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on Regulation |
| By: | Paul Heidhues (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf); Johannes Johnen (CORE/LIDAM, Université catholique de Louvain); Botond Kőszegi (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of consumer-protection regulations limiting post-purchase harm when there are many markets and consumers have limited attention to examine prices or product features. Such regulation lowers the attention necessary for valuable purchases, which can allow a consumer to purchase in more markets, or serve to induce competition. The first benefit is most important when few markets are regulated, while the second emerges when regulatory scope is sufficiently broad to create “spare” — i.e., in equilibrium unused — attention. Because little spare attention can enforce competition in many markets, consumer welfare can be highly non-linear in regulatory scope. The benefits of regulating a market often accrue in other markets, and there is a sense in which overly tight regulation outperforms overly lax regulation. Broad consumer protection can help the economy reach productive efficiency, and when this is achieved less regulation may suffice. |
| Keywords: | Consumer protection, regulation, competition, participation, limited attention |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:383 |
| By: | Chi Kong Chyong; David Newbery |
| Keywords: | Variable renewable electricity, marginal curtailment, average curtailment, levelised cost of electricity, VRE support design |
| JEL: | L94 Q28 Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg2524 |
| By: | Michele Bisceglia (Center for Algorithms, Data, and Market Design at Yale (CADMY)); Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management); Fiona Scott Morton (Yale School of Management) |
| Abstract: | We study how privacy regulation affects menu pricing by a monopolist platform that collects and monetizes personal data. Consumers differ in privacy valuation and sophistication: naive users ignore privacy losses, while sophisticated users internalize them. The platform designs prices and data collection options to screen users. Without regulation, privacy allocations are distorted and naive users are exploited. Regulation through privacy-protecting defaults can create a market for information by inducing payments for data; hard caps on data collection protect naive users but may restrict efficient data trade. |
| Date: | 2025–11–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2474 |
| By: | Koski, Heli; Rouvinen, Petri |
| Abstract: | Abstract This report examines the global race for 5G and 6G leadership through a comparative analysis of regulation, R&D investment, patenting, and the rollout of next-generation networks and services across Europe, the United States, and Asia. The United States leads in digital services and semiconductors, while Asia dominates telecommunications infrastructure and hardware. Europe’s strengths lie in telecom equipment and specific semiconductor niches but remain too narrow to offset weaknesses in digital platforms and data-driven services. Patent data highlight Asia’s stronger position in 5G technologies, while R&D spending confirms U.S. leadership in areas less visible in patent counts yet vital for long-term innovation and value creation. Europe performs relatively well in 5G network deployment and services in some member states but lacks the scale in digital services and innovation ecosystems needed for global leadership. The EU’s comprehensive digital regulation has particularly strengthened privacy protection but risks constraining innovation. To remain a meaningful player in the 6G era, Europe must align its regulatory ambitions with its production and innovation capacities and its investment incentives. Without such recalibration, well-intentioned regulation may ultimately erode the competitiveness it seeks to protect. |
| Keywords: | 5G, 6G, Global markets, Regulation, Innovation capabilities, Patents, R&D |
| JEL: | O33 O38 O32 O57 L52 L96 L8 |
| Date: | 2025–12–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:report:170 |
| By: | Tomaso Duso; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | Trade conflicts, geopolitical tensions, digital disruption, and the climate crisis pose major challenges for the European Union (EU) and its member states. As called for in the Draghi Report, industrial policy measures can increase competitiveness, strengthen resilience, and facilitate the twin transformation. This article explores ways in which competition policy can be realigned to better accommodate industrial policy objectives. Using German competition law as a reference point, it presents options with which legislatures and competition authorities can respond to current challenges, reconcile conflicting objectives, and adapt the decision-making framework. It then considers elements of a competition-oriented industrial policy, understood as an evidence-based, targeted approach in which competition serves both as a guiding principle and as a control variable. |
| Keywords: | industrial policy, protection of competition, competition, regulation, competition policy, competitiveness, internal market |
| JEL: | L40 L50 L52 K21 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2145 |
| By: | Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler |
| Abstract: | A profit-maximizing monopolist curates a database for users seeking to learn a parameter. There are two user types: "Nowcasters" wish to learn the parameter's current value, while "forecasters" target its long-run value. Data storage involves a constant marginal cost. The monopolist designs a menu of contracts described by fees and data-access levels. The profit-maximizing menu offers full access to historical data, while current data is fully provided to nowcasters but may be withheld from forecasters. Compared to the social optimum, the monopolist keeps too much historical data, too little current data, and may store too much data overall. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.00897 |
| By: | Koski, Heli; Rouvinen, Petri |
| Abstract: | Abstract The focus of next-generation mobile network development has shifted from infrastructure to data, software, and innovation ecosystems. Leading firms are expanding their R&D investments most rapidly in digital services and semiconductors, while R&D in telecommunications infrastructure has grown more slowly. At the same time, global technological leadership has increasingly concentrated in the United States and Asia. Europe’s share has declined across nearly all domains central to 5G and 6G technologies, and its position in data-driven innovation, software, and commercial scaling has weakened. The EU’s digital regulation has become a double-edged sword: it strengthens privacy and consumer protection but simultaneously increases the costs of innovation and business growth, particularly in data-intensive sectors. Competitiveness in the 6G era will require a balance between regulation, innovation, and investment. Europe must strengthen the conditions for data utilization and ease regulatory constraints that hinder innovation. In the long term, competitiveness will depend not only on the creation of new firms but also on Europe’s ability to grow and sustain its own global players that can create value across the key layers of the data-driven economy. |
| Keywords: | 5G, 6G, Global markets, Regulation, Innovation capabilities, Patents, R&D |
| JEL: | E62 E63 H30 |
| Date: | 2025–12–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:briefs:169 |
| By: | Brühl, Volker |
| Abstract: | The European Green Deal (EGD) has the intention to transform the EU into a sustainable, resource efficient and competitive economy, ensuring zero net emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2050. This article illustrates the complex regulatory architecture of the EGD, which is often overlooked. While each of the initiatives is reasonable, their combined impact - often reinforcing each other - could impede Europe's global competitiveness, especially in a fragile economic environment. There are some fields where a thoughtful discussion about implementation deadlines and reporting requirements could help to resolve trade-offs between environmental objectives and competitiveness. |
| Keywords: | European Green Deal, Regulatierung, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, European Green Deal, Regulation, Competitiveness |
| JEL: | A10 K20 L50 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfswop:333951 |
| By: | Francisco Amaral (University of Zurich - Department Finance; Swiss Finance Institute); Steffen Zetzmann (University of Mannheim) |
| Abstract: | We study how energy price shocks transmit through segmented housing markets. Using German rental listings from 2015 to 2024, we show that higher energy prices are capitalized into rents only in high-rent segments, where elastic demand pressures landlords to reduce rents for inefficient units. In low-rent segments, characterized by less elastic demand and tight markets, rents do not adjust, leaving low-income households to bear the full increase in energy bills. As a result, total housing costs for low-income households rise three times more than for high-income households when energy prices increase, amplifying existing inequality. |
| Keywords: | Housing Markets, Energy Prices, Climate Change, Inequality |
| JEL: | R31 Q41 Q54 D31 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp25101 |
| By: | Jamasb, Tooraj (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Llorca, Manuel (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Rossetto, Nicolò (Florence School of Regulation (FSR), European University Institute (EUI), Italy); Schmitt, Laurent (Digital4Grids, France, and dcbel, Canada); Smilgins, Aleksandrs (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School) |
| Abstract: | The digitalisation of the energy sector is giving rise to energy data spaces that aim to support secure, interoperable, and sovereign data sharing among stakeholders. While the focus has mainly been on technical aspects of data spaces, the economic dimensions, particularly the allocation of costs, are underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by examining principles and methods for cost allocation. We review ongoing European initiatives for energy data sharing and discuss how it can generate value while ensuring efficiency and fairness in cost allocation. We identify proportional and weighted proportional allocation rules as robust and implementable solutions. In addition, we briefly discuss governance options for fair access, data sovereignty, and economic sustainability, emphasising the complementary roles of public coordination and market mechanisms. We propose policy recommendations for a sustainable and equitable energy data ecosystem design in Europe: (i) the establishment of a single coordinating entity for a European energy data space, (ii) adoption of proportional cost allocation as default principle, (iii) distinguish between regulated and non-regulated exchanges, and (iv) incentivise early participation and data contribution. |
| Keywords: | Cost allocation; Data spaces; Economic sustainability; Energy sector; European policy. |
| JEL: | C70 D40 L90 Q40 |
| Date: | 2025–12–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2025_013 |
| By: | Juan Benvides (Feedesarrollo); Sergio Cabrales (Fedesarrollo) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se resumen los resultados de las Notas previas de la serie, se proponen principios de política energética y sobre el papel del gas en Colombia, se diagnostican y categorizan los problemas que deben resolverse en la cadena del gas natural, y se formulan recomendaciones. |
| Keywords: | Gas; Gas Natural; Política Energética; Transición Energética; Crecimiento Económico; Política Pública; Colombia |
| JEL: | L72 L95 O13 Q41 |
| Date: | 2025–11–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000124:021922 |