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on Regulation |
| By: | Linnenbrink, Daniel |
| Abstract: | European policymakers argue that bidding zones with uniform prices ensure fairness in electricity markets. Since the outcome of such a fair spot market is often infeasible due to network constraints, a second stage is needed: the redispatch. I establish a mechanism design result showing that even a minimal fairness restriction on the first stage strictly increases procurement costs for asymmetric dispatches. In detail, I analyze a market-based redispatch mechanism where inc-dec gaming creates arbitrage profits for those producers that benefit the network the least. These results identify a general cost of fairness in sequential markets and question uniform bidding zones in electricity markets. |
| Keywords: | mechanism design, fairness, electricity market design |
| JEL: | D47 D82 L94 Q48 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:343566 |
| By: | Färber, Nina Lena; Hey, Florian |
| Abstract: | Article 5(2) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) prohibits gatekeepers from combining personal data across core platform services unless end users consent within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This paper argues that importing the GDPR's consent standard into a competition-driven provision produces a structurally mismatched regulatory design. Drawing on competition economics, we examine the underlying data combination rent and show that this rent, rather than raw data volume, constitutes the primary source of gatekeeper dominance. This rent is economically ambivalent: pro-competitive where combined data improves products, anti-competitive where it serves surplus extraction. Yet Article 5(2) DMA faces user-related constraints for acknowledging its economic ambivalence, because it rather restricts what is harmful only conditionally. We demonstrate that consent, when applied in markets characterized by pronounced power asymmetries, generates predictable welfare losses: entrenching incumbents, fragmenting data ecosystems, and reducing consumer welfare without effectively constraining the rent it targets. In particular, we argue that data-based payment constitutes an economically distinctive mode of exchange that, unlike monetary payment, does not directly deplete disposable income. The resulting two-fold regulatory impasse implies that neither widespread consent nor widespread refusal advances market contestability or data sovereignty. In response, we assess alternatives, including data fiduciaries, data intermediaries, and portability-based data markets, that target the data combination rent more directly. None dominates on all margins. The choice among imperfect institutions is comparative. We conclude that, if data combination is to be governed at all, effective regulation requires instruments calibrated to the economic structure of data-driven markets rather than to the individual autonomy framework of data protection regulation. |
| Keywords: | Competition Policy, Consent, Data Combination, Data Sovereignty, Digital Markets Act (DMA), Gatekeepers, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Platform Regulation |
| JEL: | K21 L40 L51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343556 |
| By: | Breide, Lukas; Budzinski, Oliver; Mendelsohn, Juliane; Stöhr, Annika |
| Abstract: | This paper develops four proposals to modernize merger control in the European Union and beyond. First, merger control should be reinforced and reinvigorated to prevent the further rising of market power and to stop the ongoing decline of competition intensity. Second, the analysis highlights the need to incorporate systemic and cross-market power into both market definition and competitive assessment. Third, it challenges the traditional presumption that non-horizontal mergers are generally less harmful than horizontal ones, showing that vertical and conglomerate integration may reinforce ecosystem power and foreclose innovation. Finally, the paper proposes the use of rebuttable presumptions to address procedural asymmetries and under-enforcement. Together, these reforms would align merger control with contemporary economic research on digital ecosystems and enhance its capacity to safeguard contestability, innovation, and dynamic competition. |
| Keywords: | merger control, merger guidelines, concentration, systemic market power, digital ecosystems, competition policy, market definition, rebuttable presumptions, competitiveness |
| JEL: | K21 L40 L51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343555 |
| By: | Hey, Florian; Budzinski, Oliver |
| Abstract: | We develop a sequential game-theoretic model to analyze the compliance incentives of digital gatekeepers under the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA). A gatekeeper chooses between full compliance and strategic compliance - a strategy of tactical, superficially lawful implementation that preserves a larger share of monopoly rents. The European Commission decides whether to accept the gatekeeper's compliance or initiate enforcement proceedings. Using backward induction, we show that in high-impact markets, the gatekeeper's equilibrium strategy is strategic compliance, investing in legal complexity to deter enforcement. In low-impact markets, full compliance is the equilibrium outcome. We extend the base model by endogenizing the Commission's enforcement incentives, modeled as increasing in the fine imposed, and derive conditions under which raising fines may paradoxically fail to induce full compliance. The model contributes to an emerging literature on regulatory compliance in digital markets and identifies the negotiation-oriented nature of DMA enforcement as a key determinant of strategic gatekeeper behavior. |
| Keywords: | antitrust, Digital Markets Act (DMA), gatekeeper, platform regulation, strategic compliance |
| JEL: | C72 K20 K21 L40 L51 L86 M21 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343557 |
| By: | Daniel Davi-Arderius; Rabindra Nepal; Tooraj Jamasb |
| Abstract: | Whether merchant arbitrage acts as a counter force to the "merit order effect" of solar and wind is important, but little is explored in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). This study fills this gap by studying the impact of charging and discharging stand-alone Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) on spot electricity prices considering their rapid recent growth in the wholesale electricity market. Australia is a global leader in BESS, and this study context is also relevant to other countries decarbonizing their energy mix. We use 5-minute wholesale price data between 2024 and 2025 and apply Quantile Regressions with instrumental variables. We find that stand-alone BESS has impact on spot-prices, but the effect is asymmetric: charging BESS increases the spot price, while discharging them decreases the spot price and thus driving self-cannibalisation. The net impact of charging and discharging on the electricity prices on consumer prices can be negative, especially under large scale penetration of BESS. The findings also offer some policy recommendations. |
| Keywords: | electricity, storage, batteries, BESS, Australia, arbitrage |
| JEL: | L50 L94 Q28 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-81 |
| By: | Yoon, Yeochang |
| Abstract: | As the share of variable renewable energy such as solar and wind rises rapidly, ensuring adequate investment in facilities that prevent outages and maintain reliable supply has become more important. Yet, Korea's wholesale electricity market relies on rigid pricing rules that fail to provide appropriate investment incentives, delaying the expansion of required resources. It is therefore desirable to reform the pricing framework so that market prices reflect demand and supply conditions effectively as signals for investment and system operation. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kdifoc:343514 |
| By: | Hey, Florian |
| Abstract: | The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) introduces significant transparency obligations regarding price and performance measurement for digital gatekeepers. This paper provides a theoretical economic analysis of these provisions, evaluating them against the ongoing debate on whether advertising is welfare-enhancing (informative) or socially wasteful (persuasive). The analysis suggests that while the DMA effectively targets information asymmetries and the so-called ad tech tax to foster market contestability and fairness, it remains agnostic to the normative implications of the advertising model itself. The paper argues that by lowering costs for advertisers without addressing the persuasive nature of advertising, the regulation risks fueling a zero-sum game, leading to a higher equilibrium volume of socially wasteful advertising. Thus, the respective DMA rules contribute to rent redistribution within the advertising sector rather than mitigating the systematic inefficiencies of an over-advertised digital economy. This suggests that structural or fiscal alternatives may be more appropriate to resolve these issues and their wider implications for the digital economy. |
| Keywords: | Ad Tech, Competition Policy, Digital Markets Act (DMA), Digital Advertising, Gatekeepers, Platform Regulation, Welfare Economics |
| JEL: | K21 L40 L51 L86 M38 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343552 |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver |
| Abstract: | A series of high-profile judgments of the European Court of Justice has recently emphasized the anticompetitive character of many regulatory interventions of sports associations (like UEFA) into the sports markets they are governing. This has led to widespread calls for reforms and changes. However, given the special characteristics of sports requiring a market-internal regulator to set, implement, and enforce the common rules of the game, a somewhat neglected question is how regulatory interventions by sports associations can look like in the future in order to avoid violating competition rules. This paper develops a framework for regulatory activities by sports governing bodies (like UEFA) that stands in line even with ambitious interpretations of the judgments. It uses the Royal Antwerpen case about regulations to promote homegrown talent as an example. However, the developed framework may be applied for virtually all regulatory interventions by sports associations. |
| Keywords: | football, sports economics, sport law, governance, competition, Royal Antwerp case, homegrown talent, market-internal regulator |
| JEL: | Z20 K21 L83 J01 J08 J49 Z22 Z23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343553 |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver; Haucap, Justus |
| Abstract: | Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Wirkungen der Finanz- und Budgetregeln im europäischen Fußball in den letzten gut 15 Jahren. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die negativen Externalitäten, welche eine solche Regulierung (sport-)ökonomisch rechtfertigen, durch die existierenden Finanzregeln auf europäischer und nationaler Ebene offenbar erfolgreich kontrolliert werden. Dazu reichen allerdings wohl bereits die mildesten und am wenigsten restriktiven der verschiedenen Regelsysteme und -elemente aus. Die wettbewerbsbeschränkenden und ökonomisch restriktiven Effekte der weitergehenden Regeln - wie der Break-Even-Regel oder Kaderkostenbegrenzungen - wären somit durch die Marktversagensproblematik nicht gerechtfertigt. Empirische Studien liefern zudem kaum Evidenz, dass sie weiterführenden Zielen (bspw. der Wettbewerbsausgeglichenheit) effektiv dienen würden. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es bedenklich, dass die DFL gerade beschlossen hat, ihre Finanzregeln zukünftig noch stärker restriktiv und spürbar invasiver auszugestalten als bisher. Insbesondere die parallele Gültigkeit einer Kaderkostenbegrenzungsregel und der Investorenbegrenzungsregel ("50plus1-Regel") wird aus sport- und wettbewerbsökonomischer Perspektive kritisch gesehen. |
| Abstract: | This article examines the effects of financial and budgetary regulations in European football over the past 15 years. It demonstrates that the negative externalities that justify such regulation from a (sports) economics perspective are apparently successfully controlled by existing financial rules at the European and national levels. However, even the mildest and least restrictive of the various rule systems and elements seem to suffice for this purpose. The competition-restricting and economically limiting effects of more far-reaching rules - such as the break-even rule or squad cost limits - would therefore not be justified by the problem of market failure. Furthermore, empirical studies provide little evidence that these rules effectively serve broader objectives (e.g., competitive balance). Against this backdrop, it is concerning that the DFL (German Football League) has just decided to make its financial rules even more restrictive and noticeably more invasive than before. In particular, the intended parallel application of a new squad cost limitation rule and the existing investor limitation rule ("50plus1 rule") must be viewed critically from a sports and competition economics perspective. |
| Keywords: | Sportökonomik, Fußball, Regulierungsökonomik, Finanzregeln, Fiskalregeln, Wettbewerb, Kaderkostenregel, 50plus1-Regel, sports economics, football, regulatory economics, financial and fiscal rules, competition, antitrust, squad cost rule, 50plus1 rule |
| JEL: | H39 K21 L40 L83 Z20 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343551 |
| By: | Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt |
| Abstract: | Im Schienenpersonenfernverkehr entstehen zunehmend neue Angebote auf nachfragestarken Verbindungen. Diese Entwicklung ist wettbewerbspolitisch zu begrüßen. Sie legt aber ein institutionelles Problem offen: Der Zugang zu besonders attraktiven Trassen ist bislang kaum systematisch mit den Netzbeiträgen anderer Fernverkehrsleistungen verknüpft. Der Beitrag entwickelt ein Trassencredit-System als regelgebundenen Allokationsrahmen: Für besonders knappe Premiumtrassen müssen Credits eingesetzt werden; netzergänzende Fernverkehrsleistungen erzeugen Credits. Bewertet werden ausschließlich objektivierbare Verkehrsleistungen, nicht die historischen Kosten eines etablierten Betreibers. Ordnungsökonomisch überführt das Modell eine bislang implizite Netzverantwortung in ein regulatorisch definiertes, handelbares Nutzungsrecht innerhalb einer regelgebundenen Wettbewerbsordnung. Seine Tragfähigkeit hängt davon ab, ob zwei Fehlerquellen institutionell beherrscht werden: die Marktmacht eines dominanten Anbieters im Creditmarkt und die Vereinnahmung der Bewertungsregel. |
| Abstract: | Open-access competition is bringing new long-distance rail services to high-demand routes. This is a welcome development from a competition-policy perspective, but it reveals an institutional problem: access to especially attractive paths is only weakly connected to the network contributions generated by other long-distance rail services. This paper proposes a track-credit scheme as a rule-bound allocation framework. Scarce premium paths require credits, while network-complementary services generate them. Valuation rests on observable transport outputs, not on the historical costs of an incumbent operator. The scheme converts an implicit network contribution into a regulatorily defined, tradable usage right within a rule-bound competitive order, provided two failure modes, incumbent market power and capture of the scoring rule, are contained. |
| Keywords: | Schienenpersonenfernverkehr, Open Access, Trassenvergabe, handelbare Credits, Netzökonomie, Wettbewerbspolitik, long-distance rail, open access, slot allocation, tradable credits, network economics, competition policy |
| JEL: | L92 R48 D47 D23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343554 |
| By: | Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt |
| Abstract: | Railteam, an alliance of European high-speed operators, offers HOTNAT: passengers who miss a cross-border connection may board another member's next available train at no extra charge. The European Commission's May 2026 Passenger Package would extend passenger rights across multi-operator journeys, making HOTNAT's design a live question. Reciprocity saves transaction costs while claims roughly balance, but operators differ in network size, connecting traffic, frequency, reliability and the value of a spare seat. Without settlement, the operator causing a missed connection shifts part of the cost to whoever carries the passenger, weighing most heavily on small point-to-point operators. Attribution suffers too: the passenger meets the operator without a seat, not the one that caused the delay. When authorised passengers outnumber spare seats, no published rule decides who travels. Onward travel should stay free at the point of use. A flat, causation-based clearing tariff with netting and a published priority order would preserve that benefit, spread recovery costs neutrally and sharpen reliability incentives. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:formoe:344001 |
| By: | Matthew S. Johnson; David Levine; Michael W. Toffel |
| Abstract: | Regulatory inspections might affect entities nearby those inspected. Such spillovers are difficult to identify because regulators target inspections and neighboring establishments face correlated shocks. We exploit the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Site-Specific Targeting (SST) program, which generated quasi-random variation in inspections among workplaces with injury rates near a discrete cutoff. An SST inspection reduced injuries at uninspected same-ZIP-code establishments by an estimated 11 percent—an effect roughly as large as the direct effect on the inspected establishment. Because spillovers extend to multiple nearby establishments, they avert several times as many injuries as the inspection’s direct effect. |
| JEL: | I18 J28 L51 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35646 |