, targeting support at vulnerable groups and hard-hit industries, and diversifying supply and improving efficiency at the same time. The policy’s performance should be judged not on price stability alone but on the full picture: the net burden on households, real output and exports in industry, supply stability, and the fiscal burden. |
| Keywords: | price caps; energy; oil prices; fuel subsidies; price stabilization; energy policy; South Korea |
| JEL: | Q48 Q41 E31 E64 E71 |
| Date: | 2026–10–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kietia:023917 |
| By: | Laurenz Marstaller |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how platforms jointly choose fees and recommendations and their implications for fee regulation. A platform charges sellers a commis sion rate and ranks products based on price and match-value. The analysis shows that price-sensitive rankings intensify seller competition, allowing the platform to extract more surplus. Commission-rate caps constrain fees, but platforms may respond by making recommendations less price-sensitive, attenuating consumer surplus gains. By contrast, capped nominal fees can be more effective because they shift the platform’s incentives toward transaction volume rather than transaction value. Effective fee regulation must therefore account for how platforms adjust their recommendation policies in response. |
| Keywords: | Algorithm Design, DMA, Platform Regulation, Platforms, Recommendations, Search |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 L51 L86 |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_799 |
| By: | Bharadwaj Kannan; Roberto Pinheiro; Jan-Peter Siedlarek |
| Abstract: | We study how firm size and market concentration drive price dispersion and margins in a market with information frictions. We start from the noisy-search framework and tie firm size to the number of establishments owned by a firm. Consumers sample establishments rather than firms, allowing multi-establishment firms to capture even informed consumers. This benefit comes at a cost to the firm, since establishments cannibalize each other's demand. We show that uniform pricing across a firm's establishments is optimal. The unique equilibrium involves price distributions with supports connected and nested by firm size: larger firms post prices over a wider support, but earn lower profit per establishment. Finally, mergers can increase concentration while reducing expected transaction prices and markups when the merger does not create a new market leader. When the merger creates a new largest firm, its effect can instead reverse, depending on the relative strength of the concentration and largest-firm channels. Thus, the effect of greater concentration depends critically on how ownership changes the firm size distribution. |
| Keywords: | search frictions; market power; firm heterogeneity |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 |
| Date: | 2026–11–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwq:104004 |
| By: | Laurenz Marstaller |
| Abstract: | Heterogeneous search costs enable price discrimination, which I study in the canonical Wolinsky (1986) sequential search setting. Firms observe a public signal of a consumer’s search cost before posting a personalized price. The welfare effects of search-cost-based price discrimination depend on the distribution of search costs. For sufficiently small search costs, all consumers participate, and price discrimina tion reduces consumer surplus. When search costs are sufficiently dispersed, price discrimination reduces participation; its effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous and decomposed into three forces. This decomposition guides optimal information design: the consumer-surplus-maximizing policy is a binary signal that separates low- and high-search-cost consumers. |
| Keywords: | Privacy, Price Discrimination, Search Costs, Consumer Search Market |
| JEL: | D83 L13 D18 D43 |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_798 |
| By: | Emil Dimanchev; Steven A. Gabriel; Stein-Erik Fleten; Filippo Pecci; Magnus Korpas |
| Abstract: | Incomplete long-term contracting in electricity markets can expose investors and consumers to inefficient levels of risk. This paper investigates how incompleteness impacts the optimal choice of climate policy. We develop a game-theoretic model of optimal policy-making in anticipation of how electricity market agents react to a given policy when gas prices and demand are uncertain and contracting is incomplete. In illustrative experiments, we observe that renewable subsidies and carbon prices induce an insurance co-benefit when markets are incomplete. This is because, relative to a complete market benchmark, incompleteness shifts investment from renewables toward gas and exposes consumers to uninsured risk from inter-annual volatility in electricity prices. By incentivizing investment in renewables, subsidies and carbon prices indirectly counteract these distortions. Consequently, incompleteness increases the optimal subsidy and carbon price levels in our experiments. Renewable subsidies exhibit a stronger insurance effect than carbon pricing, as the latter leads to more investment in gas with carbon capture and storage and more volatile electricity prices. While carbon pricing is more economically efficient than subsidies in complete markets, incompleteness shrinks its efficiency advantage and even leads to cases where subsidies are more economically efficient. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.41103 |
| By: | Peter Michaelis (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study how minimum quality standards (MQSs) interact with market size when quality entails marginal production costs and non-recurring investment. In a vertically differentiated duopoly with endogenous quality choice, price competition, and an outside option, the unregulated duopoly remains viable at every positive market size because firms lower quality in smaller markets. A binding MQS restricts this adjustment and creates a strictly positive market-size viability boundary. Which firm reaches it first depends on market size relative to standard stringency. In relatively small markets, the constrained low-quality firm loses viability first. In relatively large markets, the unconstrained high-quality firm does so because induced upgrading raises its non-recurring investment burden. Crossing this boundary eliminates the high-quality product and yields a stable low-quality-only outcome, with no profitable re-entry by the high-quality firm. A marginally binding MQS raises welfare at every finite market size. When market size is sufficiently large relative to the investment burden, the welfare-maximizing standard is interior; when it is sufficiently small, duopoly viability binds first. The welfare-maximizing standard rises with market size. Separate policies that shrink the effective customer base or raise the non-recurring investment burden required for compliance can make an otherwise viable duopoly non-viable. The viability structure can also give a firm an incentive to support regulatory tightening that makes its rival non-viable. |
| Keywords: | Minimum quality standard; Market size; Quality investment; Market structure; Duopoly viability |
| JEL: | L13 L15 L51 |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:349 |
| By: | Nathan Engelman Lado; Ahmed Alahmed; Audun Botterud; Saurabh Amin |
| Abstract: | We examine the joint PV and storage operational and investment decisions of a prosumer under net energy metering (NEM) and peak/off-peak tariffs. Legacy NEM compensates net exports at the retail rate over a netting period, typically under time-invariant pricing. To better reflect system costs, tariff features are being reconsidered, with many U.S. states adopting time-varying prices and export compensation below the retail price. We formulate the prosumer decision problem as a cost minimization problem with charge/discharge, PV investment, and storage investment decisions. We analytically derive the optimal decisions based on the tariff's membership in one of six regions that partition the tariff space. Using these solutions, we examine the relationship between PV and storage, identifying when they are complements or substitutes. Furthermore, we identify the relationship between private DER incentives and the distribution utility's (DU's) net cost of serving the prosumer. For both storage and PV, when investment costs are greater than the costs of serving the customer, there is no tariff where investment in PV and storage decrease non-adopter bills. Under the same conditions, complementarity between PV and storage decreases DU cost recovery for a given tariff. In a Massachusetts-based case study, we validate our theoretical findings by connecting tariff design features to DER interaction, the DU's net cost, and DER adoption in a stochastic, multi-prosumer, and multi-period setting. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.40650 |
| By: | Nils Johnson; Geoff Blanford; John E. T. Bistline |
| Abstract: | Data center demand is increasing faster than generation can be built, encouraging proposals to interconnect large loads on condition that they reduce consumption during high-stress periods. Estimates of how much load can be added via flexibility rest on simplified accounting and report only annual curtailed electricity. Here we use a national energy systems model that co-optimizes hourly generation and load curtailment across 16 U.S. regions to characterize the flexibility and power system impacts of enabling headroom. While 50 GW can be served while curtailing less than 0.1% of its annual energy, small annual curtailment conceals potentially severe operating requirements. Most regions require curtailment deeper than 90% in at least one hour, so the load must disconnect or have sufficient on-site resources to provide full back up. Furthermore, announced data center locations are not aligned with modeled headroom and relying on existing generation fleets raises CO2 emissions and wholesale electricity prices. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2611.00462 |
| By: | Luke Garrod; Ruochen Li; Antonio Russo; Chris Wilson |
| Abstract: | There is growing evidence that some firms pass on cost changes more than their rivals. This evidence is documented in response to a wide range of cost changes, including manufacturer trade promotions and excise taxes. The limited theoretical understanding of such heterogeneous price responses does not account for firms' promotional strategies that are common in retail markets. This paper characterizes the heterogeneous transmission and incidence of cost changes in a duopoly model of sales when firms have asymmetric loyal customer bases. We show that, under log-concave (log-convex) demand, the larger firm passes on less (more) than the smaller firm. Moreover, cost increases make the depth of firms' sales shallower (deeper), while not affecting their frequency. These price responses affect different firms and consumers heterogeneously. A cost change impacts the larger firm's profits more than the smaller firm's. It also tends to affect the surplus of non-loyal consumers the most, the surplus of the larger firm's loyals the least, and the surplus of the smaller firm's loyals by an intermediate amount. We further show that incidence shifts away from consumers and towards firms when loyal customer bases are more asymmetric or when more consumers are loyal. We discuss the implications for retailers' promotional pricing and manufacturers' trade promotions |
| Keywords: | cost pass-through, incidence, customer loyalty, promotional pricing, trade promotions, competition |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 M31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13136 |
| By: | Krzysztof Wozniak |
| Abstract: | Service fees continue to proliferate in a wide range of markets, from retail to payments, generating questions about their impact on consumer choice, competition, and fairness. This paper explores how sensitivity to such fees varies across consumers, use cases, and competitive settings, and whether it is affected by consumer learning. I am able to conduct this in-depth empirical analysis thanks to a uniquely detailed, high-frequency panel data set on surcharged ATM cash withdrawals. Results show that average elasticity estimates mask substantial heterogeneity in consumer sensitivity to service fees. I explore ways in which market and behavioral mechanisms can help explain this heterogeneity. Finally, I investigate whether consumers strategically adjust their behavior in response to service fees. |
| Date: | 2026–11–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:104001 |
| By: | Jarrad Harford; Dirk Jenter |
| Abstract: | This survey reviews the literature on the role of incentives in mergers and acquisitions. We examine the incentives of the most important players in M&A decisions: acquirer and target executives, acquirer and target directors, shareholders, merger arbitrageurs, and investment bankers. We concentrate on incentives that affect the focus on value maximization, whether they be incentives to prioritize or deviate from it, and we cover financial incentives, private benefits, empire building, career concerns, and risk-reduction motives. We find a complex web of offsetting and reinforcing incentives among the decision makers, each of whom anticipates the others’ incentives, and we argue that the acquisition market itself generates important incentives that discipline managers. |
| Keywords: | mergers and acquisitions, M&A, incentives in M&A |
| JEL: | G34 L22 M12 M52 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13126 |
| By: | Karam Kang; Mo Xiao |
| Abstract: | Can firms influence policy through investment? Using 2010--2019 U.S. broadband deployment and state policy data, we find that large internet service providers expand capacity more in electorally competitive counties. Greater large-provider capacity in swing counties is associated with fewer subsequent entry- and investment-facilitating policies, especially rights-of-way accommodations that reduce deployment barriers faced by smaller providers. To interpret these patterns, we develop a model in which a large firm's capacity can reduce the policymaker's gain from intervention. In the model, policy deterrence raises the large firm's market share and can reduce total deployment. |
| JEL: | D72 L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35992 |
| By: | Greta Falavigna (CNR-IRCrES, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile, strada delle Cacce 73, 10135 Torino); Giampaolo Vitali (CNR-IRCrES, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile, strada delle Cacce 73, 10135 Torino) |
| Abstract: | Since the 1970s, European countries have increasingly prioritized the protection of the environment and human health. In response to these growing concerns, the European Community has progressively broadened its regulatory framework, issuing an expanding array of directives and regulations aimed at safeguarding natural resources and improving public health conditions. This paper provides a concise, yet comprehensive overview of the main environmental legislation developed within the European Community, culminating in the ambitions of the European Green Deal, with particular attention devoted to the REACH regulation. To evaluate how these regulatory measures influence corporate performance, innovation dynamics, and strategic behavior, the analysis draws on the theoretical foundations of both the Porter Hypothesis and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. By integrating these perspectives, the paper highlights the complex interplay between regulation, competitiveness, and environmental responsibility. The study concludes by outlining promising avenues for future research that warrant deeper scientific exploration, especially in light of the evolving regulatory landscape and the growing emphasis on sustainable industrial transformation. |
| Keywords: | REACH, environmental regulation, economic impact, Porter Hypothesis, Pollution Heaven Hypothesis. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csc:ircrwp:202601 |
| By: | Charles Okeyia (Lisbon, Portugal); Nuno Marques de Almeida (Lisbon, Portugal); Joe Amad-Echendu (Pretoria, South Africa); Simplice A. Asongu (Johannesburg, South Africa) |
| Abstract: | This article explores the potential of blockchain technology (BCT) and digital twins (DT) to revolutionise the management of distributed telecom infrastructure assets in developing countries. By addressing the electricity supply challenge and enhancing asset maintenance, these technologies provide opportunities for the future of telecom infrastructure in these regions. Based on an empirical review using data from quantitative and qualitative approaches, including semi-structured interviews and survey questions, the results show that blockchain and digital twin technologies are not only promising but also significantly enhance the efficiency of optimising distributed telecoms asset maintenance practices. These technologies enable predictive maintenance activities, real-time visibility, and escalation of asset functionality and faults, providing reassurance about their effectiveness. |
| Keywords: | Asset Maintenance; Blockchain and Digital Twin Technologies; Distributed Telecoms Assets |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:25/037 |
| By: | Yuteng Cheng; Charles M. Kahn; Francisco Rivadeneyra |
| Abstract: | Real-time payment systems increase fraud risks by compressing the detection window. We develop a framework to study two institutional levers: centralized versus decentralized fraud control, and the allocation of fraud losses through liability and reimbursement rules. Centralized governance does not by itself implement the planner’s allocation, because user fees can inefficiently exclude small payments. In a decentralized regime, a simple liability split generally does not implement the first best, but the optimal split can be characterized by the relative adjusted curvature of sender- and receiver-side prevention technologies. Liability is generally shared, but becomes sender-heavy when receiver-side monitoring is sufficiently less flexible. With access and cap mandates, centralized governance dominates; without them, decentralization can yield higher welfare. |
| Keywords: | Models and tools; Economic models; Money and payments; Payment and financial market infrastructures; Retail payments |
| JEL: | D D8 D86 E E4 E42 G G2 G28 L L5 L51 |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:26-41 |
| By: | Podesta, Martina; Chan, Tiffanie; Surminski, Swenja; Higham, Kate; Magoon, Mallika |
| Keywords: | ARRAY(0x620706cf3f30) |
| JEL: | R14 J01 |
| Date: | 2026–11–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141849 |
| By: | Simplice A. Asongu (Yaoundé, Cameroon) |
| Abstract: | The present study complements the extant literature by assessing how remittances affect the incidence of capital flight on renewable energy consumption in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries. The empirical evidence is based on interactive quantile regressions and the following findings are established. There is an unconditional negative incidence of capital flight on renewable energy consumption while remittances mitigate the negative incidence of capital flight on renewable energy consumption. Furthermore, thresholds of remittances are apparent at which the unfavorable incidence of capital flight on renewable energy consumption is completely mitigated. The corresponding remittances thresholds which are exclusively apparent in the bottom quantiles of the renewable energy distribution are 0.999 and 0.909 (% of GDP) in the 10th and 25th quantiles, respectively. Policy implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Remittances; Capital Flight; Renewable Energy; Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | H10 Q20 Q30 O11 O55 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:26/044 |
| By: | Keil, Samuel; Schick, Constantin Peter; Sternal, Martin; Schiereck, Dirk |
| Abstract: | This study investigates how M&A announcements by six dominant digital platform companies – termed Digital Giants (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, and Nvidia) – affect market valuations of competitors across distinct dimensions of rivalry. Applying an event study and multivariate regression to 889 M&A announcements from 2010 to 2024, we identify an asymmetric pattern across two rivalry dimensions. At the submarket level (Direct Rivals), diffuse signaling prevails: they show no systematic reactions, consistent with platform envelopment decoupling exposure from the product-market boundaries classical rival effect theory presupposes. At ecosystem level, ecosystem-wide exposure emerges: Indirect Rivals – Digital Giants competing for orchestration control – co-move with the acquirer’s valuation through overlapping governance and infrastructure interdependencies. A comparison against announcement-free days shows this co-movement is only partly continuous, with an announcement-specific component under the SIC-based rival definition. The findings establish a multi-dimensional rivalry framework extending classical rival effect theory to digital platform contexts. |
| Date: | 2026–10–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:162912 |
| By: | Mark Swilling; Andrew Boraine; Mlondi Ndovela; Garth Malan; Hilda Jaka Mabiza; Erika Kraemer-Mbula; Rebecca Hanlin; Francois Engelbrecht; Jessica Steinkopf; Julian May; Zeph Nhleko; Alboricah Rathupetsane |
| Abstract: | As climate change increasingly threatens the long-term security of critical water, energy, and food resources, there is an imperative to invest in the growth and fortification of infrastructure across these interconnected sectors. |
| Keywords: | Water, Energy, Food, Finance infrastructure, Financial dynamics, Climate change, Natural resources, Governance |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2026-108 |
| By: | Jing Li; David Scolari; Katalin Springel |
| Abstract: | We study the pass-through of U.S. state electric vehicle incentives using transaction-level data and a newly assembled dataset of state programs from 2012–2020. Average pass-through is approximately full, but this aggregate estimate conceals substantial heterogeneity. We find that pass-through varies sharply across program designs and buyer characteristics. Transaction prices decrease for purchases and point-of-transaction incentives, resulting in more than full pass-through, while for leases, incentives are substantially eroded by higher transaction prices. Pass-through also varies non-monotonically with buyer income, with no evidence that higher- income buyers capture a larger share of the marginal incentive dollar. Nous étudions la répercussion des mesures incitatives mises en place par les États américains pour l’achat de véhicules électriques, à partir de données individuelles sur les transactions et d’une nouvelle base de données regroupant les programmes des États pour la période de 2012 à 2020. En moyenne, les mesures incitatives sont répercutées presque intégralement sur les prix payés par les consommateurs, mais cette estimation globale masque d’importantes différences. Nous constatons que le degré de répercussion varie considérablement selon la conception des programmes et les caractéristiques des acheteurs. Les prix de transaction diminuent pour les achats de véhicules et lorsque les mesures incitatives sont appliquées au moment de la transaction, ce qui entraîne une répercussion supérieure à 100 %. En revanche, dans le cas des locations, une hausse des prix de transaction absorbe une part importante des avantages procurés par les mesures incitatives. La répercussion varie également de manière non monotone selon le revenu des acheteurs, sans que les résultats indiquent que les acheteurs à revenu élevé bénéficient d’une plus grande part de chaque dollar supplémentaire d’incitatif. |
| Keywords: | Electric vehicles, incentives, price pass-through, public policy, subsidies, automotive market, consumer income, Véhicules électriques, mesures incitatives, répercussion sur les prix, politiques publiques, subventions, marché automobile, revenu des consommateurs |
| Date: | 2026–11–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2026s-26 |